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All lovely tales that we have heard or read; 
An endless fountain of immortal drink, 
Pouring unto us from the heavens brink. 
Nor do we merely feel these essences 
For one short hour; . . .  . 
They must be always with us, or we die. 
John Keats, Endymion 
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Preface

In June, 1971, Professor Clarence Allen Forbes retired 
from the professorship of classics at the Ohio State Uni­
versity after more than fifty years of teaching classical 
subjects. In his honor a symposium was held at the uni­
versity on March 12 and 13, 1971, at which the papers 
gathered in this book were first presented; the contribu­
tors are colleagues, friends, and students of Professor 
Forbes, and their differing professional affiliations and 
approaches to the classics are in some measure an index 
of the wide range of Professor Forbes's own intellectual 
achievements. His record as a scholar may be gauged 
from the bibliography of his works; but in honoring 
him we chose to turn to his achievement as a teacher, who 
with learning and modesty brought alive classical liter­
atures and cultures for generations of students. 
The symposium owed its inception to the vision and 
encouragement of Professor Charles Babcock, who at the 
time of its planning was dean of the College of Human­
ities. We also acknowledge with gratitude the help and 
ix 
support of many of Professor Forbes's colleagues and 
friends; and special thanks are owed to Mr. Weldon 
A. Kefauver, director of the Ohio State University Press. 
Finally, a tribute may here be paid to Mrs. Clarence 
Forbes, who for half a century has supported and in­
spired her husband, and on the occasion of the sympo­
sium participated at his side. To them both we offer this 
book in happiness and gratitude. 
by Mark Morford 
Foreword 
Lass den Anfang mit dem Ende 
Sich in Eins zusammenziehn! 
Schneller als die Gegenstande 
Selber dich vorilberfliehen! 
Danke, dass die Gunst der Musen 
Unvergdngliches verheisst, 
Den Gehalt in deinem Busen 
Und die Form in deinem Geist.* 
Goethe, Bauer im Wechsel 
In honoring Clarence Forbes, we honor a teacher and 
scholar who exemplifies the timeless integrity that 
Goethe's poem describes. We honor a humanist whose 
life is inspired by a vision of objective verities, yet one 
who is humble enough to continue the never-ending 
search for Truth, so that his grasp of the "Form in his 
soul" becomes an instrument of motion and change. Few 
men of intellectual stature have the dynamic quality that 
"unites the beginning with the end"; for many Truth is 
clear and immutable, and their attitudes cannot be 
* "Let the beginning unite with the end; let yourself fly by 
more quickly than the objects; be thankful that the Muses in 
their goodness promise what cannot perish—the values in your 
breast and the Form in your soul." 
xi 
Xl  l 
changed. Others are rootless searchers, changeable and 
superficial. Only among the few who can know and yet 
inquire will be found the great teachers. 
It is tempting, in preparing a festschrift, to gather to­
gether a miscellaneous assemblage of contributions from 
the many friends, colleagues, and students of the recip­
ient. Such a book would be impressive in its broad dis­
play of humanism, but it would have little unity. We 
have chosen rather to limit our scope and, in a brief 
compass, to consider the permanence of the classical 
humanities through the vicissitudes of nearly two thou­
sand years of alternating decline and renaissance. Our 
approach is to some extent eclectic, inevitably, if we 
consider the range of our subject. Thus we have con­
centrated on but three periods of history (the fourth, the 
eighteenth, and the twentieth centuries), each repre­
senting a crucial stage for the classical tradition. Three 
of our contributions are written from a twentieth-century 
viewpoint, and in Professor McDonald's chapter we 
have the retrospective sweep of the historian to balance 
the more strictly contemporary perspectives of Profes­
sors Babcock and Rutledge. Whether we should share 
the optimism of the latter or should agree with Professor 
McDonald in his regret for the passing of the classical 
tradition, only time will show; that such a difference in 
attitudes is even possible argues, at least, against an 
ossified tradition and indicates a certain vitality in con­
temporary classicism. There will be less room for argu­
ment about the two periods of the past that we have 
considered here. Professor Seidlin shows us how "the 
intelligible forms of ancient poets" (the phrase is Cole-
ridge's) inspired German literary genius at the end of 
the eighteenth century, and in so doing he speaks elo­
quently for the benign influence of the classics upon the 
German romantic movement. Let us hope that he will 
Xl l  l 
have permanently disarmed the attitude of mind that 
could entitle a book The Tyranny of Greece over Ger­
many. Professor Heimann's study of Saint Jerome takes 
us back to the borderland of paganism and Christianity, 
when the classics could have become museum pieces, vis­
ible and useless like the inventions in the Erewhonian 
Book of the Machines; instead, the vitality of the clas­
sics and the genius, however imperfect, of Jerome and 
the Fathers like him transmuted them and saved them for 
a life that still continues. It is at this stage that the con­
cept of humanism underwent its most radical develop­
ment since the fifth century B.C., and we may well won­
der if we do not now stand at another parting of the 
ways. If we do, as Professor Babcock suggests, then we 
may take courage from that distant confrontation of the 
pagan classics and the Christian Fathers and hope that 
once again the classics will be a vital part of whatever 
new humanistic tradition emerges. 
Since the contributions gathered here were delivered 
orally at a symposium, the limitations of time compelled 
us to leave out significant stages in the history of the 
classical tradition. Professor McDonald touches com­
prehensively on the great classical renaissances of the 
Carolingian Age and of the Italian Renaissance, but the 
inquiring reader will nevertheless miss a more detailed 
consideration of those periods. The parallels between 
our own time and the eighth century are obvious and 
misleading. According to Sir Compton Mackenzie (as 
quoted in the Illustrated London News for April 25, 
1970, p. 13) "The time will come when . .  . it will 
indeed be a distinguished person who can read"—an 
ominous reminder of an earlier dark age. Few now study 
Latin, fewer still understand it, and Greek is virtually 
excluded from all but the most rarified levels of aca­
demic pursuits. Yet knowledge of the Greek and Roman 
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civilizations is more widespread than it ever has been, 
and the potential for spreading the classical humanities 
through the printed word and the media of mass com­
munication is there to be realized. The eighth century 
had its Alcuin and its Charlemagne who, although (in 
Gibbon's phrase) "his own studies were tardy, laborious 
and imperfect," yet was the patron of distinguished 
teachers and scholars and the unwavering supporter of 
education and its concomitant revival of learning. The 
scholar-teachers of our time no less need encouragement 
by the leaders of their society, who in a democracy must 
lead in response to the wishes and tastes of the people. 
The problem, then, of preserving an ancient and funda­
mental tradition is infinitely more complex, and its solu­
tion must depend even more on devoted and widespread 
education by the trustees of that tradition than on patron­
age by the rich and powerful, whether they are govern­
ments or individuals. 
The Italian Renaissance, like fifth-century Athens, is 
proof of the need for a commitment by society in general 
to humanistic ideals if those ideals are to be a part of a 
living educational and intellectual milieu. The patronage 
of the Church and the wealthy could not alone have en­
abled a Petrarch or a Poggio to revitalize classical learn­
ing, without a more generally favorable climate of opin­
ion. In the limited society of the city-state, where a single 
man or family could sway the whole people, these favor­
able conditions were brought into existence with com­
parative ease. Yet the task is not impossible with a mod­
ern democracy living in the post-McLuhan age. If we, as 
classical humanists, conceive our task to be merely the 
conservation of the classical tradition, we shall betray 
our trust, and our studies will inevitably be the preserve 
of an elite, to many of whom the classical languages and 
cultures will be as much a social passport as an intellec­
tual stimulus. This has already proved to be the case in 
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some European countries, where the end result may yet 
be the elevation of the classics to the status of museum 
exhibits. On the other hand, if we conceive our mission 
to be the vitalizing of the educational and intellectual 
life of society, then our opportunities are limitless if our 
courage is great and we have imagination to match it. 
For "democratic" in education need not mean acceptance 
of the lowest common denominator, and the instruments 
of mass communication need not be the enemies of lib­
eral studies but their potent allies. 
It is here that Goethe's unity of the beginning and the 
end falls into place. The classical teacher and scholar 
is uniquely equipped to speak to the modern age in its 
own terms though his own intellectual foundations are 
laid in that distant past which is itself the basis of west­
ern culture. His humanism interprets the human ideal in 
terms that change from age to age while always drinking 
from the endless fountain of classical antiquity. Greek 
humanism was adopted by Rome; Roman humanism 
fused with Christianity; the Frankish barbarians gave 
new life to classical literature; the Italian Renaissance 
rediscovered the literature, thought, and art of the 
Greeks and Romans and used them as a living part of 
contemporary cultural life; the German romantics and 
their contemporaries were equally true to the classical 
ideal and, at the same time, were men of their own time. 
In our time the opportunities and obstacles are as great 
as in the times of those earlier challenges; it is the priv­
ilege, and the challenge, of the classical teacher to show 
to his contemporaries the unchanging values that under­
lie an ever changing culture. The true classicist is he 
who, like Blake's bard, "present, past and future sees," 
and with integrity unites his knowledge of the truths of 
the past with a sympathetic understanding of the chang­
ing present. 

The Endless Fountain 
Essays on Classical Humanism 

by Charles L. Babcock 
I 
The Classics and the New Humanism 
"Is the present moment the portent of a new epoch of 
history, a new age of humanity, a new sort of humanism, 
a new type of man?" 1 The question is John Courtney 
Murray's concerning the future of humanistic education; 
and from his question, I have taken the New Humanism 
of my title. Any person with a background in the humani-
ties—indeed, most persons trained in what we have 
called the liberal arts—will recognize that I have delib­
erately chosen to speak of the classics in relation to a 
concept whose ultimate definition is likely to rest with 
the individual. The pluralistic nature of our educational 
system may justify this intentional vagueness, but, even 
more, the scope of any concept developed on the root 
human- demands it. I have therefore resisted the tempta­
tion to use the term humanities for the compelling reason 
that within the framework of higher education we are in 
a continuing crisis of definition of the humanities and 
their place in that framework. The educational humani­
ties will not be far from my thinking, as you will see, but 
the concern will be more with their implication than with 
their curricular position. 
An additional prefatory note will reveal where some 
early thoughts were leading. I first submitted as a title 
"The Classics as the New Humanism," and then modi­
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fied my intent by shifting from as to and under a clutch 
of pressures among which can be discerned practicality, 
candidness, reasonable doubt, and some timidity. 
We are witnessing the emergence of a New Humanism 
as perhaps the most vital educational force in our pres­
ent experience. It is educational because it emanates in 
good part from those whose age places them within or 
just beyond our years of formal education, or from those 
who play some role in formal education. It is educational 
because it seeks to define, analyze, and make persuasive 
and finally effective a set of ideas and accompanying 
data designed to improve our performance as members 
of society. It is educational because in its very emer­
gence it is teaching us something about ourselves, our 
institutions, and our future. 
The New Humanism is no single force attributable 
solely to a simplistic credo, a uniform group of doc­
trines, an accepted body of texts, or one articulate and 
persuasive spokesman, although it benefits from, or is 
hampered by, all of these at times. It is, rather, an atti­
tude, a concern, a questioning, a criticism, a searching, a 
determination. Although many of its origins are in edu­
cation, it has roots in, and surely now pervades, politics, 
religion, business, and society—in fact, defying such 
compartmentalization, all parts of our lives. If any one 
thing unites it, it would be a central issue throughout 
that puts the focus on man, social and individual, as he 
relates to his environment, physical and social (taking 
this last word as inclusive of all the man-made systems 
that affect the individual in his living). New? Certainly 
not. Humanism? By any broad definition. New Human­
ism? If it succeeds, as it has dramatically in the past 
decade, in requiring two generations to pause, to take 
stock of themselves and their attitudes, to revise their 
relationships one to the other, and to affirm the humanity 
of their goals. Yes. New Humanism. 
In 1972 I need do little to fill in the outline suggested 
above, for we are all affected by this force and are in­
escapably a part of it. Because of this involvement, 
however, the historical portion of Father Murray's ques­
tion must be approached with caution; and the observer 
must recognize that he looks from within, even as a part 
of, a series of events. He must therefore content himself 
with the role of reporter, denied the advantage of per­
spective and the possibility of objectivity essential to 
the historian. John P. Roche, warning against the "in­
stant historians" of the Kennedy-Johnson years, reminds 
us impressively of the limitation imposed by our very 
contemporariness: 
To be specific, I doubt that any historically valid treatment 
of the Kennedy-Johnson era can emerge for at least another 
decade, if then. I confess that when I emerged from the 
White House I signed up to do an "insider volume," but sober, 
professional second thoughts have led me to put that project 
on ice until at least 1980. The problem is that I simulta­
eously know too much, but not enough. I know what I 
thought was happening, what others on the staff thought was 
happening, what the press thought was happening. But I 
cannot fully document what happened. And I have seen 
enough highly classified documents to know that what most 
of the observers thought was happening was at best half-
right.2 
And yet, like the political strategists, those of us in 
education who are observers and participants in recent 
developments have not the choice to wait "at least 
another decade" to assess what is happening and then 
make the appropriately wise decisions. We are a part of 
a process that has generally prospered by a self-imposed 
and self-regulated slowness to change and that has prided 
itself on a conservative attitude because of confidence in 
what it was preserving. Suddenly (as time has been 
understood in our world), our process of change must be 
accelerated and probably altered. And how ill-equipped 
we are for either acceleration or alteration is demon­
strated by the frustrations besetting the efforts of ad­
ministrative and curricular bodies in all our institutions. 
Because we must recognize the force of the New Hu­
manism and use its criticisms and its suggestions in pro­
viding a current education that does not ignore the past 
and does prepare for the future, in some way we must 
again be convinced of the validity of now and of what we 
do now, despite our inability to assess its consequences. 
Perhaps Hannah Arendt has described our time in a 
comment that seems also to respond to Father Murray, 
when she notes the circular movement from thought to 
action and back to thought that has dominated the earlier 
generations of this century: 
Whereby it would be of some relevance to notice that the 
appeal to thought arose in the odd in-between period which 
sometimes inserts itself into historical time when not only 
the later historians but the actors and witnesses, the living 
themselves, become aware of an interval in time which is 
altogether determined by things that are no longer and by 
things that are not yet. In history, these intervals have shown 
more than once that they contain the moment of truth.8 
Many who are critical of education today would be 
happy with the formulation "things that are no longer" 
and would be glad to grasp "things that are not yet" as 
an immediate goal, say, for tomorrow. But to some ex­
tent our generation of educators may best be able to play 
the activist role being forced upon it by accepting Miss 
Arendt's "odd in-between period" as descriptive of our 
time. The fact that our predecessors often must have 
felt justified in seeking similar solace or stimulus in the 
face of their seemingly overwhelming obstacles should 
not deny us our brief moment of assumed uniqueness. 
The call to us for action has been loud, often raucous, 
usually uncompromising, and too frequently violent. It 
has been dismissed as immature, illogical, irrational, 
impossible, and unwise, and yet for whatever reasons, 
and some of them may be less than admirable, we and 
our institutions are responding to the call for change in 
structure, and our academic bodies are beginning to ac­
celerate the metamorphosis that has been their natural 
continuing state, no matter how the critics may assume 
that for their generation change has stopped or is too 
agonizingly slow. We are far enough into this process 
to see at work some of the stabilizing tensions, a polari­
zation between those for whom no change can be fast 
enough and those for whom any change is at the least 
questionable, and the emergence, at least for a while, of 
a kind of progressive conservatism that may, if given 
the opportunity, bring about the necessary changes. Ac­
ceptance of criticism has been remarkable—indeed, I 
consider it the most remarkable and least appreciated 
part of the whole unsettling process. The need for change 
and the recognition that much in our system is subject to 
legitimate criticism have now become canonical first 
statements for spokesmen of nearly all parts of the spec­
trum. Only after these axiomatic professions do the 
differences in substance, method, or degree reveal a 
continuing state of perplexity. 
Let me narrow our consideration to the process of 
liberal education to which our colleges of arts and 
sciences in American higher education have addressed 
themselves. Assessing the qualities of leadership in an 
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academic speech of 1913, Viscount Haldane, then Lord 
Chancellor, provides a remarkable condensation of the 
goals of liberal education as we have understood them. 
Noting that "youth, with its elasticity and boundless 
energy, is the time to lay the foundations of wide knowl­
edge and catholic interests," he says: 
Every man and woman is, after all, a citizen in a State. 
Therefore let us see to it that there is not lacking that interest 
in the larger life of the social whole which is the justification 
of a real title to have a voice and a vote. Literature, philos­
ophy, religion, are all widening interests. So is science, so 
are music and the fine arts. Let every one concern himself 
with these or such of them as he thinks can really appeal to 
him. So only will his outlook be wide enough to enable him 
to fill his station and discharge his duties with distinction. He 
ought to be master of much knowledge besides that of his 
profession. He must try to think greatly and widely.4 
Some of us who have tried to write catalog statements 
about the purpose of a liberal education and the goal of 
the bachelor of arts degree could have profited from 
Lord Haldane's presence. This is what we have professed 
as our goal and have hoped we were accomplishing in 
liberal arts training. The motto of my own university, 
which scarcely limits itself to the liberal arts in its offer­
ings, says it simply: Disciplina in civitatem. 
But apparently we have not succeeded in providing 
our educative goals with a structure or an attitude that 
insured their accomplishment by our students. So we 
are being told, and large numbers of us are accepting 
the criticism as valid. Arland F. Christ-Janer, president 
of the College Board, encapsules the indictment in an 
examination of future priorities for the board: 
The harsh reality is that people are fed up with abstractions 
which cannot be seen as relevant to intellectual, spiritual, 
and visceral needs. Right for the role of education is the 
enhancement of the future and mankind's place in it. The 
future is filled with unsureness. Too often it cannot be 
adequately perceived. 
At the present, the educational system is thought of as 
inadequate to the necessary preparation for a future which 
contains the marvelous and sometimes overwhelming con­
stant of rapid change. In reaction to criticisms we have be­
come preoccupied with the present moment, and we are 
overlooking the unavoidable insistence of the future. As a 
result, the educational institutions are living with too short 
and narrow a perspective as they develop their programs of 
study and education. To be sure, there are those who insist 
that it is only the present that matters. These voices must be 
resisted, for they tend to prevent the educational institutions 
from their larger mission, which is to chart the way into the 
future and in some sense to live in that future.5 
If that future is to be shaped by our current awareness 
of our dilemma, as it is thus bluntly set down, what kinds 
of modification can we envision? I use modification 
pointedly, and I am well aware that it may seem to some 
to be an inadequate response, for it may imply little ad­
justment and guarantees only some degree of change. It 
is not a revolutionary word, and there are those who feel 
sincerely, and express forcefully, the need for such 
sweeping educational change that only revolutionary 
aptly describes it. To justify such an apparently bland 
word, I would suggest two reasons. The first is practical: 
the mass is too large to tolerate quick, drastic changes 
without repercussions in the development of several stu­
dent generations. The second is perhaps emotional, but I 
prefer to think of it as intellectual as well: the system 
has worked and has such a weight of soundness in it that 
I believe those student generations need not be disrupted. 
My generation and those before mine have benefited 
almost beyond conception from the American commit­
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ment to education. And this is more than middle-aged 
complacency; it is frank admiration for a system mat 
has through educational opportunity achieved for a na­
tion of immigrants much more than the most visionary 
shaper of its beginnings could have imagined. Lest I 
sound inanely starry-eyed, I am well aware that Amer­
ican education has had to endure enormous strain to ac­
complish its charge, which Henry Steele Commager 
phrases thus: 
The story is familiar, how, especially in the nineteenth cen­
tury, we required our schools to train citizens competent to 
govern themselves (a requirement not urgent in the Old 
World), to absorb and Americanize millions of newcomers 
from the Old World and elsewhere, to encourage and 
strengthen national unity, and to teach the habits and prac­
tices of democracy and equality and religious tolerance.6 
If the charge now requires a different emphasis, and 
Commager develops the theory that our schools may be a 
victim in the twentieth century of their success in the 
nineteenth, I am not prepared to accept that the whole 
fabric must be scrapped and a new one substituted. Edu­
cation, after all, combines a fiduciary with a hermeneutic 
role, and these are particularly qualities of the liberal 
arts. In fact, they are the primary qualities of the edu­
cational humanities. Part of the trust implied is histor­
ical and part is strikingly contemporary. A provocative 
reminder of this mixed trust is set down by R. J. Kauf­
mann: 
Humanists seem to me most authentic when they resist being 
exhausted by mere historicity. There is something balky 
about us; a brand of holy stupidity obliges us to ask ques­
tions about what has been left out of persuasive social syn­
theses. We are frequently off to one side giving artificial 
1]

respiration to qualities of experience which, being under­
valued in the contemporary ethos, slip into a limbo where 
all those things not easily "conceived" undergo the prag­
matic equivalent of historical death. . . . Bluntly, humanists 
are people delegated to articulate and service an ecology of 
survival values.7 
I like the abrasiveness of these qualifying remarks on 
humanists, and they seem to me to strike just the right 
note of stimulation to those professing the humanities. 
Much of the strength of our position will lie in the his­
torical experience of which we are both guardians and 
purveyors, but our worth is to be found in our success 
in offering the values engendered by that experience to 
the generations of the future. Since the classics have long 
been central to humanistic learning and teaching, and 
since Kaufmann's remarks could be read by some as a 
justification for the sidelining of the humanities, the 
classicist in particular should recognize in these remarks 
the limitations they suggest and the very positive results 
implicit in their conclusion. 
At least four facets of this century's educational trend 
provide useful perspectives to the present position of the 
classics. In large part they are factors of the years fol­
lowing World War II, but the longer view is more per­
tinent. First, education has extended upward and out­
ward to embrace incredible numbers of students and to 
take a spiraling percentage of them to its upper levels. 
Second, the liberal arts, which were traditionally domi­
nant in the curricula of secondary and higher education, 
survived the impact of the land-grant institutions but 
have had to share the field increasingly with technical, 
vocational, and professional programs. Third, the scien­
tific explosion has provided a major impulse toward the 
scientizing of all disciplines, and the humanities have 
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worked hard to develop scientific structure and method. 
Finally, and perhaps as a direct result of all the above, 
specialization has for some years shaped the curriculum, 
the preparation of the teacher, and the preoccupation of 
teacher and student alike at the higher levels of the sys­
tem. These facets of substance, size, method, and ap­
proach have become our facts of life; they represent 
defensible—in part, admirable—developments. The 
greater proportion of students educated reflects much 
credit on our democratic system; we have much need for 
the product of the more practical educational programs; 
systematization of knowledge, implied in "scientizing," 
is a practical aid to the analysis and presentation of that 
knowledge; the specialist should be more equipped to 
command and present his material than the person less 
specialized. But a part of the criticism I have attributed 
to the New Humanism asserts that much of the resulting 
education now fails to meet the needs of present and fu­
ture generations. Part of the complaint is that the factors 
of size, substance, method, and approach as shaped by 
these trends have effected a dehumanizing of the process, 
the goals, and the results. And it follows that, if educa­
tion is neither humane nor human, then the system that 
offers it must be wrong and much be changed. 
If change is thus posited as a necessity, and we seem 
to be accepting that it is in some degree, what of the 
classics? How are they to assist in that change to assure 
the best results for the student, the most promising route 
to the broader goals of humanistic education? 
We have already begun to take the first mandatory 
step as agents for this change and in response to the 
curricular imperatives that have in part anticipated it. 
In the years since the classics relinquished their absolute 
hold on higher education, we have begun to find ways to 
offer the experience of the classics to many students for 
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whom the approach is made only through their own lan­
guage. Although the classicist had long recognized that 
new translations of the classics were needed for new gen­
erations of readers, and although distinguished new ver­
sions of Homer and Vergil made these classics available 
to the general reader as masterworks, defenders of the 
traditional curriculum came late to the acceptance of 
the classics in translation as a legitimate part of the 
formal educational experience. That acceptance was 
mainly a pragmatic one. With a few exceptions it came 
in the aftermath to the academic revolution that saw the 
elimination of requirements in the ancient languages 
as the foundation for an undergraduate liberal educa­
tion, and the development of the broad areas of human­
ities, social sciences, and physical, or natural, sciences 
as the new structural basis for that education. The history 
of that modification is well documented, as is the com­
pensatory modification in our offerings. I would only 
note that the modification in classical offerings contin­
ued apace during that remarkable period of numerical 
expansion in higher education that followed World War 
II, and at a time when students were electing the lan­
guages in gratifying numbers if in less gratifying per­
centages. As classicists, we applied the benefits of our 
unexpected status as a defense-oriented discipline to the 
professional levels of our work, and perhaps thereby set 
back the effectiveness of our general education, to which 
we clearly felt less commitment, even at times when de­
mands on general classics courses seemed often beyond 
our ability to meet. 
Statistics are available to show that at most levels of 
instruction in the classical languages, numbers are static 
or decreasing (such pleasant exceptions as rising elec­
tions in beginning Greek cannot counter this). At the 
same time, there is healthy interest in our courses that do 
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not require the languages, courses in the literatures in 
translation, in civilization, in mythology, and the like. 
The local status of language requirements and of general 
distribution requirements that include a humanities seg­
ment is a significant factor in the assessment of these 
fluctuations, but it should not conceal the continuing rec­
ognition by succeeding generations of students that the 
classics provide a stimulating and productive educa­
tional experience. 
An obvious concurrent shift is now suggesting itself 
in response to the concern about specialization. In his 
personal and professional commitment, the classicist is 
having to realize that he has been almost too successful 
in that trend toward specialization and systematization 
of his discipline, which I have called "scientizing." So 
successful, in fact, that he has come dangerously close 
to professing his subject in ways that justified the charge 
of dehumanization. All too often we have become spe­
cialists in a narrowing fashion, have found our best 
teaching experiences in the technically oriented course 
of restricted and usually advanced material, and have 
gained our rewards from the scholarly development of 
such specialization. The resultant imbalance, both in the 
individual scholar and in the presentation of the classics 
to students, has been recognized for some time; in dis­
torted form it became an issue in the postwar contro­
versy dubbed "publish or perish." In outcome, however, 
our constituents began to feel that we thought it more 
important to stress the language and its technicalities or 
its variations than to consider what was being said in 
that language and what it might mean to them. An over­
generalization, perhaps, but the fact remains that we 
classicists shared in this criticism to an unfortunate de­
gree with our fellow disciplines in the liberal arts. Al­
ways excepting the personal intellectual rapport between 
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teacher and student, we seemed to be inviting commit­
ment to a science and not a culture, to structural analy­
sis rather than communication, to systematics rather than 
an appreciation of our intellectual ancestry, and to insti­
tutions devoid of the people who created them or whom 
they served. 
Gerald Else, one of our most able and balanced of 
classical spokesmen among educators and politicians, 
recently noted that even into our century the humanities 
were the classics as we think of them. The change in out­
look just mentioned can be highlighted with his interpre­
tation of the aims of the old humanities, the classics, 
beyond the verbal study: 
Yet language was not the be-all and end-all of the old 
humanities, at least in their best periods. I will assert that 
they had three modes or points of impact, each with its own 
educational purpose: first, they worked in and through lan­
guage, aiming to develop educated taste; second, they 
worked with and on the mind, aiming to develop educated 
judgment and persuasiveness; and third, they operated in 
and upon the whole man, aiming to make him a moral per­
son and a responsible citizen or political leader—in other 
words, a free man.8 
Else is saying here that the classicist's role as humanistic 
educator is essentially the role described by Lord Hal­
dane. Horace summed it up most neatly in his comment 
on the role of poets in Ars Poetica 333: aut prodesse 
volunt aut declectare poetae. 
In his essay De officiis Cicero, one of the great human­
ists, dwelt on a philosophical distinction not new to him 
but characteristic of ancient and modern value systems 
alike: quid utile and quid dulce, what is useful and what 
is pleasant. So also the Roman concerned himself much 
with what he ought to do, quid decet, and what was 
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morally (that is, by divine sanction) right or wrong, fas 
or nefas. Ethical systems from Socrates in Plato to 
Alfred North Whitehead and Paul Tillich have sought 
such understanding of man's social responsibility to him­
self and to his fellow, and have questioned social, politi­
cal, or educational structures that seem to have eschewed 
that responsibility in their pattern of growth or success. 
The best of the questions we are being asked by our 
students now are certainly moral questions. They stem 
from a vital concern for personal identity, for conscious­
ness of self, and for self-in-society. This concern is not 
new. What is new, and hence the concept of New Human­
ism, is that young people now are transferring that self-
searching to an intensive look at the system, whatever 
manifestation of it they may see, and asking how it aids 
or hinders the human values they seek in themselves 
and for others. In their own way they have espoused a 
form of Roman humanitas, looking for that combina­
tion of moral and intellectual excellence and that breadth 
of personal viewpoint fundamental to the Roman ideal. 
They are saying what we as classical humanists have 
been saying but perhaps not practicing convincingly: 
that technical skills are essentially mnemonic, and that 
thought and character are developed only through broad 
experience; that human relations may well be fostered 
by technical skills, but they can survive only if moral and 
intellectual excellence and commitment show the way. 
Young people question that such a goal can be achieved 
in education through the course distribution or general 
requirements and ask for a near-total permissiveness in 
the curricular package as their prescription for its 
achievement. In the end they resent the normative tenor 
of the older generation and criticize the essentially de­
scriptive limitations we have placed on the process of 
education. Despite the rhetoric of the individual that has 
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recently been dominant, there is clearly a moral thrust in 
the New Humanism that should respond to a liberal edu­
cation, if that education can reassert the values that 
shaped it to the present generation. The militant critics 
have forced these considerations; but we have noted 
widespread support and acceptance of their criticisms 
and concern for a reassessment of priorities, of moral 
values, of courses of public action and private activity, 
and, ultimately, for a redefinition of individual and cor­
porate responsibilities and goals. The whole educational 
system stands accused, but if the humanistic attitudes of 
present students shape the accusation, then those disci­
plines most surely endowed with humanistic potential 
and tradition must look to themselves and face what 
0. Meredith Wilson has written of as "The Dilemma of 
Humanistic Education": "Humanistic education has 
been engrossed with the problem of how best to sharpen 
the intellect. By what means do we help our child to ful­
fill his 'human potential'?" 9 
Let me juxtapose two ideas mentioned earlier, the 
fiduciary and hermeneutic qualities of education—and, 
in particular, of humanistic education—when brought to 
bear on what Professor Kaufmann called the humanist's 
delegated task, articulation of an ecology of survival 
values. Appreciation of this confluence should remind 
the classicist of the quality of his subject, its incredible 
breadth, its proven value-oriented potential, and its claim 
on the meaning of the adjective that describes it, classi­
cus. I need not rehearse the canon of what we have to 
offer in the way of idea, literary form, cultural and 
social institution, humanity and inhumanity, logic and 
faith. The list is long, exciting, varying, and universally 
useful. Yes, Cicero's utile happily combines with his 
duke, as does Horace's prodesse with his delectare, if 
we remember that we are dealing with the values of our 
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heritage. Those values cannot be allowed the luxury of 
somnolence or burial even in an era when we are bom­
barded daily with such an overwhelming number of new 
facts and interpretations that yesterday and tomorrow 
have to fight for attention. If we as classical humanists 
are trustees and interpreters of the past, then we must 
not let the present's seeming unwillingness or inability 
to hear obscure the universal values that we are trans­
mitting. These works "of the first class" have not only 
created our ideas and our vocabulary for their use, but 
they have taught us how to develop, warp, or reject them. 
Their values are those by which we live, or, if you will, 
those against which we rebel. The manner by which our 
instruction imparts this concept will vary. Because of 
the vitality of the cultures of antiquity and the unceasing 
pertinence of what they have given us, there is a natural 
danger in the process of interpretation, as noted by 
David Porter: 
I have much sympathy for the demand of our students that 
their education be relevant to their lives, but the problem is 
far more complex than they sometimes realize. Nothing is 
easier, to take an obvious example, than to make the Trojan 
Women relevant to American involvement in Vietnam, and 
few classes do not respond to such a treatment. The difficulty 
is that by making this connection, provocative in itself, we 
may suggest to our students that this alone is significant 
about the play, whereas the fact is that the Trojan Women 
is still with us precisely because its significance transcends 
any one time or place, be it 415 B.C. or 1970 A.D. Thus, the 
real danger is that by stressing the particular relevance of the 
Classics to our time we may unintentionally obscure the even 
more important fact of their general relevance to all times 
and places.10 
The relevant is so often not recognized at the time, 
perhaps in part because its importance is essentially 
19 
individual and only by educated transferal is it applic­
able to broader social concerns. The humanist must 
constantly rethink his teaching with this in mind, return 
constantly to the great issues and suppress all but the 
necessary deviations therefrom that may form the cur­
rent excitement of his research and therefore should 
breathe life into his teaching. The scientized humanities 
can become the trivialized humanities. But we must also 
remember that relevance, real value, cannot in the flower­
ing of man's mind be confined to those areas that allow 
immediate and practical application. Relevance, if it is 
to strengthen the culture that can improve itself, must 
allow for the detailed and seemingly narrow examination 
of man's accomplishments and mistakes, putting the 
puzzle of man's human strengths and weaknesses to­
gether. Then can the humanist contribute to the self-
understanding students seek, and then can he satisfy 
both the urge to know and to understand, in which ethical 
choice is always at question, and the responsibility to 
serve, whether in the transmission of knowledge and the 
interpretation of principles or in the extension of a help­
ing hand to a staggering individual or society. 
Loren Eiseley, a marvelously sensitive interpreter of 
the human experience and an able anthropologist, has 
some sensible words about the misconception of aca­
demic relevance. He is speaking of one of his professors, 
whose own awakening to the field of anthropology he has 
just described: 
I absorbed much from him, though I hasten to make the 
reluctant confession that he was considerably beyond thirty. 
Most of what I learned was gathered over cups of coffee in 
a dingy campus restaurant. What we talked about were 
things some centuries older than either of us. Our common 
interest lay in snakes, in scapulimancy, and other forgotten 
rites of benighted forest hunters. 
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I have always regarded this man as an extraordinary 
individual, in fact, a hidden teacher. But alas, it is all now 
so old-fashioned. We never protested the impracticality of 
his quaint subjects. He was an excellent canoeman, but he 
took me to places where I fully expected to drown before 
securing my degree. To this day, fragments of his unused 
wisdom remain stuffed in some back attic of my mind. Much 
of it I have never found an opportunity to employ, yet it 
has somehow colored my whole adult existence.11 
Loren Eiseley is one whose career and talents might 
well guide us in relating the classics to the world of 
education in which we now live and the direction of 
which we hope to influence. Eiseley fits, as well as any 
person I have known, the definition of a modern Renais­
sance man, one who has broad interests and has been 
able to develop his knowledge in a number of areas well 
beyond the superficial. He is a scientist and a humanist, 
and he has found a medium for expression of each capac­
ity that denies the individuality of neither and demon­
strates that there is no mutual exclusion in either. His 
literary competence is of the highest order, his scientific 
accomplishment matches it, and his books combine the 
two admirably. His whole career has been academic, and 
yet he has managed to talk of the ordinary experience of 
growing up and wondering about nature and people in 
terms that combine philosophical and anthropological 
depth with poetic beauty. 
I dwell on Eiseley for two reasons. First, he demon­
strates in his own personal achievement and in his intel­
lectual qualities what I believe we should have in our 
educational thinking: the retreat from the exclusiveness 
of specialization into the more productive climate 
wherein the specialist recognizes his responsibility to the 
general needs of society and works toward the reuniting 
of the disciplines to that end. Second, if we in the classics 
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are to profess our field fairly in such a climate, we must 
alter our training patterns in such ways as to produce a 
modern Renaissance man of Eiseley's type as the classi­
cist for the future. These two assessments are not neces­
sarily to he separated. They seem to me to be extensions 
of what the academic classicist has been doing in the 
past, from which he has allowed the climate and the 
pressures of mid-twentieth-century education to distract 
him. 
Lord Snow's celebrated "two cultures" have in recent 
years been subjected to much scrutiny. Few question that 
one "does" science and the arts in different ways, but 
there is much question about the artificiality of the self-
imposed separation between the scientist and the artist 
or the humanist. Werner Heisenberg has recently at­
tempted to demonstrate the humanistic milieu in which 
he and such scientists as Bohr, Planck, Fermi, and Ein­
stein evolved the physics that has so deeply affected our 
lives.12 In another area, the chemist Roger Williams 
pleads for a closer relationship between biology and be­
havioral science by arguing from a biological stand­
point that "the recognition of the uniqueness of human 
minds is essential to human understanding." 13 And yet 
only a short time ago, as I prefer to view it, when in 
1941, I was a freshman at Berkeley, there was still 
amusement that psychology had been legitimized by be­
ing inscribed in monumental letters on a building com­
pleted less than a decade earlier to house the life 
sciences. How many of us remember psychology as a 
life science within our educational experience? 
The New Humanism, I believe, has challenged us to 
remember that education has become overcompartmen­
talized, that these separations, though potentially valu­
able for the isolation of fact and the securing of tech­
nological advance, run the risk of failing the student and 
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the society that he represents by neglecting the reintegra­
tion of knowledge thus achieved for the individual and 
social good. Cannot science and the humanities reunite 
in education to achieve again something of the common 
sense that would not separate them in antiquity? Surely 
the reason for the remarkable preference shown for the 
social and behavioral sciences by students these days is 
not the joy they find in quantified data but their belief 
that these areas of study are humane in the best sense 
of the word and that they have the ultimate interest of 
individual and social man as their purpose. Have we in 
the humanities not lost our purpose if that degree of 
humaneness is not pellucid in our teaching? 
If we are too compartmentalized, is interdisciplinary 
activity a remedy? In part it surely is, and the classics 
have long been interdisciplinary in their offerings. The 
classicist who is not at least a cultivated amateur in 
history, archaeology, art, and philosophy is not whole. 
Although literature has been central to our discipline, 
we, as interpreters of civilizations and cultures, have 
been led into a variety of neighboring disciplines and 
have been required to speak with at least modest ex­
pertise as we look at, say, economic or technological 
aspects of the ancient world. But perhaps we have been 
too hesitant in advancing beyond the frontiers of the 
humanities as we have looked for interdisciplinary rela­
tionships to which our insights might contribute. The 
University of Michigan's Center for Ancient and Modern 
Studies has certainly shown the way in expanding the 
interfacing of the classical humanities with the social 
and behavioral sciences. Studies of ancient science and 
technology are becoming more frequent, and they are 
not limited to the admirable aegis of the historian of 
science; many are written by classicists drawn to them 
from literary problems. The political scientist is surely 
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as natural a colleague for the interdisciplinary classicist 
as is the philosopher or the specialist in another liter­
ature. The excited response of the engineer or the pre­
medical student or the physicist or the sociologist to the 
newly discovered world of antiquity in a course in Greek 
or Roman civilization has offered us the challenge. As 
strict constructionists, we have been cautious in remind­
ing ourselves that "interdisciplinary" suggests and even 
demands solid disciplines among which the relationships 
can be explored, and rightly so. But experience has bred 
increasing confidence in our ability to define the curric­
ular content of such courses and to recognize that the 
gray areas of overlap are not devoid of color content. 
Interdisciplinary explorations will continue to play an 
increasing part in our impact on liberal education. 
"Education," says Charles Silberman, "is becoming 
the gateway to the middle and upper reaches of society, 
which means that the schools and colleges thereby be­
come the gatekeepers of society." 14 This remark is made 
in a context that points to the inevitable politicizing of 
educational institutions in this role, but it should remind 
us as well of our responsibility as the shapers of the 
consciousness of that society. The student trying to de­
fine for himself whence his New Humanism derives and 
where it should lead has instinctively expected the human-
ities—D. L. Stevenson's "culturally defining arts" 15— 
to show him how to approach the problems that he and 
his society face. The humanist as "ecologist of survival 
values" has his task set for him, and it must not be 
interpreted to mean that the survival is his alone. 
You will remember that we once believed in commit­
ting to memory great passages of literature or noble 
sayings from the past as guides to our own emerging 
values or as items of pleasure or comfort for moments 
when either was needed. Literature, the classics, whether 
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the works of the first order from antiquity or from later 
cultures, provided to the educated or even to the par­
tially educated person rich entertainment for his spirit, 
stimulation for his mind, precepts for his choice of ac­
tion, and examples for his daily life; the classics shared 
with religion the larger part of his intellectual and spiri­
tual activity. Cicero caught the importance of literature 
in a world we still struggle to understand in a few lines 
of his speech for Archias. Those over forty will have 
learned them and have been moved by them: 
Nam ceterae neque temporum sunt neque aetatum omnium 
neque locorum; at haec studia adulescentiam acuunt, senec­
tutem oblectant, secundas res ornant, adversis perfugium 
ac solacium praebent, delectant domi, non impediunt foris, 
pernoctant nobiscum, peregrinantur, rusticantur. (Arch. 16) 
We are being advised here, of course, of the value of the 
studia litterarum both for the formation of character and 
the pleasure of the mind, of which they are, Cicero as­
sumes, remissio humanissima ac liberalissima—words 
of a Roman consular in a dubious defense of a Greek 
poet in a world that can mean little to the now gener­
ation. 
But the classical humanist knows that Cicero's words 
are words that are normative to the culture of the West 
and have established what we have been, what we might 
have been, who we are, and who we might be. It matters 
little that few of us are directly descended from that 
Roman culture or from the Greek that informed it. The 
fabric of what we are as a multiracial, many- or single-
classed, pluralistic society has been prepared—some-
times misguidedly, more often with inspiration—from 
the continuing reinterpretation and expression of the 
ideas that were shaped in the millennium centered on the 
birth of Jesus and of the Roman empire. Much of antiq­
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uity has only historical value for the present, though 
much of it is as pertinent to us now and for the future as 
ever before. Thus the questions asked, the perceptions 
offered, the pleasures and horrors chronicled, the search­
ing for self and society in a rapidly expanding world, 
move far beyond the historical and the limits of the 
practical as they speak to the individual who seeks them 
out. 
May I illustrate by two short quotations from a state­
ment by Christine Philpot Clark, a black student of the 
classics as an undergraduate at Bryn Mawr and now a 
lawyer in New York City with an impressive record in 
civil rights and civic concerns: 
I fought back thoughts about how irrelevant to my later life 
my studies were, noting such thoughts were common to 
everyone seeking a liberal arts education. I now think that 
had I pursued the racial roots for my particular uneasiness 
about the relevance of my studies, I would have felt absurd 
and would probably have never finished college, Bryn 
Mawr or anywhere else. But the College helped me through 
the crisis. And I'll never forget it. As a result I work free 
for only two efforts: black liberation and Bryn Mawr College. 
Mrs. Clark concludes her remarks with a comment of 
shattering pertinence: 
Bryn Mawr did give me much of my capacity to cope, joy 
in discipline, and strength in gaining knowledge. The College 
led me to past worlds and hopes about future ones. It taught 
me to spot weak motivation (including my own), to question 
fallacious reasoning and to devise rational alternatives. 
These gifts are not only nice words; they are useful in de­
stroying racism.16 
The New Humanism is an uncompromising force. Its 
proponents have the same task their elders had, self­
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knowledge and understanding of the environment in 
which that self must function. But they are angry with 
what they are learning of themselves and of how the 
environment, physical and social, falls short of the 
human and technological potential that they have seen 
surrounding them as they have grown to adulthood. 
They are totally committed to rectifying the shortcom­
ings, human and technological. Their commitment should 
be catching, as Henry Hewes suggests in his review of 
the play The Trial of the Catonsville Nine: 
To attend this play is to go to the Good Shepherd-Faith 
Church on West 66th Street and make a token atonement for 
the incompleteness of our commitment. We do not even have 
to be in political agreement with these radicals. We only 
need to feel that whatever it is we believe, we believe it too 
half-heartedly.17 
We cannot believe half-heartedly in the value of the 
classics as a continuing source of individual and social 
advantage in education, both formal and informal. They 
have something to say of value to the New Humanist, 
whose newness consists of his commitment with its sense 
of human urgency. To it we can respond with the flexi­
bility allowed by quality and the conviction that real 
values transcend importunities even for those impor­
tuning. If we redirect our own commitment, it will speak 
to that of others. 
Nil desperandum, Horace has Teucer advise his com­
panions (Odes 1.7.27 and 30-32)  : 
o fortes peioraque passi 
mecum saepe viri, nunc vino pellite curas; 
eras iterabimus aequor.18 
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II 
Classicism, Christianity, and Humanism 
In this paper, I shall examine critically the origins, 
growth, and decline of the classical curriculum; the way 
of life that it has fostered; and the values that may be 
salvaged from it before it passes away. That the classics 
are in extremis has long been known. Almost fifty years 
ago, in 1922, George H. Stevenson, Fellow and Tutor of 
University College, Oxford, wrote an essay entitled, 
"Some Reflections on the Teaching of Roman History" 
in which he said: "Now we are taking in each other's 
washing. Schools provide universities with graduates— 
universities provide schoolmasters to schools." More 
recently, in the spring of 1958, the Association of Teach­
ers in Technical Institutions (in Great Britain) declared 
war against "a limited culture dominated by the glory 
of Greece and the grandeur of Rome reflecting little of 
the achievement, the ideas and the philosophy of modern 
science." 
A culture and a discipline that have endured for some 
four hundred years and during that time, for better or 
worse, have formed the mind and character of western 
Europe should not be interred without decent funeral 
rites. Unfortunately, I am unable to do this without being 
personal and autobiographical, and for this I ask your 
indulgence. In his inaugural address upon his induction 
as Professor of Medieval and Renaissance English Liter­
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ature at the University of Cambridge in 1954, C. S. 
Lewis observed that the title of the new chair was signi­
ficant. By joining the Middle Ages with the Renaissance, 
it implied that the traditional antithesis between the two 
had been exaggerated. I am essaying an even more radi­
cal judgment: that my education as a growing boy and 
the way of life that it inculcated were much closer in 
subject matter and temper to the schooling of the six­
teenth century than is the contemporary system to that 
of World War I America; that there was less change in 
the character of western Christendom between 1600 and 
1914 than there has been between 1914 and 1971. 
This remarkable cultural continuity was due to a his­
torical coincidence. In the Renaissance and for some 
three centuries following it, the classical spirit of Greco-
Roman antiquity was joined with the Christian spirit of 
the Middle Ages to create Christian humanism. This 
was a mixed marriage and has always shown the stresses 
and strains of an imperfect union. Nonetheless, it bore 
bounteous fruit because what each had in common with 
the other was so precious and so intimate that the traits 
whereby they differed could not keep them apart. This 
is not to say that the betrothal was necessary. Like all 
betrothals it was fortuitous. None will maintain that 
one need be a classicist to be a Christian or a Christian 
to be a classicist. In the fourth century the emperor Jul­
ian attempted to impede the sponsalia; and in the elev­
enth century Saint Peter Damian tried to obtain a decree 
of nullity. Both failed, and in the sixteenth century the 
union was consummated. 
There were three reasons for this: (1) in the sixteenth 
century the superintendence of education was almost a 
complete monopoly of the Christian cleric, and there­
fore, whatever changes might occur in the curriculum, 
the intent of the teachers could not be other than to con­
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firm a Christian pupil in the Christian faith; (2) the 
vehicle of communication, written and oral, was the 
same for both Christian and classical studies—the Latin 
language; (3) it was shortly discovered, though through 
a glass darkly, that there was a subtle and salutary con­
nection between the humanity of Jesus and the humanism 
of the Greco-Roman spirit. Had not Plato and Plotinus 
in the late classical period and Aristotle in the high 
Middle Ages given intellectual form to Christian philos­
ophy and theology? Had not Vergil been baptised by 
Dante? 
Finally, it was in the guise (or disguise, if you will) 
of Christianity that the fundamental Judaic concepts of 
the unicity of God and the complete dependence of man­
kind upon Him were brought to the Western world. Car­
dinal Manning once remarked that spiritually we are 
all Semites. Certainly, there is much to the contention 
that Christianity is Judaism made acceptable to the Gen­
tiles. Teste David cum Sibylla, as the medieval hymn put 
it. David and the Sibyl were both prophetic of the new 
order. Thus the classical concept of the wholeness and 
self-sufficiency of man was joined with the Judaic con­
cept of the absolute sovereignty of God. These two points 
of view seem, and indeed are, contrary, if not contradic­
tory; and the only belief that made such a synthesis pos­
sible was the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation— 
verbum caro factum, the Word made flesh, the humaniza­
tion of divinity. I remember as a young man attending 
church in Switzerland and hearing a sermon De Deo 
ludente—God at play. 0 sancta simplicitas! As Thomas 
Hardy says in his poem "Christmas Eve": "So fair a 
fancy few would weave in these days." 
This Christian classicism, engendered in the Renais­
sance, became and remained the basis of the education 
of the youth of western Christendom from the sixteenth to 
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the earlier part of the present century. In our times and 
in our country it has expressed itself most fully in the 
curriculum and discipline of the small American church-
related liberal arts college. In the second half of the six­
teenth century this type of education was no less a reality 
at Eton and Winchester in Anglican England than it was 
at Strassburg under Johann Sturm, the headmaster of 
the Lutheran gymnasium there; or under Calvin at Ge­
neva ; or, finally, at Messina in Sicily, where the Jesuits 
had opened their first school in 1542. Indeed, it may be 
said that if there was, at the time of the Reformation, one 
issue on which both middle-class and conservative Prot­
estantism and aristocratic Catholicism agreed, it was the 
necessity of instituting and maintaining a Christian clas­
sical curriculum. 
Myself, I received my early education at a Jesuit pre­
paratory school and a Jesuit college. Subsequently, I was 
matriculated at Oxford where, in the School of Litterae 
Humaniores, I continued on a higher level and with little 
deviation from the norm my earlier education. Since 
then, whatever training I have received has been pro­
fessional, not liberal. If the earlier years are the period 
in which a young man's mind and character are formed, 
I confess (and I say it with gratitude and affection) that 
I am the product of Jesuit schooling. Now, of the many 
manuals and treatises of instruction and guidance com­
posed and published during the Renaissance in order to 
initiate this new system, the Jesuit Ratio Studiorum, 
definitively expressed in the edition of 1599, was one. 
There were editions before 1599 and several since then, 
and, taken together, they represent the most detailed and 
most comprehensive description of the Christian classical 
curriculum and its purpose. In Catholic Counterrefor­
mation Europe, the Society of Jesus enjoyed an almost 
complete monopoly of the education of boys; and in 
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Protestant Europe, however much they might differ theo­
logically from the Catholic church and among themselves, 
the Church of England, the Lutheran church, and the Re­
formed church all agreed that the learned Christian 
gentleman was the Christian educated in the classical 
tradition. Since I have not only read but also to a degree 
studied the Ratio and (what may be more important) 
experienced its application and effects in my formative 
years, I believe that I am competent to pass judgment 
on it and, in doing so, on the several cognate Protestant 
systems directed toward the same end. I doubt that there 
is any school in Christendom, even a Jesuit school, 
where I could receive the same kind of education today. 
I am a relic. There are not many like us left, and you 
will not see our kind again. 
The Ratio was not the invention of the Jesuit educator. 
Ignatius of Loyola himself declared that the model of 
his system was the classical curriculum already in use 
at the University of Paris, his own alma mater and that 
of his first companions. In fact, he was wont to compare 
the discipline of Paris with the lack of discipline in the 
contemporary Italian universities, and he deliberately 
staffed his own Roman college with Paris graduates. But 
the Ratio's antecedents go even further back. In 1538 
Johann Sturm, already identified as the Lutheran head­
master at Strassburg, published his treatise De litter-
arum ludis recte aperiendis. Indeed, Sturm and his com­
panions contended that the Jesuits had stolen their plan 
from him, and none can deny that the palm of priority 
belongs to Pastor Sturm. The fact is, of course, that the 
classical contagion was already abroad, and both Igna­
tius and Sturm had been infected by the schools of the 
Brethren of the Common Life. Sturm had studied for 
three years (1521-24) at their college at Liege and, 
according to his biographers, adopted its organization 
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as the model for his Strassburg school. Ignatius, in turn, 
when he began his studies at Paris, had lived at the 
College Montaigu, where the system of the Brethren al­
ready prevailed. 
Before describing this curriculum, let us examine its 
antecedents, and first, on the classical side. There are 
three names associated with its development—Isocrates, 
Marcus Tullius Cicero, and Quintilian; and there are 
two works essential for its understanding—the three 
books of Cicero's Be Oratore and the twelve books of 
Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria. 
Let us start with Isocrates. Greek formal higher edu­
cation began with the Sophists, of whom the first was 
Gorgias and the last and best was Isocrates. In form the 
word sophistes means a man who makes a profession of 
wisdom—one who makes his living by teaching for pay. 
Before Pericles the aristocratic code of Pindar prevailed 
—that male excellence (arete) was a combination of good 
breeding and beautiful bodily form, active and at rest. 
But Pindar was the last of the Greek aristocrats, and be­
fore he died in 438 B.C., he was disturbed by the grow­
ing insolence of Athenian imperialism and the rise in 
Athens of an urban proletariat of the type that later 
Cicero calls in Rome the turba forensis. After Pericles' 
death in 429 B.C. Cleon established the prototype of the 
novus homo, which leads to Aristotle's definition of man 
as a zoon politikon, the man who is domiciled in the polis 
and engages in political activity. But effectively to do 
this in fourth-century Athens was to study rhetoric and 
to excel in the art of public speaking. In an age in which 
there was no radio, television, or newspaper, in which 
reading matter was scarce and generally inaccessible, 
when, as Demosthenes tells us, men came in from the 
suburbs at dawn to ask, "What's the news?", the only 
way to public notice and public office was by the art of 
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literary composition and the practice of public declama­
tion. This was a present need for a practical end, and the 
sophists supplied it. For Isocrates the proper study of 
man was rhetoric, and his highest good was active partic­
ipation in public affairs. Unlike Plato and Aristotle, 
Isocrates considered philosophy as propaedeutic to rhe­
toric, and unlike the Pre-Socratics, he viewed astronomy 
and geometry simply as "gymnastics of the mind." To 
use a later Latin phrase, to Isocrates the well-rounded 
man was the bonus vir dicendi peritus—the man who 
was both good and a good speaker. 
Thus Isocrates established two principles of formal 
education that became in time, and thereafter remained, 
the foundation of a liberal discipline: (1) that the art 
of correct and elegant composition is fundamental in 
every school system; and (2) that the formation of char­
acter, moral training, which is the adaptation of the 
child to the mores of the community, is and should be 
the aim of every educational system. As to the art of 
composition, we must remember that to the Greek logos 
meant not only the spoken and written word but also the 
thought that lies behind the outward form. There is 
nothing that compels us to define and refine our ideas 
more than the requirement that we put them down in 
writing for everyone to see. This training in literary 
form, this acquisition of the three fundamental qualities 
of good writing, clarity, economy, and grace, became 
then and remained thereafter the basic discipline of the 
Latin grammar school. 
As for the second of Isocrates' two principles, that a 
good orator must also be a good man, we must remem­
ber that the Greek male was not a domestic animal. He 
lived in the open air and not at home. His was the 
public assembly that voted on the propositions of the 
public orators. Thus the orator must be the politician 
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and the statesman, versed in domestic and foreign pol­
icy and genuinely dedicated to the welfare of his state 
and fellow citizens. In this way the art of composition 
is raised above the level of verbal dexterity, and the 
public orator is put in a higher echelon than the dema­
gogue. He deals with issues that are great and honor­
able, that contribute to the general welfare and happi­
ness of mankind, and that tend to liberate the mind 
from mean and selfish motives and to produce that 
quality which Cicero, in the De Officiis, calls magnani­
mitas. If he does not become in Plato's words "the 
spectator of all time and existence," at least his vision 
extends beyond the frontier of his native land and his 
concept of human needs beyond his personal wants. 
Isocrates' own life and work are an example of this 
broader concept of the function of rhetoric. Although 
he composed many speeches for others and taught 
rhetoric for some forty years, because of a speech defi­
ciency he never appeared in court. He was really a 
tractarian, and his compositions were in effect tracts 
for the times. Living when the Persian menace once 
again appeared great and the Greek states were destroy­
ing themselves in fratricidal strife, he sought the polit­
ical unity of Greece under a leading state or statesman. 
Appealing in turn to Athens, Sparta, and Dionysius of 
Syracuse, he finally found his champion in Philip of 
Macedon and died happily on the morrow of the battle 
of Chaeronea. To Isocrates, as he says in his Panegyri­
cus, the word Hellenes should apply to those who share 
a common culture rather than to those who derive from 
a common ancestry. More than any other individual 
of his time, except perhaps Alexander the Great, he 
foresaw the Hellenistic world, and it was he who 
handed on the torch to Marcus Tullius Cicero. 
Because Cicero was a Roman and wrote and spoke 
36 
Latin, we are apt to forget that he lived in a world 
society that was culturally Greek. As the Greek clas­
sical age was the period of creative literary activity, 
so the Greek world after Alexander was the age of 
conscious literary criticism and formal scholarship. 
Alexandria, as a contemporary writer put it, became 
"the hen-coop of the Muses," where grammarians, phi­
lologers, textual critics and textual commentators flour­
ished. The literary art became a self-regarding activity 
in which poets wrote for other poets and coteries of 
scholars clustered together like bees in hives to fan 
one another. It was in this atmosphere and by these 
groups that the classical Greek authors of the golden 
age of Greek literature were made the paradigms of 
the higher education and Attic Greek, and only Attic 
Greek, the language of the learned class. The Latin 
language, on the other hand, though it was achieving 
literary maturity in the usage of Cicero and his con­
temporaries, had not yet attained that academic status 
which admitted it to a place in the curriculum of higher 
studies. Its position was not unlike the position of the 
vernacular languages (English, French, Spanish, and 
so forth) in relation to Latin in the time of the Renais­
sance. Accordingly, in Rome during Cicero's time all 
the tutors of well-born Roman boys were Greeks; and 
most Romans, if they could aiford it, went to Greece 
for their graduate studies. Molon, the Rhodian ambas­
sador, was one of Cicero's tutors, and on one occasion 
addressed the Roman Senate in Greek without the aid 
of an interpreter. Cicero spoke both literally and tropi­
cally when he remarked, "We Romans have gone to 
school in Greece." Note finally that by this time Greek 
professors of rhetoric were teaching Romans the art of 
composition and public oratory for the very good reason 
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that it was in Rome now, and not in Greece, that public 
oratory was the path to public honor. 
Cicero carried on the tradition of Isocrates in one 
respect and differed from it in two other respects. In 
the Rome of Cicero, as in the Athens of Isocrates, the 
teaching of rhetoric and public speaking was for use 
and not for pleasure. Public policy there, as in Athens 
earlier, was being decided by the plebs urbana, or, as 
Cicero less graciously expressed it, the faex Romuli; 
and it was only in the Forum, in the Senate, and in the 
lawcourts that a political program could be made public 
and brought to completion. But it was wherein he dif­
fered from Isocrates that Cicero made his greater con­
tributions. To Cicero, no doubt partly as a result of his 
political misfortunes, the study of rhetoric for use was 
ancillary to the study of literature for its own sake. In 
moving from Rome to Tusculum, from his town house 
to his country villa, as the winds of political favor rose 
and fell, Cicero combined in a remarkable fashion the 
active with the contemplative life, the "slings and 
arrows" of the hustings with the otium et quies of exur­
bia. In the second place, unlike Isocrates, Cicero made 
rhetoric ancillary to philosophy. To him, as to Plato 
and Aristotle, the intellect was superior to the will, and 
the contemplative to the active life. 
It is in the light of these two differences from the 
Isocratic formula, the cultivation of literature for its 
own sake and the primacy of philosophy over rhetoric, 
that Cicero's De Oratore is to be read. In the three 
books of this work Cicero expresses professionally his 
whole theory of education. This essay was published 
in 55 B.C., when Cicero was at the height of his fame 
and intellectual powers. There is nothing narrow about 
it. From the title one might think it is a handbook on 
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rhetoric and oratory, or at best a technical treatise on 
education. It is all that, but more. It elaborates Cicero's 
mature views on rhetoric, literature, philosophy, his­
tory, and politics, so far as each contributes to the for­
mation of the ideal man of the golden age of the Greco-
Roman world. In it Cicero is the first to name the seven 
liberal arts that later were to form the trivium and 
quadrivium of the Middle Ages: literature, rhetoric, 
philosophy, mathematics, music, geometry, and astron­
omy. He is also the first to embrace these studies under 
the captions artes liberates and liberalis disciplina. In 
doing so, he translated into Latin and through Latin 
into the European languages the Greek expression en­
kuklios paideia—all-around education. The meaning 
of the Greek phrase is more precisely expressed in the 
Latin. Liberalis comes from liber and connotes free­
dom; not just freedom from slavery but emancipation 
from manual and mercenary pursuits; and the enjoy­
ment of that otium cum dignitate without which what 
Aristotle calls "the activity of leisure" cannot be exer­
cised. As the old Egyptian proverb put it: "A black­
smith never goes on an embassy." 
Cicero's ideal is the doctus orator: as Crassus says, 
"When I am asked what is the highest excellence of all, 
I give the palm to the doctus orator." It is he who pos­
sesses par excellence the quality of humanitas, and it is 
in the De Oratore that the word humanitas most fre­
quently occurs. In fact, the word is almost the exclusive 
property of Cicero. It is interesting, in passing, to note 
that the Greeks thought of education as beginning with 
the boy (paideia from pais), and the Romans conceived 
it as reaching its perfection in the man (humanitas from 
homo). Cicero makes it clear that this ideal is not easy 
to attain because it involves the simultaneous achieve­
ment of two aims: the practical one of Isocrates—to 
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make a man good and a competent public orator; and 
the more academic aim of Cicero—the cultivation of 
the more humane letters and philosophy for their own 
sakes. Most men will not have the nature, the ability, 
the opportunity, the leisure, and above all the financial 
means to attain them. But the Ciceronian concept of the 
double aim persisted, in theory if not always in fact 
(Omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci, as Horace 
says) until, more than a century later, the rhetorician 
Quintilian institutionalized and made professional the 
amateur program of Cicero. 
Between Cicero and Quintilian the nature of Roman 
society changed, as Tacitus makes clear in a famous 
passage in his Annals. The old narrowly Roman nobi­
litas, which had ruled the later Republic until the rev­
olution, was giving place to a new bureaucratic establish­
ment made up of competent men from the more obscure 
Roman families, from Italy outside Rome, and from 
the provinces. Crassus had already observed in the De 
Oratore that the Latins were more interested in study­
ing literature than the Romans; and later, Pliny the 
Younger, in a letter of recommendation on behalf of 
a young man, wrote, "He is fond of study like most poor 
men." These were the novi homines of the early Empire 
who "by good luck or by hard work," as Tacitus puts 
it, having achieved Roman citizenship ascended the 
ladder of honor (the cursus honorum) in the imperial 
civil service and attained an honorable place in the 
new regime. Of these the supreme example was the 
emperor Vespasian, a Sabine who never quite lost his 
rustic speech. His grandfather had been a centurion in 
Pompey's army; his father a tax farmer in Asia Minor; 
and his mother's brother the only member of his family 
before him to achieve the senatorial dignity. Vespasian 
himself started his public career as a tribunus militum 
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and rose through successive stages, quaestor in Crete 
or Cyrene, aedile and praetor in Rome, until he be­
came proconsul of the province of Africa. Obviously, 
for these men, who lived throughout the empire, the 
old tirocinium fori (the novitiate of the forum), as 
Quintilian calls it, was largely unavailable. Cicero, 
you will recall, was taken by his father to Rome and 
apprenticed, as it were, to the distinguished family of 
the Scaevolae. But this had been in the good old days, 
and Quintilian, although he recommended it in prin­
ciple, was quite aware that it was no longer feasible in 
practice. Consequently, it was for the education of this 
new class that Quintilian wrote his Institutio Oratoria, 
the most important treatise on education in the history 
of western Europe in its influence upon educational 
practice. 
Quintilian lived and taught rhetoric in the first cen­
tury of our era. He was of Spanish origins and there­
fore by birth representative of the new order. The two 
generations of his life-span were not a period in which 
political oratory was encouraged or practiced with 
safety. There were of course the lawcourts, where ora­
torical ability was still of use; but the practice of law 
was now becoming professional, and law schools were 
springing up not only in Rome but also in the pro­
vinces, especially at Beirut. Clearly this was not the 
way by which the liberalis disciplina of Cicero was to 
be preserved. On the other hand, there was the need 
created by the growth of the new non-Roman public 
servants and men of letters, whose spoken tongue was 
either not Latin or a provincial patois of Latin. Nat­
urally these men, moving into Roman official and liter­
ary circles, coveted the badge of civility that only a 
correct and urbane Latin speech and style could confer. 
Because the only available system whereby this urbanity 
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could be acquired was that of the schools of rhetoric, 
at Rome and abroad, naturally it was to them that men 
of the new classes flocked. In the beginning there was 
chaos and a tendency toward exaggeration and arti­
ficiality in expression that is characteristic of the liter­
ary nouveau riche. Declamatio ran riot, and the younger 
Seneca justly observed, "We are being educated for 
the classroom and not for life." On the other hand, this 
was the educational background of the great writers of 
the silver age of Latin literature, men like the younger 
Seneca, Lucan, the younger Pliny, Tacitus, and, above 
all, Quintilian himself; and therefore it had in it the 
promise of the future. Vespasian, when he appointed 
Quintilian the first salaried professor of rhetoric in 
Rome, took the initial step toward its official support; 
and Quintilian, when he published his Institutes about 
95 A.D., inaugurated and institutionalized a discipline 
that lasted almost until the fall of the western empire. 
The discovery by Poggio, in 1410, of the complete 
manuscript of this work in the monastery of Saint Gall 
was without doubt the most important find in the history 
of Renaissance and modern liberal studies. Quintilian's 
Institutes formed the model of instruction in the schools 
of the Low Countries conducted by the Brethren of the 
Common Life, where Erasmus studied, and also later 
at the University of Paris, where the founder of the 
Jesuits went to school. A contemporary of Saint Ignatius 
speaks of "noster Quintilianus"; and another early 
Jesuit, in a commentary on the Ratio published in 1703, 
cites the Spanish-born rhetorician continuously and 
almost exclusively as his authority. 
Quintilian, although he defined the orator after the 
elder Cato as the bonus vir dicendi peritus, lived in an 
age when the professional practice of oratory, except 
in the lawcourts, was no longer the path to political 
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preferment. Therefore, his aim was rather the bonus 
vir scribendi peritus, and his purpose the training in 
the Latin language and Latin literature of the well-to-
do youth throughout the Empire. Consequently, a broad­
ening of the curriculum was necessary. The latter part 
of Book I, which discusses grammar and language, is 
directly of use to every student of Latin, even today, 
and indirectly to every student of language. In Book X, 
he discusses and recommends the acquisition of good 
reading habits, not narrowly for rhetorical uses but 
broadly for the study of all literature. His analysis in 
the same book of the works and styles of Greek and 
Roman writers is a locus classicus in the history of 
literary criticism. Although Greek was read and the 
Greek classics taught, the emphasis was now on Latin, 
spoken and written, for by this time, because of the 
achievements of the writers of the golden age, the Latin 
language had replaced Greek as the language of instruc­
tion in the higher learning and was now considered in 
and of itself worthy of imitation. Quintilian's own Latin 
style is redolent of Cicero, and it is Ciceronian Latin 
that he makes the model of instruction in Latin prose 
composition—Ex uno fere Cicerone, as the Ratio later 
puts it. His achievement was the guarantee in the later 
empire of a ruling bureaucracy that was not only literate 
but also to a degree literary. The architects of Renais­
sance education built their edifice upon two foundations, 
Cicero and Quintilian. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the education of 
talented youth in the second century became a matter 
of public concern, and that the municipalities in Italy 
and the provinces undertook the financial subsidy of 
their schools of grammar and rhetoric as well as their 
teachers. Most of the early Latin Christian fathers were 
trained in this discipline. Saint Augustine was a student 
43 
of rhetoric at Carthage and a professor at Milan. Au­
sonius at Bordeaux in the fourth century and Sidonius 
at Lyons in the fifth were the latest examples of the 
persistence of Quintilian's legacy. Both were Christians, 
the latter a bishop and subsequently sainted; yet they 
exhibit a remarkable ability to mix the sacred with the 
profane and to rub shoulders, as it were, in a friendly 
and graceful fashion, with their non-Christian school­
fellows and neighbors. 
From the fall of the western empire to Charlemagne, 
however, the issues were the cultural unity of Europe 
itself and the very survival of the Latin language as a 
medium of communication, literary and administrative. 
By the beginning of the fifth century Christianity was 
supreme, and the bishop was sitting in the seat of the 
older municipal magistrates. Learning was being trans­
ferred from the urban school to the monastery and 
public power from the civil to the ecclesiastical author­
ity. It was now the task of the Roman church to assume 
the burden of Vergil's imperative, Tu regere imperio 
populos, Romane, memento. It was no accident that 
the Roman Empire and the Roman Catholic church 
were the only two institutions in western Christendom 
that combined a conviction of a special divine mission 
with a claim to universal dominion. The issue was no 
longer the survival of literary Latin; it was the survival 
of Latin, any kind of Latin, so long as it was intelligible, 
barbarisms and solecisms included. In the eighth cen­
tury Saint Boniface, when he heard a child being bap­
tized in nomine Patria et Filia et Spiritu Sancta, was 
genuinely concerned whether the baptism was valid. In 
the previous century Gregory the Great had come to 
the conclusion that the church had absorbed from the 
pagan classics all the culture that it needed, and he 
rebuked Bishop Desiderius of Vienne for teaching 
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Christian boys the pagan classics. He had Prudentius, 
he said, and he did not need Ovid: "The same lips can­
not sing the praises of Jove and Christ." For quite a 
while the issue was by no means sure, and it was only 
with Charlemagne, who lifted up the fallen diadem and 
once again assumed the imperial mantle, that the dawn 
broke. 
The story of the revival of learning is too well known 
to be recounted in any detail here. It began with Bede 
at Jarrow and Alcuin at York, and with the latter 
passed from England to the Continent when Charle­
magne founded his palace school at Aix-la-Chapelle. 
The process that started in the Dark Ages was now being 
reversed. The care of learning was being moved from 
the monastery back to the town and its superintendence 
from the bishop to the crown. Since externi were now 
admitted to the new schools, the first small step toward 
the secularization of learning had been taken. Although 
education remained completely under the ecclesiastical 
thumb, it was now possible for men who did not envisage 
a career in the church to seek a higher education. 
The purposes of this new curriculum were at first 
purely utilitarian: (1) to train priests who could read 
the Latin Bible; (2) to provide scholars who could read 
Latin to pursue the study of philosophy and theology; 
(3) to secure bishops who could keep records in Latin 
and thus efficiently administer a diocese; and finally, 
(4) to educate laymen in Latin so that they could be­
come trained civil servants and administer the law. 
Thus medieval Latin emerged. It was not the Latin of 
Cicero, but at all events it was Latin and, under the best 
circumstances, as with the later Scholastics, correct and 
precise Latin suited to the needs of the time. 
The next change in the cultural complexion of Europe 
occurred between the death of Charlemagne and the 
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beginning of the thirteenth century. The causes of this 
change were many, but important were the revival of 
trade, the renewal of town life, and the rise to promi­
nence, if not to power, of a new middle class. The 
medieval university came into being, and with it the 
development of graduate specialties: (1) philosophy, 
and especially logic; (2) theology, and with it the move 
to reconcile Aristotle (and to a lesser degree, Plato) 
with Christian revelation; (3) law, especially Roman 
law, and with it the need to read and study the Justinian 
corpus; and finally, (4) medicine, with attention first 
to Galen and subsequently to Hippocrates. Thus arose 
in the medieval university the higher faculties of phi­
losophy, theology, law, and medicine. Together with 
these developments, there occurred subtle changes in 
attitude. The prayers of Saint Augustine credo quia 
incredibile est and credo, Domine, adjuva incredulita­
tem meam gave way to Anselm's affirmation credo ut 
intellegam. It was no longer intellectus quaerens fidem 
but fides quaerens intellectum. Philosophy became the 
handmaid of theology, and revelation was viewed as the 
friend and not the foe of the rational soul. The second 
change in attitude was the conscious search for and 
evenutal recovery of the Greco-Roman classical sense of 
civic virtue to replace, or at any rate to exist alongside 
of, the practice of Christian perfection. The rise of the 
cathedral schools encouraged these changes. In the first 
place, they were conveniently located in the larger ur­
ban centers, especially for the attendance of the new 
middle class; and in the second place, they welcomed 
externi who had no intention of becoming monks or 
priests. 
The third change in attitude was the development of 
a certain worldliness and a search for creature com­
forts, as the spiritual manuals put it. Luxuries became 
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available, even if only to a limited degree, and with 
luxuries leisure, and with leisure the pursuit of plea­
sure and, particularly, the joys of mundane love. Nat­
urally, together with all this there developed a certain 
bourgeois cynicism with respect to the merits and prac­
tices of the religious life. No wonder that Ovid and 
Juvenal began to enjoy a vogue! The new men had no 
need of Prudentius—they had Ovid. It was in such an 
environment that the vernacular languages began to 
acquire literary maturity in the hands of such artists as 
Dante in Italy and Chaucer in England. A counter­
culture was in process of growth. 
Once, however, the new men decided to abandon 
medieval ways, they had no choice but to return to an­
tiquity. Just as the men of the Reformation sought to 
recover primitive Christianity, so the men of the Renais­
sance tried to find in the secular culture of classical 
antiquity a substitute for the obscurantism of the Mid­
dle Ages. Latin was the only universal learned language 
in western Europe, and any formal education was of 
necessity in and through the Latin language. Greek, to 
be sure, came in as an adjunct to Latin, but not as the 
language of academic discourse and instruction. Sec­
ond, the medieval church was the only universal insti­
tution in western Europe in the sixteenth century that 
had at hand the organization and facilities to undertake 
formal education. Therefore, the new education, how­
ever much it might seek its models in the glory that 
was Greece and the grandeur that was Rome, remained 
under the supervision and discipline of the Christian 
ecclesiastical authorities. Thus the nuptials between clas­
sicism and Christianity were celebrated, and the union 
was consummated. 
It is instructive to recall how clearly and surely the 
men who did this knew what they were doing. Erasmus 
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maintained that the profane subjects of the classics were 
admissible only si propter Christum. Ignatius inverted 
this proposition by saying that one should absorb along 
with his letters the morals of a Christian. Thus the 
bonus vir dicendi peritus of Isocrates becomes the bonus 
vir scribendi peritus of Cicero and Quintilian and finally 
the bonus vir vivendi peritus of Christian humanism. 
It is also instructive to recall how long into modern 
times this partnership lasted. In 1639 the words of a 
contemporary letter were carved on the gates of Harvard 
College. It read: "After God had carried us safe to 
New England and we had builded our houses, provided 
necessaries for our livelihood, reared convenient places 
for God's worship, and settled the civil government: 
one of the next things we longed for and looked after, 
was to advance learning and to perpetuate it to posterity, 
dreading to leave an illiterate ministry to the Churches, 
when our present ministers shall lie in the dust." When 
King's College, later Columbia University, was opened 
in New York City in 1754, the advertisement read: 
"The chief thing that is aimed at in this college, is to 
teach and engage the children to know God in Jesus 
Christ, and to love and serve Him in all sobriety, god­
liness, and richness of life, with a perfect heart and a 
willing mind; and to train them up in all virtuous habits 
and all such useful knowledge as may render them 
creditable to their families and friends, ornaments to 
their country, and useful to the public weal in their 
generation." It was not until 1852 that those who were 
not members of the Church of England could stand for 
degrees at Oxford, and not until 1876 that they could 
hold fellowships. Thus the classical curriculum became 
and remained Christian, and the propaedeutic Christian 
education became and remained classical. 
It remains to inquire what purposes this Renaissance 
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education served then and up to the days of my youth. 
In the first place, in early modern times it was the nec­
essary prerequisite for all higher education, in law, 
in medicine, and preeminently in the church. This was 
particularly true of the Roman Catholic church, for 
which Latin was the one and only language of ritual 
and administration; but also, in the Protestant churches 
Latin was required for the study of philosophy, theol­
ogy, and sacred scripture. As to law, in England Latin 
was not necessary for the study of the English common 
law, where the Inns of Court sufficed; but on the Con­
tinent it was indispensable for the pursuit of the civil 
law, for which the Code of Justinian was required. Most 
important of all, the classical curriculum provided the 
terminal education for those who did not seek further 
professional instruction. For them, the classical curri­
culum provided not only the necessary discipline in the 
use of language in writing and conversation but also 
an acquaintance with the cultural background of Euro­
pean thought and morals and the necessary social graces 
to be at ease in an aristocratic milieu. In short, a classical 
education became the badge of civility, and a knowledge 
of Latin a sign of that quality which Pascal calls the 
esprit de finesse. It was the enkuklios paideia, the libe­
ralis disciplina, the all-around education of that limited 
group whose destiny was to give orders, whether in the 
churches, in the parliaments, in the officer class in the 
armed service, in the professions of law and medicine, 
or finally, in trade and business. Superficially, the clas­
sical curriculum seems to have been a kind of initiation 
ceremony whereby those who belonged to the ruling 
classes preserved their own cultural continuity and pro­
vided a kind of trial by intellectual ordeal whereby 
those who did not belong were enabled—a few of 
them by hard work, good luck, and winning scholar­
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ships by passing difficult examinations—to achieve ad­
mission to the upper echelon. But this is not the whole 
story. For all its faults, its selectivity, its exclusiveness, 
its effortless superiority, one might even say its arro­
gance, the classical curriculum under Christian auspices 
was until 1914 the only remaining badge of European 
unity. Sir Edward Grey knew it on that early August 
morning in 1914; Hilaire Belloc expressed it when 
he wrote: "Europe is the faith and the faith is Europe, 
and the decline of the faith is the decline of Europe." 
Shortly after the close of World War I, Jean Renoir 
dramatized it in that most sensitive and perceptive film 
entitled The Grand Illusion. The British officer with 
his swagger stick, the French officer with his white 
gloves, and the German officer with his monocle, all 
killed one another off in Flanders fields and at Verdun. 
Requiescant in pace! 
Now, what has happened to the classics since 1914? 
In the first place, the Christian churches, including the 
Roman Catholic church, are no longer in control of 
education; in fact, they are no longer in control. They 
have abdicated their position of authority; they no 
longer give orders—not even the Pope of Rome. The 
classes in control are no longer Christian except in 
name. I do not mean that there are not professing and 
indeed genuinely sincere Christians among them, but 
simply that their public decisions are not now made 
on the basis of Christian morality—and this is the 
whole point. The Christian churches have been suc­
ceeded in the position of authority by two new classes: 
the managerial class, whose principle is efficiency; and 
the technological class, whose principle is material 
progress. Before neither tribunal can there be an appeal 
to mercy. Thus, the Christian pillar upon which our 
humanistic education rested is no longer there. We are 
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no longer a Christian nation, and this opinion has re­
cently been supported by several decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court. 
In the second place, the arts college has been de­
stroyed by mass education. The classical curriculum 
never was, and was never intended to be, an education 
for the many. This is a hard saying, but it must be said 
because it is true. The Christian classical culture was 
based on the hypothesis that seems to me to have been 
universal among advanced societies until now: namely, 
that the ruling class first disciplines itself from within 
and then, having done so, disciplines the lower orders 
from without. It occurred to me, while watching the 
growth of communism, that the discipline that the 
Communist elite (the party members) imposed upon 
themselves resembled nothing so much as the discipline 
that the Jesuit order imposed upon its members in the 
period of its greatest success. The purpose of the clas­
sical curriculum—and once again may I emphasize 
that it reached its highest expression in the small 
church-related liberal arts college—was to train a 
Christian elite. A Christian elite no longer exists, so 
far, at any rate, as it exercises public power. 
In the third place, mass education has removed the 
arts college from the center of the campus to its periph­
ery. We now have colleges of education, colleges of 
commerce, colleges of public administration, and so 
forth—all on the undergraduate level. But the purpose 
of these colleges is not the inculcation of a way of life 
but professional training either to do a particular job 
or to make a specific kind of thing. They are in effect 
training schools, and the only point on which they differ 
from the earlier plebeian training school is that they 
transcend the manual level. 
Finally, the arts college has been given the coup de 
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grace by the descent upon it from above of the graduate 
school, particularly in those subjects that once were 
the germane property of the arts college. This develop­
ment was a contribution of German scholarship to the 
higher learning that reached American universities 
roughly at the beginning of the present century but had 
barely touched Oxford when I began my studies there. 
Now, there was nothing wrong in this development in 
itself. It was the application of the principles and tech­
niques of the higher learning to the traditional subjects 
of the arts college, particularly to Latin, Greek, and the 
study of literature in general. It has produced a body of 
knowledge that has immensely broadened and deepened 
our appreciation of classical antiquity. No teacher of 
the classics, even in the traditional arts college, should 
be unacquainted with it. But this is not to say that it 
should affect the arts college so that practical and pro­
fessional excellence in arts college subjects becomes the 
aim of undergraduate education. This deviation from 
the earlier norm is particularly apparent in the study 
of the modern languages. It is one thing to teach a 
student to read French; another to train him to speak 
it. In the first instance the purpose is to equip him to 
become culturally acquainted with a great literature; 
in the second instance the purpose is to provide him 
with a facile and current vocabulary for practical con­
versational usage. The one does not necessarily imply 
the other, as I discovered when I first visited Paris as a 
young man. On the other hand, an unlettered alien can 
come to our shores and in a short time acquire a prac­
tical conversational facility in English—not the best 
English, to be sure, simply parlando. But this tendency 
toward practicability and professionalization is evident 
in subjects other than the modern languages, among 
them Latin, Greek, and ancient history. Too many of 
52 
our students today study the classics to the end that 
they become professors of the classics, and by doing so 
evade or at least make secondary the acquisition of a 
humanistic manner of life. We must not forget what 
Stephen Leacock said in his little essay on "Homer 
and Humbug": "I know there are solid arguments ad­
vanced in favor of the classics. I often hear them from 
my colleagues. My friend the professor of Greek tells 
me that he truly believes the classics have made him 
what he is. This is a very grave statement, if well 
founded." When graduate disciplines are brought down 
to the undergraduate level, Wissenschaft triumphs over 
humanitas. 
This professionalization and specialization within the 
classical disciplines has had another effect upon under­
graduate teaching. It has limited the instructional ambit 
of the teacher. One no longer teaches ancient history. 
One teaches Greek history; another teaches Roman his­
tory; and a third teaches the history of the ancient Near 
East. One no longer teaches the classics. One teaches 
Latin; another teaches Greek. Once again, this frag­
mentation of special interest is appropriate in the grad­
uate school, although even there I think it is overdone. 
Surely it is out of place, or at any rate unnecessary, in 
undergraduate teaching. In my own student days the 
same man who taught Homer in Greek also taught Ver­
gil in Latin and Milton in English, passing from one 
language to another and from one poet to another with 
all the ease and insouciance of the amateur. In fact, 
that is what he was—an amateur—and that is what he 
ought to have been. Amateur comes from amo, "I love," 
and he loved what he was teaching; he loved his pupil? 
too, and they loved him in turn. An amateur pursues a 
subject, whether it is contract bridge, or chess, or tennis, 
or Latin, or English poetry, because it is fun and he 
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enjoys it. Ignatius saw this, and the Ratio recommends 
that a boy should pursue his studies cum animi hilari­
tate, laughing and joking on the way. Looking back upon 
my own academic life, I have come to the conclusion 
that perhaps my greatest achievement has been that I 
have been able to perform my professional duties and 
at the same time maintain my amateur status. 
This brings us to our last two questions. What is hu­
manism? And can we preserve humanism without the 
classical curriculum and the Christian dispensation that 
have supported it for so long a time? With regard to 
the first question, no precise definition can be given. 
Humanism is like love—it must be experienced to be 
appreciated. On the other hand, its nature is not inef­
fable. Perhaps it can best be defined in negative terms. 
For instance, political science teaches us much, but it 
cannot teach us that the good shepherd gives his life 
for his sheep. The study of economics teaches us much, 
but it cannot teach us that it is more blessed to give than 
to receive. Modern medicine can teach us much, but it 
cannot teach us that it is the duty of the strong to protect 
the weak. These are eternal verities, however much 
honest men may disagree with regard to their particular 
application. We all know that sympathy is better than 
callousness; that mercy is better than justice; that hu­
mility is better than arrogance; and that continence is 
better than self-indulgence. 
This is only another way of saying that the purpose 
of a humanistic education is the training of the emotions. 
In this argument we have the Franciscans and the Au­
gustinians on our side against the Thomists. Scotus tells 
us that the will is greater than the intellect, and Thomas 
a Kempis that it is better to love the Trinity than to be 
able to define it. We also have the men of the Renais­
sance on our side. Petrarch states that it is better to will 
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the good than to know the truth. We also have the great 
mystics on our side. William Blake says that the forgive­
ness of sins is the essence of Christianity. The emotions 
are strange affections of the human soul. They are 
deepened and widened by repeated experience and at the 
same time corrupted by overindulgence. This makes 
their training a delicate discipline. Love feeds on itself, 
but it can be sated. As both Plato and Aristotle taught, 
the good man is the man whose emotions are sharpened 
to the razor's edge but remain in accord with right rea­
son. In short, the ultimate purpose of the arts college is 
moral rectitude softened by love and pity. In the words 
of Pascal, the heart hath its reasons of which the reason 
knoweth nothing. 
What then do we have left—humanism standing erect 
upon nothing, but humanism still standing, as the young 
are now showing us, however confused their thoughts 
may be and however faltering their words. Ex ore in­
fantium! Fortunately, humanism never was and never 
can be a Christian classical monopoly. It is part of 
human nature, and all men partake of it to a greater or 
lesser degree. Homo sum: humani nihil a me alienum 
puto. Moreover, there have been and are other forms of 
humanism than ours—Chinese, Indian, Islamic, and 
Jewish, to mention some. But it is one thing to have in­
dividuals who are humane and quite another thing to 
have an established humanistic culture based upon an 
educational system and discipline. Our crisis is that our 
humanism has been founded upon half a millennium of 
conscious, organized, disciplined education based upon 
the Greek and Roman classics and the Christian faith. 
Moreover, we have tied our mores to an absolute. We 
have had no Confucius to teach us the prudential virtues. 
Consequently, when the Christian faith collapses, Chris­
tian morals, which are our mores, collapse with them. 
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This can be catastrophic. Ave atque vale! Morituri te 
salutamus! 
Watchman, then, what of the night? This side of 
complete chaos—and that can happen, read Gregory 
of Tours—I see three possibilities: (1) In the course 
of time, in saeculis saeculorum, our Christian classic 
culture may be subsumed, as the philosophers say, by 
an alien dispensation, Chinese, Indian, Islamic or some 
other, just as the Christian culture subsumed that of 
the Greco-Roman world. Non uno itinere itur ad tarn 
grande mysterium, as Symmachus, the last of the pag­
ans, said when in the fourth century he protested against 
the removal of the statue of Victory from the Roman 
senate chamber. There is no one only way to the ulti­
mate mystery. However, when we reflect that it took 
Christian Europe a thousand years to achieve this kind 
of synthesis, such an anticipation is not immediately 
consoling, and it is doubtful that any of us living today 
will survive to witness the event. (2) Another way 
might be through the medium of the fine arts: painting, 
sculpture, music, the theater, and such like. The Ratio 
itself says: friget enim poesis sine theatro. The Muse 
of poetry needs the theater for her life-blood. This al­
ternative has at least one advantage over the classical 
curriculum: it can be made to reach the many in a 
way and to a degree that the old discipline never did, 
and it is the many and the young that must be reached. 
They are already crowding the schools and universities; 
they have already moved the arts from the fashionable 
drawing room to the street and the marketplace, and 
they are no longer content to spend their lives as Plu-
tarch's "rude, mechanical multitude." (3) Finally, 
there is the suggestion made recently in the pages of the 
Times Literary Supplement (London) by Professor 
F. R. Leavis and by Roy Fuller, the present Professor 
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of Poetry at Oxford. Conceding (non sine lacrimis) 
the end of the old system, they recommend that the En­
glish School—or, as we say, the English Department— 
assume the mantle of humanism. After all, just as Latin 
in the time of Quintilian and into the Renaissance had 
displaced the Greek of Cicero's period and had become 
the literary language of the learned world, so by this 
time the several vernacular languages (and for us this 
means English) have achieved literary maturity and 
are in the position to displace Latin as the language 
of polite discourse and instruction. None will deny 
that they—and preeminently the English language, if 
one thinks of Chaucer, Shakespeare, and Milton—have 
within themselves the essence and all the qualities of 
humanism. This alternative appeals to me because it 
leaves something for us classicists to do. Just as, until 
now, we have been explaining classical mythology to 
Christian humanists, so, hereafter, we can explain 
Christian mythology to the new secular humanists. Non 
omnis moriar. 
In the entire span of recorded history there have 
been three ultimate dangers to the survival of advanced 
societies: undisciplined power; undisciplined wealth; 
and undisciplined pleasure. The onset of one alone 
would be difficult enough to offset; the attack of all three 
marching abreast is terrorizing. Surely, Plato must have 
had a point when he said that only those should be 
trusted with authority who could be counted upon to 
refuse it. Nolo episcopari. Surely Saint Francis must have 
known what he was doing when he embraced Lady 
Poverty. Surely John Calvin could not have been wholly 
wrong when he taught that only those are to be trusted 
with great wealth who have been rigorously trained 
from early childhood "to shun delights and live labor­
ious days." It is time, therefore, that we recall some 
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of the maxims of the classical past: meden agan, ne 
quid nimis, nothing too much; gnothi seauton, know 
thyself. "The proper study of mankind is man." To the 
humanist the universe is anthropocentric. He may be 
wrong. It may not be. But it is the only assumption that 
makes the human condition tolerable. Protagoras said 
that there are many appearances and some are better 
than others, but none is truer. Among the phenomena 
is the phenomenon of Man. Art is long, but life is short. 
There is the famous passage in Herodotus where Xerxes, 
watching his immense host crossing the Hellespont, 
bursts out weeping and, when asked why, replies that 
it has just occurred to him that none of these men will 
be alive a hundred years from now. Sunt lacrimae re­
rum. As Mr. Dooley, the sage of Halsted Street, said: 
"I know histhry isn't true, Hinnissy, because it ain't 
like what I see every day in Halsted Street. If any 
man comes along with a histhry of Greece or Rome 
that'll show me the people fightin', gettin' dhrunk, 
makin' love, gettin' married, owin' the grocery man, 
an' bein' without hard coal, I'd believe there was a 
Greece and Rome, but not before. . . . Histhry is a 
post-mortem examination. It tells you what a counthry 
died iv. But I would like to know what it lived iv." 
Perhaps what the children mean when they say today 
that love is better than war—though they do not know 
this because since they are not products of Christian 
classicism—is that the Greek word for human excel­
lence, arete, should be sublimated to the Christian con­
cept of human perfection, agape. 
by David F. Heimann 
III 
Christian Humanism 
in the Fourth Century: Saint Jerome 
In the history of the confrontation between the cultural 
forms of classical antiquity and the growing influence 
of the Gospel, the concept of Christian humanism 
is frequently presented as the combination of the best 
that each had to offer to the civilizing of the West­
ern world. There are obvious and very sound reasons 
behind this choice. Humanism has always seemed a 
most natural choice of word for describing whatever 
elements characterized the cultural refinement of the 
classical spirit at its best, and Christian, as a specific 
form of humanism, asserts that it is in the Christian 
view of man that humanism reaches its happiest devel­
opment. 
There are problems in using these words, as well. 
The concept of Christian humanism is, historically, more 
regularly applied to a much later era, the late Middle 
Ages or the Renaissance, an age that evolved a far 
fuller picture of the role of man within the Christian 
scheme of things. This is not to say that the role of man 
is, by its nature, uncongenial or wanting to the Christian 
point of view. However, it is possible that a scholar who 
looks closely at the fourth century might conclude that 
the Christian philosophy had not yet evolved its philos­
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ophy of man to the point where it could add significantly 
to pagan humanism. 
One must in fact observe that the two elements, 
Christian and humanism, do not always articulate per­
fectly: too often they contradict each other in areas 
where actually there was the raw stuff of an eventual 
synthesis that could have promoted the most cherished 
objectives of each element. 
One difficulty arises from the fact that the application 
of the terms Christian and humanism to the fourth cen­
tury involves some extrapolation. The terms are carried 
back over several centuries of development, and what 
the Christian humanist's view of the world must have 
been after Dante is, to some degree, predicated upon 
what it could have been only in potentia in the fourth 
century. 
Definitions 
The problem can be approached by two kinds of 
definition. The first is in terms of essence. Humanism 
is essentially the philosophy that proclaims the central 
importance of the role played by man, and Christian, 
broadly speaking, means pertaining to, or characterized 
by, the philosophy of the Gospel. 
What is really needed, however, is not so much a 
simple definition in terms of essence as a phenomeno­
logical approximation of the concepts involved, an 
awareness of the range of meaning gradually appropri­
ated by the terms, and determined ultimately by the his­
torical circumstances in which they developed and the 
peculiar limitations of the broader areas to which his­
torically they have been applied. Thus Christian must 
be distinguished into denominatively Christian and his­
torically Christian; humanism into the Renaissance 
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culture we know by that name, with the rediscovered 
human values it sought to assert, and what is more 
denominatively humanistic, that is, the exaltation of 
the role of man. There are those who could not possibly 
admit the term Christian humanism as applied to the 
fourth century in any conceivable frame of reference. 
Christian here is not the Christian of Apostolic or sub-
Apostolic times. It is Roman Christianity, in some re­
spects more a cultural milieu than a spiritual challenge, 
yet still demanding fresh impetus for its Gospel. At 
the same time, it is not the Christianity of our own day 
with all its dogma well worked out. 
In much the same way it is indeed probable that the 
humanism of fifth-century Athens could claim logically 
to exclude the very notion of a Christian humanism, 
for, by definition, the "intellectual search for and inter­
est in the true nature of man" 1 is inherently opposed 
to either enlightenment from a god or the eventual re­
duction of human effort to an ancillary status vis-a-vis 
the divine. Historically, this rigorous application of 
the terms has generally been avoided. Humanism can 
equally well apply to the philosophy that asserts the 
primacy of the human role in a universe in which there 
are gods, or in which there is a God. The first chapter 
of Genesis, for example, is a bold though essentially 
preliminary step toward the exaltation and liberation 
of man from the superstitious fear of gods and demons 
and existential insecurities of every kind, yet it is set 
squarely in a theocentric context. The same is true of 
belief in an afterlife. It can free a man for further con­
centration on the dignity of his human role just as well 
as it can violate what might be claimed to be the philo­
sophical limitations of humanism: man must be left to 
his own resources. In a word, there is nothing in the 
belief in a divinity, per se, to exclude the harmonious 
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linking of the two terms under consideration. Human­
ism can ideally be Christian, and Christianity can, in 
principle, be humanistic. 
There have been, moreover, changes in the meaning 
of the key concepts. Thus, a Christian humanism with­
out the external trappings and modes of thought proper 
to the Renaissance would be inconceivable from one 
point of view, no matter how secondary some of these 
elements might actually be to an essential definition of 
either humanism or Christianity. This is the precaution 
with which we must approach a consideration of the 
historical hallmarks of humanism: concern with man, 
with letters, with the past, with a classical ideal for art 
and society that is meant to be largely normative, and 
with the objectives and ideals of what we have come to 
know as liberal or humane education. 
So much for the historically determined definition. 
From another point of view it is more important to 
examine the essential definition of the terms. For then 
one can not only get at the fundamental elements but 
one can look back into history to identify the first ap­
pearances of trends or attitudes or spirit that can be 
recognized as denominative elements of Christian hu­
manism. We are thus ultimately forced into the position 
of using terms that have become overgrown with layers 
of meaning, while ourselves distinguishing the basic 
definitions. How humanistic and how Christian, then, 
is the Christian humanism of the fourth century? 
Another essential in the search for a definition is a 
measure of contemporaneity. This involves something of 
a reconstruction, similar to the methods of biblical stu­
dies, where the emphasis has rightly been upon recap­
turing the original spirit of the books. Our interpreta­
tion here should achieve a sympathetic appreciation of 
the world views of antiquity. There exists as yet, for ex­
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ample, no convincing appreciation of the Christian out­
look, in all its nobility and essential limitations, that 
animates Jerome's Lives of the Desert Fathers, or the 
early Christian dialogues; again, scholars have not yet 
properly identified the tone and spirit within the many 
patristic letters of the Christian martyrologies. Augus-
tine's Confessions and City of God have been ap­
proached in this more sympathetic way, as being docu­
ments that have early made their way into the larger 
framework of world literature; but many elements need 
to be considered before our evaluation is wholly in keep­
ing with the thinking of the fourth century itself, and 
not simply an overlay of later scholarship. Too often, 
for example, we steal a page from the Fathers them­
selves and read their works simply as mines of dogma. 
We should do much better to look into them for a view 
of the world and of man's position within it. 
Classical Humanism 
Classical humanism, in this context, describes a vision 
whose horizons are set by a paramount concern for the 
human, for the ideal of man and humanity as capable 
of individual and collective realization. Its hallmarks 
are proportion, harmony, balance, and aesthetic appre­
ciation of the most noble elements in man (not except­
ing the areas where human experience impinges upon 
the otherworldly), all inspired by a fine sense of form 
molded to mate with and perfectly to express the con­
tent of the vision. This is an ideal slow to develop, and 
once it is achieved, both in classical Greece and later 
again in classical Rome, it rapidly disintegrates. 
Hence the need for the well-known distinction be­
tween classical and antique.2 Classical refers to that 
whole nobility of human vision and ideals that has 
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ever caught the fancy of every true lover of the human. 
The age that succeeds upon the breakup of the classical 
may be, however, more properly referred to as antique. 
It is characterized by the retention of much of the ex­
ternal forms of the classical, but little if any of the 
spirit that gave life to that form; by a growing preoc­
cupation with erudition versus creativity; and by a 
corresponding lack of political, social, and cultural 
sense of direction. The true flowering of the classical 
soul, an intense but quickly dissipating vision, con­
siderably antedates the triumph of the Christian phi­
losophy, with which it never did come into direct contact. 
One likes to make the case that all that was best in 
Greek and Roman thought was channeled directly into 
Christianity, just as in another context one would like 
to envision the stream of Christian revelation running 
in one continuous flow from Old to New Testaments. 
The picture is not so simple as that. It is the antique 
and not the classical culture that meets with Chris­
tianity in its early years when Christianity was in a 
position to build a true continuity with the traditions 
of Rome. What Christianity takes, or even could take, 
of the antique past is, moreover, not the better elements. 
From Vergil, for example, the antique culture drew 
grammar and divination, but its entire literary orienta­
tion was everywhere too dependent upon compendia 
and commonplace, dogmatic misinformation joined with 
a triteness and a pervading sense of form that had al­
ready grown sterile when it no longer functioned as 
the form of classical harmony. This is a distinction fre­
quently enough made, but not always borne in mind. 
Historically, the result is a breach of continuity: there 
cannot ever be that happy and all but unnoticed transi­
tion from classical humanism to Christian humanism. 
To ask, in fact, what would have ensued had Christian 
64 
philosophy been wedded with the ripeness of the clas­
sical glory is, in some respects, quite pointless. From 
another point of view, however, it is a very healthy 
question, for its very phrasing points up much that de­
serves attention in the less than ideal state of things that 
actually obtained. 
Although it is important to be aware of this far-reach-
ing distinction between classical and antique, one must 
not overstate the position. The total historical configura­
tion that was classical humanism does not, when it 
begins to dissipate, simply burst like a bubble. There 
are elements in the dissolution that survive for a later 
regrouping in the Christian culture. There is thus a 
partial continuity, the continuity of individual elements 
within the larger discontinuity of an interrupted tradi­
tion. There is still access to the classical humanistic 
ideals, but now it involves, much as it does in the Re­
naissance or in modern times, a rediscovery; and the 
techniques for managing this rediscovery, this restora­
tion of formal continuity with the past, were not in the 
fourth century so sophisticated or reliable as they are 
today. 
Christianity was, moreover, already well on the road 
to evolving its own culture and philosophy. As a result, 
the less than accurate recovery of the older humanistic 
ideals proves to be something of an advantage in one 
sense, in that it affords the Christian development greater 
scope to assert those elements that are peculiarly Chris­
tian and still label the results as classical. Part of the 
Christian development, after all, ought to be what it 
can draw from the humanism of ages past. However, 
here the fact of discontinuity, especially when it is not 
clearly recognized, does invite considerable distortion. 
When all is said and done, one must admit that the 
classical spirit as a total outlook upon life had grown 
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so alien that only a few could lay valid claim to the 
sympathetic understanding of even its broader outlines, 
and fewer still could make a contribution toward its 
effective continuation. 
The concepts of continuity and discontinuity, which 
provide a convenient polarization for studying the debt 
of Christian humanism in the fourth century to the clas­
sical heritage, have led to many conclusions, some of 
which need to be reexamined. Time being a continuum 
for the experience of the individual, the scholar likes 
to superimpose a temporal sequence upon the flux of 
the centuries and find evidence of continuity or discon­
tinuity at every turn, the seeds of one thing or the Fort­
leben of something else. In this the scholar deserves our 
thanks; but to deserve our praise, he must be thorough. 
There is great danger that he will wrongly lead us to 
accept a basically incomplete statement of the reality 
whose outlines he means to trace. Notwithstanding these 
dangers, there must be a thorough examination of the 
characteristic elements of humanism, and their histori­
cal developments and adaptations, before we can even 
consider the validity of a Christian humanism in the 
fourth century. 
Man 
The humanist is expected to have a coherent picture 
of the central position occupied by man in the scheme 
of things. The pagan had this in the classical past, but 
it was a lesser ingredient in the antique culture inherited 
by the fourth century. The central picture of man, in 
the Christian theory, was also enunciated, in Scripture 
and in the earliest Christian preaching. The Christian, 
in pursuing his ideals, might logically incorporate the 
humanism of the classical past. 
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The humanist picture is supposed to flow from the 
consideration of man and his nature. The Christian pic­
ture of man, on the other hand, is supposed to flow 
from the dignity of man envisioned as the citizen of 
two worlds, an ideal illustrated by the Incarnation. 
Thus the Christian humanist view of man must har­
moniously blend two world pictures. We shall see shortly 
that whereas Christ and the Christian myth should, and 
perhaps could, have effected this amalgam, de facto 
it did not. The Christian paradox was potentially a 
definitive insight but seldom a true fusion of the two, 
often rival, claims upon human allegiance. 
The story of fourth-century humanism is further com­
plicated by the fact that pagan humanism looks solely 
to human reason for its knowledge of the philosophy of 
man, whereas Christian philosophy purports to draw 
upon a revelation as well. Thus it appears to conceal 
its debt to Greek philosophy, as transmitted by Cicero 
and others who had learned its essential modes of 
thought and divisions, and also to the pagan view of 
human dignity that is fundamental to the humanist tra­
dition. It is shortsighted to regard all these continuing 
or rediscovered insights as purely the product of Chris­
tian philosophy. 
Letters 
The humanist turns habitually to literature and the 
arts as an abiding and readily accessible source for the 
contemplation of his ideals of human dignity and en­
deavor. This conservative attitude has always demanded 
that the models that the humanist admires should have 
survived several generations; here the Christian hu­
manist draws his conservatism from the Roman sense 
of tradition as well as his own inherent religious ten­
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dencies. The humanist tends to call these works classics, 
in the sense that having stood the test of time they can 
present their insights to each succeeding generation as 
sources universally relevant to every age. The culture 
of the past is thus applied to the enlightenment of the 
present; its ideals and criteria are canonized, invested 
with normative value as models toward which any con­
temporary humanism must necessarily aspire. 
The Roman vocabulary uses the same word, mores, 
to describe both what has always obtained and what is 
the proper standard of any human behavior. The Chris­
tian develops this identification further in his discovery 
of a providential continuity in the economy of revela­
tion whereby God wills that the truths and ideals 
achieved by ages past should serve as building blocks 
for an increasingly lofty and definitive stage of spiri­
tual and intellectual development. This attitude is fur­
ther reinforced by the Roman tradition of continuity 
within a literary genre, and its extension to the world 
of early Christian literary endeavor. 
Language 
Historically the humanist has developed a nice sense 
of language if only because of his involvement with the 
literary records of the past. It is his capacity for speech 
that makes the human specifically different from the 
beast, and the Roman word for culture in general, 
humanitas, has always represented the Roman ideal of 
the fullest development of those qualities that are most 
human in man. In this context the proper definition and 
use of words and language have always been regarded 
as a convenient and accurate index of human intel­
ligence. 
This is more than simple fascination or jeu d'esprit 
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in the true humanist who should display a keen appre­
ciation of the need for formal equivalence between the 
truth that he apprehends in his mind and its eventual 
verbal or written expression. This is never simply a 
quest for elegance and polish, but, as it were, an attempt 
to establish a sort of inner harmony between the world 
of ideas and the world of verbal expression. The ensu­
ing discipline of expression tests the depth and accuracy 
of his thinking (if only in that the expression involves 
considerable time and effort) and exerts a powerful 
semantic control over the likelihood of either the verbal 
expression or the intellectual concept ever being lightly 
abandoned. The one mutually complements and rein­
forces the other. 
The Latin language is especially adapted to achieve 
this nicety and harmony of expression. The very forg­
ing of the Latin literary language and style, as a matter 
of fact, involved generations of dedicated and earnest 
labor in warring with the medium of language. These 
efforts are, to be sure, characteristic of all artistic de­
velopment, but the course that the Latin literary lan­
guage took was also influenced by Greek literary forms 
and models, the exemplaria that animated and inspired 
the Roman effort. The result was the fine balance and 
sense of language that marked the humanitas of Cicero 
and the artistry of expression of the poetry of the Golden 
Age—two precious ideals in the heritage that Rome left 
to the early Christian centuries. 
The Latin literary tradition thus developed a special 
predilection for polite (that is, polished) diction; for 
emendatio (the painstaking elimination of every im­
perfection) ; for lucidus or do (clearly grasped mean­
ing supported and set off by elegant diction); for callida 
iunctura (effective and ingenious ordering and arrange­
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ment of words to enhance their basic functions and 
nuance). This is a noble tradition that, once proclaimed, 
never really dies. The techniques forged by the need 
for expression remained available, like many other 
forms that have outlived their basic inspiration, for 
emulation by later generations of Latin writers who, 
though lacking the literary vision and potential of the 
Golden Age, found the ideal at least partially achievable 
in their careful attention to the smaller details of com­
position. 
The structure of the Latin literary language is such 
that it can express infinitely more in the way of subtle 
antithesis through its flexible word order than, for exam­
ple, can modern English. Contrasting words like one-
many, you-me, up-down, can, in the more flexible 
structure of the Latin sentence, be set side by side or 
otherwise stressed and contrasted. The Christian vocab­
ulary is by its very nature full of such contrasted themes: 
paradox that life is death, or death life. The Latin 
Christian authors exploit this potential to the full. 
Rediscovery 
Humanism can involve something of a rediscovery, 
in the Renaissance sense of the word, even where we 
would not look for it as essential. This accounts for 
much of its vitality. Even in classical Roman times this 
element was never wholly lacking (cf. Horace's exem­
plaria Graeca), and in the fourth century it is much 
in evidence. It implies essentially two things: enough 
continuity with the humanist tradition to create a sym­
pathetic atmosphere, and enough discontinuity to make 
the realization of the humanist insights a more or less 
new discovery for that age, thereby providing for de­
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velopment and change within areas that would otherwise 
have been too rigidly controlled by the conservative 
force of tradition. 
There is no compelling reason why the Christian 
faith and the Christian philosophy should not have 
developed a humanism that successfully emulated and 
continued the best elements of the classical past, despite 
the existence of differences in emphasis within the Chris­
tian humanist's attitude toward man, the classical past, 
letters and language, and in the degree of conscious 
rediscovery that he was able and willing to aspire to. 
It is disappointing to note that Christian humanism 
fails to achieve its fullest potential in all these respects; 
yet it is gratifying to observe how aware Christian think­
ers had become to at least some of these considerations. 
The Christian Myth 
The philosophy that animates the Christian synthesis 
involves continuity with the humanistic culture of the 
past. Although it is true that Christian thinkers very 
clearly began turning to the philosophies of Greece and 
Rome for models along which to develop the Christian 
message, it is also true that not all these philosophies 
were humanistic. 
Still, the Christian world picture or the Christian 
myth (that is, those elements in Christian thinking and 
revelation that correspond to mythos in antiquity) is 
characterized primarily by a radical unity and total 
depth. First of all, the Christian philosophy effectively 
subsumes the fundamentals of Greek and Roman phi* 
losophy: the vision of Plato, a world of pure and perfect 
existences whose shadows only are what we encounter in 
the life of the senses; the logical necessity of what was 
recalled of the Aristotelian system; the contemplative 
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charm of Neo-Platonic gradations to divinity; the indi­
vidual and personal imperatives of an afterlife, an ideal 
proposed and promoted by the mystery religions; and 
the Stoic gospel as a moral imperative. All these strains 
eventually find their place in the vision of a God who 
is both creator and object of love and guarantee of the 
soul's individual immortality. 
The Christian synthesis also bridged a deeper gap. 
Roman religion had sought primarily to achieve and 
maintain the pax deorum by a ritualized observance of 
all the externals of the divine cult, devoid of individual 
moral commitment to the Olympian divinities or even 
to the native Roman deities. There was no necessary 
connection between the gods' blessing upon the Roman 
state and the private morality of its citizens. In equat­
ing the two as equally imperative elements of religious 
observance, the Christian philosophy achieved a phe­
nomenon unique in antiquity and a source of interior 
strength. 
The person of Jesus Christ serves as key to this re­
markable accomplishment. As the embodiment of the 
Christian mythos, he combines heaven and earth, di­
vinity and humanity. At the same time, he exists as the 
Person Christ and the Mystical Christ, the whole body 
of the Christian Church who believe in his Gospel and 
are raised by his grace to a higher, supernatural level 
of existence on condition of their being one with him. 
In a single stroke Christianity might thus answer all 
the enigmas that Greek and Roman mythos might ap­
pear to raise: it might assert the value and dignity of 
man and still safeguard the prerogatives of divinity; 
it might settle the divergent claims of heros and theos, 
while asserting the unity of mankind, the purpose of 
human existence in harmony with a divine will, free 
will and foreknowledge in God—Christ as all in all. 
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Whereas the ancient humanisms had tended to look 
upon man as the measure of all things, this was not a 
view with which Christianity was particularly sympa­
thetic. Logically it might well have been, for humanity 
was given new status through the advent of the novus 
Adam, the new man who incorporated heaven and earth 
in the unified expression of the human dilemma, by 
virtue of which he could truly be called the measure of 
all things. This conception could have been called Chris­
tian humanism from one point of view: the philosophy 
developed about the concept of the man, Christ. It is 
not, however, what Christian humanism should have 
come to mean, and at all events it certainly does not 
characterize the thought of the fourth century, when the 
very word humanity, humanitas, tended to express one 
extreme of a polarization, divinitas being the other ex­
treme, and thereby to become a pejorative concept rather 
than the Roman term for culture. By the fourth century, 
the role of man as the measure of all things, although 
consistent with the basic principles of the Christian 
mythos, had already suffered considerable distortion. 
Religious Continuity 
For the more obvious continuities within the religious 
philosophy of antique Rome we can look to much of the 
form, the liturgical ritual and dignity (gravitas) that 
marked Roman religion: the liturgical season and its 
adaptations of the pagan vegetal cycle and hero cults; 
the concept of an initiate body of elect within the larger 
mass of lesser mortals; the derivation of personal stan­
dards of morality from an ethical philosophy based on 
an idealized yet coherent conception of the nature of 
man;8 even the mysteries and elements of superstition 
that continued to haunt the private observances of town 
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and countryside; finally, the burgeoning worship of the 
saints, the fragmentation or bureaucratization, if you 
will, of the essential purity and all-efficacy of the divine 
power. All this flows quite naturally from the Roman 
spirit and makes a profound impact upon the content 
and form of Christian literature. To its Roman antece­
dents the early church also owed its pervasive feeling 
for order and law; the hierarchically organized struc­
ture of its government; its sense of mission as lawgiver 
to the nations; its conviction of manifest destiny; and 
its presumption that the text of Scripture has a fuller 
and secret meaning.4 
The authority of Sacred Scripture, moreover, is only 
partly the result of the dogma of divine revelation, for 
it proceeds from a way of seeing things that is congenial 
to the Roman mentality, that is, the absolute authority 
of the written word that has survived the centuries. An 
equal respect is accorded to Vergil and Plato and to 
whatever survives from antiquity, and this is a ten­
dency that the Fathers and the early Middle Ages con­
firmed and carried several steps further.5 This attitude 
was further developed by the cult of erudition rather 
than originality. 
Yet this is not a surprising development before the 
advent of widespread literacy and before printing had 
robbed the word of much of its inherent mystique, a 
culture where auctor as a concept always has overtones 
of authority. Neither must we be surprised to note that, 
in keeping with the Roman mentality, there is always 
a strong interaction between form and content. These 
elements pass almost unconsciously into the Christian 
ambience and are subordinated to the Christian's sense 
of the otherworldly, which in itself accounts for the fact 
that Christianity did not subsume all these divergent 
strains with perfect harmony. 
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Tradition, one of the most cherished Roman traits, 
had certainly not been lost in the patristic era.6 Men like 
Tertullian, Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine were thor­
oughly in sympathy with the grandeur handed down 
authoritatively by Rome. This conservative tendency 
took the form of holding fast to a depositumfidei, re­
vealed faith entrusted to the keeping of the Church by 
Christ himself. Much of the inherent content of this 
depositum—dogmas such as primacy, Incarnation, Trin­
ity, predestination, grace—were slow to develop, in 
times free from persecution or as a reaction against the 
gropings of heresy. 
Heresy is, of course, essentially a pejorative word, 
but here it is a concept that needs to be evaluated in 
the light of its own times. In these early centuries it is 
more properly understood as a tentative expression of 
Christian philosophy. It thus becomes one of the polari­
ties of a Christian truth, at first uncritically believed 
by the simple and then upon reflection seen to contain 
some obvious inconsistencies. It provokes a reaction, 
and the resultant synthesis emerges as the authoritative 
statement of the Christian philosophy or, at a later date, 
as dogmatic truth. Heresy in these later years becomes 
heresy only after it has lost its debate with what emerges 
as orthodoxy. At first it appears to have an equal claim 
to win out as the truth. It is well to stress this point for 
the insight it provides into the Christian attitude. 
Christian intolerance of pagan opinion is character­
istic of a society that has either a conviction of the cor­
rectness of its official position or a sense of such im­
perative and categorical reaction against contamination 
from any source external to itself that not even the ad­
mittedly positive contributions of such an outside cul­
ture, not even those elements that would have been most 
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advantageously included in the Christian synthesis, dare 
be tolerated.7 This intransigent position had character­
ized the writings of those of the early Fathers who 
lacked the education to appreciate it, and in the fourth 
century this fear of subtle contamination was still very 
much in evidence. The resulting intolerance is cer­
tainly not humanistic, especially when the opposing 
views are founded upon a philosophy that is dictated by 
the highest traditions of classical culture, or when, as 
in the case of many of Jerome's adversaries, they are 
a corrective reaction against what is seen as an im­
proper development in the Christian philosophy itself. 
This is not to say that heresy is good or Christian dogma 
bad, but that the tension between the two forces in the 
fourth century needs to be viewed in a more sympa­
thetic light. 
Faith and Revelation 
The basic position of the Christian philosophy is gen­
erally characterized as faith, fides, a concept that has 
been subjected to considerable scrutiny and definition in 
the Christian theology. For present purposes, we need 
note only one point: the faith of the humanist should be 
in humanitas, as it was in classical times, whereas the 
Christian faith is faith in God or Christ. 
Now, this distinction does not cut off the Christian 
philosophy from all claim to insight into, and expres­
sion of, true humanism. Faith can be (and early is) a 
powerful stimulus to philosophy, for it opens the way 
to the contemplation of elements in human nature that 
otherwise never would have been appreciated.8 In the 
great Church Fathers one feels instinctively that this is 
the case. Yet here, too, Christian faith learned to focus 
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more on the wonders of man's role in the world than to 
consider his eternal goals so transcendent an objective 
as to monopolize all his human energies. 
The enthusiastic and inspired element of faith has 
always been part of the Christian tradition. Like inspi­
ration, however, the element of faith soon loses much 
of its personal immediacy and becomes largely a pre­
amble to acceptance of infallible truth. It was to some 
measure the failure, by the fourth century, of the Chris­
tian philosophy to provide adequate dialectic expres­
sion and foundation for the truths it proposed to the 
faithful that prompted it to have recourse simply to the 
"rule of faith," that is, the dogmatic assertion of a fact, 
and to revert to mysterion, that is, an article of faith 
believed to be true but still incapable of positive dem­
onstration because of the weakness of human reason. 
This is a position where Christianity had stood once 
before and to which it would again return. There was a 
more positive sense of mysterion as impetus to personal 
faith and commitment in the earlier years. The mani­
fest errors of the second-century apologists and the 
positions taken by the third-century philosophers, fluc­
tuating within the polarities of spirit-flesh and idealism-
materialism, eventually give rise to the Christian solu­
tion of negative approaches: the Christian philosophy 
was content to demonstrate that truths were not inher­
ently contradictory or repugnant to human reason. 
Whether one chooses to see it as an advantage or 
hindrance in the long run, the fact that Christianity does 
claim to draw upon an absolute source of authority, and 
hence credibility, for its philosophy is certainly the most 
ponderable element of discontinuity with the past. The 
proud conviction of divine revelation, a deposit of truths 
that impinge upon the world of human experience from 
without and bear the clear stamp of credibility by virtue 
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of their being vouched for by God himself, is a new and 
heady ingredient. It made the Christians an enthusiastic 
church of martyrs and evangelists. In time, however, it 
too came to function as material for the workings of the 
philosophic mind, once the passage of years had elimi­
nated the need for compelling demonstration of the 
concept as a basis for the unfolding of the Christian 
philosophy. Yet even apart from the Christian's need 
to retain his early enthusiasm, the Incarnation made 
serious demands upon the philosophical acumen of 
early Christianity. 
The duality of sources presents a real problem. True 
humanism, the purist might well argue, should be re­
stricted to the use of purely natural resources. Although 
it was argued that the supernatural source of informa­
tion could yield valuable insights into the human situa­
tion and destiny, eventually the formal differences be­
tween the two approaches betrayed the attempt at fusion. 
Fundamentally, and in actual fact, the Fathers did 
not mean to urge too great a distinction between the 
readability of those truths that came via divine revela­
tion and those that came via the light of natural reason. 
There was, they presumed, a continuum in the economy 
of salvation that provided for the sure progression of 
what was known, of old, by light of human reason into 
what came ultimately from the same source, God, by a 
uniquely different and more credible way. More cred­
ible, that is, not in terms of its ultimate origins but in 
terms of its having taken a more direct route, less sus­
ceptible to the vagaries of human misinterpretation. 
By the fourth century, moreover, Christianity had al­
ready begun to develop its own ambience. So much 
theologizing had already been done upon the divinely 
guaranteed data of revelation that it was not always 
possible to distinguish between what was known origi­
78 
nally via the unaided light of human reason and what 
had come through the medium of revelation. Much of 
what had indeed come from reason alone, but had taken 
a rather circuitous route, was made to flow instead from 
the sources of revelation as if it were a message straight 
from God, whereas in fact it had developed from the con­
tinuity with the classical past, not always classically 
remembered, and often in fact strangely distorted. 
Even where it was recognized and understood, the pagan 
classical heritage could not be simply taken over or even 
simply baptized. It would have seemed that the Incarna­
tion had been to no avail if the humanistic philosophy 
inherent in Christianity had been too easily and too 
simply recast in classical terms. Even when, as in the 
case of Ambrose's De Officiis, the classical pagan phi­
losophy does make its way into the patristic soul, the 
specifically Christian differences are generally stressed 
to the disadvantage of the pagan, which is to say that the 
cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, temperance, and 
fortitude are first of all baptized into their Christianized 
counterparts and then almost immediately relegated to 
a position of lesser importance than that enjoyed by 
the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity. These 
virtues, in their turn, undergo a curious development, 
progressing from the virtues imposed by a sort of neces­
sity upon the downtrodden classes who first embraced 
the Gospel to a position in which they are, so to speak, 
virtues only by analogy. It is the sheer gratuity of the 
Christian-infused virtues that is stressed. They come 
essentially as a free gift from God and are not the 
product of any human striving. Still, no purely human 
act is meritorious, in the supernatural order, without 
the foundation laid by these virtues in the soul of the 
elect. 
The doctrine of grace, as it takes on more precise 
form, lent further impetus to the development of an 
otherworldly orientation. It helped to set the unfortunate 
polarity of nature-grace, thereby asserting that nature is 
of itself evil and that its only salvation lies in its being 
elevated to the higher order of grace. This point of view 
tended to absolve the human agent of some human effort 
and further blunted his sensitivity to the humanistic 
culture. The search was now for the security of the super­
natural and the comfort of dogma, in place of the chal­
lenge of using the world and living the Christian paradox 
by honoring the claims of both nature and grace. The 
rapid emergence of dogma from the humanitas of philos­
ophy is regrettable, if only because dogma is of its very 
nature more intransigent and less open to religious in­
spiration, whereas a true Christian humanism needs to 
promote largely the opposite objectives. 
What theology does in essence is to press for a science, 
that is, rigorous dogmatic theology. This involves an 
abuse of the language of Scripture, reducing the Bible's 
inspiration to the more sterile guarantee of inerrancy, 
and thus tending to cloud the appreciation of the Bible 
as literature. Words in theology must taken on technical 
force, and the expression of high religious enthusiasm 
hardens into a search for literal meaning so that the 
terms can function as the precise medium of revelation. 
Frequently this process involves reading something into 
the text. There are subtle changes in important words, 
where the meaning appears to be the same, in connota­
tion, bearing, and intent, whereas in fact it has under­
gone considerable modification in order to function as 
the vehicle of scientific argument. 
This process of development and adaptation is seen as 
a providential one, with God working through the very 
imperfections of his chosen human instruments. This 
conviction does much to explain why theology, in its 
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search for precise demonstration of dogma, does not 
always hold fast to the obvious and literal meaning of 
words. Arguments frequently can be supported by alle­
gory, adapted senses, typology, even by outright error in 
translation. From the humanistic point of view this is 
an abuse of language, and it invites a further abuse. 
Gnosis 
Side by side with the development of dogma we note 
the rise of that occultist tendency to find the Gospel still 
speaking its mysteries, no longer in terms of the original 
religious challenge and vision, or, again, in terms of 
what had formerly served as the raw material for dog­
matic theology, but as an epiphenomenon, a growth upon 
the letter that would assure the occultist satisfaction of 
the need to be transcendentally reassured.9 
Gnosis is a term applied to a group of self-styled elite 
within the Christian religion, although it had its pagan 
antecedents and counterparts. It has close ties with Neo-
Platonism and the concept of knowledge through puri­
fication (the Essenes of the Dead Sea are a further 
analogue). As a doctrine it was gradually abandoned 
after the third century, when dogma had become more 
defined and there was less scope for writing one's own 
bill as a Christian. As an ascetic principle, characteristic 
of that group in every age to whom the Spirit really 
speaks, it is as abiding a factor within Christianity as is 
the Creed and the unshakable authority of the Roman 
Pontiff. 
This urgency to exploit the letter of the text for other 
than its obvious meaning was largely the result of 
changes in the Christian structure itself. There had been 
considerable flux in the first centuries of Christian think­
ing, and Harnack is not far wrong in asserting that the 
81 
Church has done well to reread her past in order to dis­
cover a unified development, at least in retrospect, where 
there had been precious little of it in actual fact. But 
now in place of flux and enthusiasm and inspiration, we 
have the harder stuff of dogma. Revelation had closed 
with the death of Saint John the Apostle, and all new 
thinking had to make explicit that which was already 
implicit in the sources of revealed truth. This framework 
imposed upon the development of Christian philosophy 
proved to be a wonderful source of unity and coherence. 
But it also made it difficult to rediscover the faith and 
enthusiasm inherent in Christianity by the truly human 
sense, that is, by going back in time to encounter this 
new phenomenon in all its original force and coming to 
grips with its true religious message. Much of the early 
spirit had not been adapted and transformed, and there 
were other important objectives to be pursued in theol­
ogy-
Still, this fascination with the letter pursues the letter 
in a peculiarly nonhumanistic manner and for nonhu­
manistic purposes. We should feel today that if the Gos­
pel has a message for us it must be as a document of 
high religious fervor, in keeping with the proper human 
use of language. When this sensus obvius is forced into 
terminus technicus or a "fuller sense," other even less 
legitimate purposes are pursued. Then it is inerrancy 
that speaks, a preoccupation that is nonhumanistic sim­
ply because it is superhumanistic. And, as every true hu­
manist might justly fear, the nonhumanistic rapidly 
develops into inhumanism, just as the superhumanistic 
will generally turn out to be antihumanism. 
There is, moreover, a difference with respect to the 
methodology of ages past. The basic dilemma of human 
existence was not customarily solved in the classical 
pagan myths and their literary development in tragedy. 
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It was, rather, sympathetically stated, and always re­
tained something of its inherent mystery. The dogmatic 
development of Christianity, on the other hand, em­
barked upon a somewhat different route. It gleaned ele­
ments of dialectic reasoning from the mythos of Scrip­
ture, through a process that does not always assure the 
survival of the religious inspiration of the sacred text, 
too often sacrificing enthusiasm for what proved to be 
merely logical afterthought or grammatical superstruc­
ture. This overrefinement resulted from confusing the 
literary genres of the sources and from reducing the 
utterances of the religious spirit to unencumbered state­
ments of dogma. Christianity needed to be disabused of 
the notion that it could solve the fundamental problems 
of human existence other than in principle and for the 
few. The process was long and painful. 
Classical humanism had, moreover, an aesthetic and 
anthropocentric view of man, whereas Christian human­
ism, even in its fullest flower, had a considerable mis­
trust of any real involvement with aesthetics as a primary 
ingredient of its world view. Aesthesis was too readily 
identified with decadence in the Roman culture of the 
early Christian centuries. This regrettable fact is, per­
haps, one of the clearest marks of discontinuity between 
the Christian and the classical ideals; and it is owing, 
not to any shortcomings in the Christian Gospel, but 
largely to the degeneration of true classicism into the 
pagan culture encountered by Christianity. 
The Christian ideal does suffer by comparison with 
the pagan classical ideal, in that it does not easily 
achieve either the balance or the awareness of human 
limitation—in a word, the thoroughgoing humanism we. 
have come to associate with the full flower of the clas­
sical pagan ideal. It was a very long time before the 
Christian life fused with the pagan form to achieve a 
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true appreciation of man's place in the universe, and 
even then this picture was quickly lost. Christianity is a 
ferment, and one hard to assimilate because it feeds 
upon, and thus destroys, much of what is really in its 
own best interests to preserve and develop. All of this 
simply illustrates the fact that theology and humanism 
are not universally compatible, and that certitude from 
God is too overpowering a credential. 
Now, the element of religion as an ingredient of the 
humanistic philosophy might, as we have seen, be seri­
ously challenged. The classical ideal must be seen as 
flowing from a consideration of human nature. Faith 
becomes compatible with human experience simply be­
cause the Christian does not always, in practice, reflect 
on the distinctions. In theory, however, there is always a 
potential problem: the individual will focus alternately 
upon one or the other polarity. 
Otherworldly 
The most serious shortcoming of Christian humanism 
proved to be the growing preoccupation with the other­
worldly. The afterlife became a preponderant element of 
the Christian's striving. Natalicia, birthday, became in 
fact the day of birth into heaven, not into earth. This 
same tendency is evident in other words. The shift in 
meaning of humanitas has already been noted, but one 
might also note how meekness and humilitas became ob­
jects of human effort instead of qualities to be avoided; 
how self-denial became more essential a virtue than tem­
perate enjoyment; and how the paradox was exploited 
that true life is seeming death. In a word, the chief theo­
retical claim of the Incarnation was to have produced 
the novus Adam, to have harmonized Logos and homo, 
the human and the divine in human destiny. Soon the 
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divine emerges as the preponderant concern: it is no 
longer a question of how manlike God has become, but 
rather how godlike man must become. 
In the fourth century this preoccupation with the 
otherworldly had more than theoretical and philosoph­
ical consequences. Christian religious enthusiasm had 
from the very beginning expressed itself in terms of ex­
treme dedication to the ideals of the Gospel. Persecution 
and martyrdom, or imprisonment in the name of Christ, 
characterized the careers and ambitions of the Christians 
of the first centuries. The fourth century, however, intro­
duced a new heroic ideal for the Christian who really 
meant to live up to his faith. With the cessation of perse­
cution and the consequent removal of an ever-present 
threat to life and freedom of expression, the Christian 
seems to have turned to a new and self-imposed challenge 
to preserve and constantly renew on a personal level 
the imminent urgency of the Gospel imperatives. The 
tendency had already expressed itself in terms of the 
chiliast enthusiasm, which is to be found as early as 
Saint Paul, the conviction that the second coming of 
Christ was near at hand.10 By the fourth century this hope 
for the imminent Parousia had dropped from focus, only 
to be replaced by a highly developed sense of askesis, 
not directed toward philosophical experience, but simply 
as a mark of the true Christian. 
Askesis itself is not new. There had long been a doc­
trine of catharsis, a self-refinement for the contemplative 
soul, but the Gospel provided an added impetus.11 Its 
overenthusiastic extension to the world at large involved 
painful adjustment. The controversies and tensions thus 
created will require some later discussion. 
The Christian is, after all, a citizen of two worlds, a 
man of two cities, in the classical formulation of Augus­
tine. His roots lie ultimately in both sources. On the one 
hand he has the mythology of the past with its human­
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izing (rather than anthropomorphizing) creation of a 
pantheon of deities who are really the larger editions of 
man himself; on the other hand he has a heritage of 
heaven after earth. The pagan religious ideal had sought 
to focus attention upon the individual's fullest develop­
ment of his inherent human potential. The Christian was 
slow to appreciate or accept this essentially ennobling 
view of human nature and to enlist it in the service of 
his own mythos. His world view too soon became an 
otherworld view. The Christian on the road toward 
Christian humanism needed, despite his calling to an 
afterlife, ideally, to make use of the world and even of 
the lustful and rebellious flesh itself before he could 
achieve his goal as Christian. He needed to be human 
before he could be truly Christian, and to be a Christian 
man before he could aspire to become a saint. For cen­
turies this ideal was neither fully realized nor resolutely 
pursued. 
When the proper balance in objectives was finally 
achieved, it came about, paradoxically enough, because 
of a change in focus. Christianity began eventually to 
function less as religious impulse than as atmosphere or 
backdrop. Much of what the Christian religion appeared 
to incorporate turned out, after the cooling effect of 
three centuries, to be merely a trend name for things that 
happened in a world become Christian. Much of what 
savored of the Christian world view was a Christian 
world view turned Establishment, with vested interests 
of its own. As such, it was ripe for a total reassessment 
of a heritage that it had failed to recognize in its infancy. 
It required the slow gestation of centuries to give birth 
to the new humanism as a proper harmony of the Chris­
tian philosophies of world and afterworld. The full 
achievement of this happy coalescence was not simply 
the product of the fourth Christian century; and one 
might well criticize the fourth century for failing to 
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achieve what it was uniquely qualified to achieve, for 
having let slip an opportunity that was destined never 
again to appear, or at least not for many centuries. 
The degree of Christian humanism achieved by the 
fourth century is still a true and genuine humanism. 
Our scholarly judgment tends to single out mostly its 
shortcomings if we fail to consider that Christianity was 
building upon the antique rather than the classical heri­
tage of ages past. We are in a position today to realize 
the failings more acutely because we can compare the 
acme of classical pagan humanism with what in many 
respects is only the earliest stage of the Christian human­
ism that later flowered in the Renaissance. Although 
our judgment is thus, in many respects, better founded 
than the less critical awe displayed by the Middle Ages 
for Patristic humanism, we must not swing too enthusi­
astically to the opposite extreme. 
Christianity and Classics 
The first Christian centuries had been marked by two 
different and not always consistent attitudes toward the 
pagan classical heritage in its literary form. Strong 
and sympathetic support came from those of the Fathers 
who were educated in the rhetorical and literary tradi­
tion of antiquity, appreciated the possible continuity 
between Christianity and its classical antecedents, and 
recognized the need to use pagan philosophy as a tool 
in the evolution of the Christian view of the world. Many 
others, conversely were more aware of the failings of 
contemporary pagan classicism (while they were unable, 
to recover the true classical humanism), of the need for 
a reaction against persecution, and of the precedence 
of otherworldly claims upon Christian allegiance. 
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The major representatives of these two opposing atti­
tudes are too familiar to require any discussion here. 
One should, however, note that a balanced judgment on 
these matters is all but impossible. If the scholar 
searches, he can draw up a surprisingly full documenta­
tion for either position, often within the oeuvre of one 
and the same Father. Even those who most mistrusted 
pagan learning felt the need to draw upon its basic forms 
of expression. 
There are a good many studies, general and specific, 
that explore the patristic relationship with the classics. 
Hagendahl, for example, has, most recently, compiled a 
listing of Saint Augustine's indebtedness to the pagan 
authors,12 and the subject is amply treated in the indexes 
of every scholarly edition of the patristic writings. But 
merely listing and identifying the sources is not enough. 
The simple fact of quotation does not indicate the atti­
tude with which the Fathers regarded their classical heri­
tage. The fact that we call these works classics today 
does not mean that the Fathers looked upon them as 
classics in anything like the Renaissance or modern 
sense. That would have been a difficult perspective to 
achieve, particularly in the face of prejudices that all 
tended to a quite opposite evaluation. The involvement 
with pagan philosophy, to which infant Christianity 
turned for methodology and a frame of reference, was 
not really humanistic. What was needed was the conver­
sion of a humanist or the thoroughgoing classical train­
ing of a sympathethically minded Christian. 
The opposition to the classics that appears to some of 
the Fathers is characterized by mistrust and misinforma­
tion. Those Fathers who have any valid claim to repre­
sent the Christianized humanism of classical times stand 
at best several times removed from the true mentality of 
the works they meant to build upon. We must never over­
look the havoc wrought by discontinuity in this respect. 
The reconstruction of the classical ideal, even where 
openly and enthusiastically attempted, was curiously in­
complete: inadequate in principle, subjective, biased, it 
sought demonstration and proof for the validity of some­
thing characteristically Christian that was supposedly 
founded upon its antecedents in the classical past, 
whereas it was, in fact, quite different in identity and 
spirit. 
This dual stream influenced the fourth century as well, 
where the issue was further complicated by the pre­
dominance of otherworldly orientations. But another 
factor that needs to be considered is the ad hoc and prac­
tical character of much patristic writing, which was thus 
often deprived of those classical humanistic ideals so 
essential to the literature of power as opposed to the 
literature of knowledge: the gratuitous development of 
an ideal theme as sufficient in itself to motivate and 
justify the artistic expression. We are dealing too much 
with the literature of knowledge or an attempted liter­
ature of power too hastily composed.13 
The influence of noble pagan thought was obvious in 
every century, and particularly in the fourth. Early 
scholarship, aware of these trends, described the resul­
tant product as pagan form and Christian content. Today 
we are more likely to recognize a higher degree of con­
tinuity within the content as well. There is thus a sur­
vival and contamination in genre as well as in the 
manner of expression. 
Patristic Literature 
The literary genres of early Christian writings have 
not received the same attention that has been accorded 
to biblical exegesis. The Roman had, after all, a sense 
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of form unique in the history of literature: he knew what 
was the proper vehicle for history, epic, satire, love 
poetry, a letter of consolation, or a panegyric. His sense 
of form led him to realize his creative inspiration only 
within the framework of a well-established genre or 
style. Painstaking emulation of one's predecessors was 
considered grounds for praise and recognition; thus the 
Roman literary mentality was not prepared to accept 
novelty. Its peculiar literary genius was more sym­
pathetic to a sense of developing tradition within the 
well-marked limits of a specific genre. 
It would be strange indeed if the Roman Church 
Fathers did not exhibit a similar awareness. Augustine's 
Confessions are, seen in this continuity, a sort of medi­
tative soliloquy. The City of God, which embodies the 
first attempt at a Christian philosophy of history, is, 
in other respects, a potpourri in the Roman tradition of 
the prose medley. Its historical and literary sources may 
or may not be manifold, but the style and form exhibit 
the later Latin preoccupation with anthologizing and ex­
cerpting of earlier authors. Jerome's Letters might have 
sprung from the pages of Quintilian as model develop­
ments of the stock rhetorical forms and styles: so much 
so, in fact, that scholars seriously doubt whether some 
of them were not written without any application to a 
real situation, as a jeu d'esprit on the part of that most 
classically learned of all the Christian authors, who lan­
guished for the rhetorical exercises of his youth. His 
Treatise against Jovinian is a fine specimen of the Roman 
style of exempla, anecdotes adduced as illustration of a 
thesis—which in Jerome's case is simply that women are 
no good. The fact that Jerome, in this context, appears 
to confuse illustration with proof is evidence, not of his 
having departed from the genre of exempla, but rather 
of the theological shallowness of many patristic po­
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lemics. The Scripture commentary develops after Origen 
on the lines of the standard explication de texte, such a 
natural if not always congenial instructional methodol­
ogy that it would be strange indeed if any epoch in the 
history of education has ever been wholly without it. 
The sermon, or homily, also a written composition, has 
manifold antecedents: the philosophic essay, the dia­
tribe, the rhetorical declamation, like which it often 
displays more brilliance than concern for evoking, in 
Bossuet's phrase, "the gift of tears"—that is, conviction 
and conversion in the listener. 
There is growing awareness among the students of the 
Patristic Age of these continuities between Christian and 
pagan Roman literary endeavor. We are concerned here 
with the non-Christian character of much that looks like 
Christian writing, those elements of continuity with the 
Roman tradition that extend more to matters of detail 
and content. 
Chief among these is the Roman development of the 
tradition of topoi, or literary commonplaces, stock 
themes that run throughout the history of literature. 
Unlike our modern age, antiquity attached no stigma to 
the employment of topoi. It was, in fact, a matter of 
pride to exploit them in novel ways. The literary history 
of individual commonplaces and their development well 
into the Middle Ages is a rewarding study.14 In a more 
general way, an awareness of these tendencies must en­
hance the appreciation of any individual patristic author. 
We shall see that this is particularly true of Jerome, 
largely perhaps because of his excessive involvement 
with mere words. 
Christian patristic scholarship on this subject has been 
curiously hampered by a nai've unwillingness to assume 
that the Fathers were actually using rhetorical and styl­
istic commonplaces, as if these were somehow at variance 
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with truthfulness and, as such, outside the arsenal of 
patristic expression. When Prudentius says he "saw 
these very things himself," it was immediately believed 
that he had done so; when Jerome alludes to the vices 
of his earlier years, he is taken at face value. When the 
Christian writer belabors his unworthiness or his inca­
pacity for artistic expression, it passes for genuine 
humility. When he asks God to aid his endeavors, it is 
made to sound like true prayer rather than a Christian­
ization of the pagan invocation to the Muses. 
Not only did the Fathers employ a considerable num­
ber of topoi that echo the Roman tradition; Christian 
literature itself soon evolved a well-stocked repertory of 
Christianized topoi of its own. This applies not only to 
the obvious substitution of Christian elements for pagan 
within the same context (like the invocation to God or 
the Saints instead of the Muses) or to areas where the 
words sound Christian to us because we are more famil­
iar with them as classical commonplaces (for example, 
protestations of unworthiness—humilitas), but also to 
many stock themes that are presumed to be the proper 
expression of the sentiments of a good Christian. This 
makes for difficulties in interpretation and requires a 
balanced judgment in assessing the true bearing of a 
patristic expression. Much of the Christian disparage­
ment of classical antiquity is not a matter of genuine 
conviction: it is conventional. Often, moreover, the very 
form of expression belies the content. One need only 
work his way through the first book of Augustine's Con­
fessions to appreciate this striking divergence between 
content (disparagement of classical literature) and the 
vehicle of its expression, which is Roman and classical, 
and jubilantly so. There is a longstanding Roman tradi­
tion, of course, for precisely this convention: see, for 
example, Horace's disclaimers to epic expertise in 
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Scriberis Vario [Odes 1.6), or in the opening lines of 
Satires 2.1. 
In a conservatively oriented and derivative literature 
such as the Latin patristic writings, content is often 
largely determined by borrowed forms. Continuity in 
traditional genres and individual commonplace made 
it a point of honor to emulate, within a traditional 
framework, the established works of those who were 
acknowledged masters in that field. The older catch­
phrase "pagan form and Christian content" is still par­
tially correct, because the Christian author had a differ­
ent message from that of pagan literature; but the form, 
too, must be seen as exerting a kind of mortmain upon 
the content, not only in its phrasing, but often in essen­
tial elements of its point of view. 
The very fact that patristic literature looked to earlier 
classical forms as a model and was aware of some con­
tinuity already precludes, at least in part, the full ac­
complishment of one cherished ideal of the true human­
ist. The patristic writer might indeed claim to be enlisting 
the past as the model for the present; but his horizons 
had grown too narrow. Continuity was largely restricted 
to form and the influences of form upon content. The true 
dimensions of the classical vision, which we might hope 
the patristic age could have recaptured, always hover 
beyond its grasp. 
Christianity and Latin 
The Latin literary language, as we have seen, is a 
facile tool for the humanist, the vehicle for the expres­
sion of Roman humanitas and fashioned for this pur­
pose. As the form determining the totality of structure 
and vision within pagan classicism, it soon dissipated; 
but many elements survived, reinforced by the rhetorical 
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bent of later education and its preoccupation with 
gathering bons mots from the past. These elments pro­
vided rich material for the Christian who was eager to 
apply even the most rudimentary humanism in language 
to the expression of his Christian faith. 
Unfortunately, it is not always the best elements that 
survived. One of the most obvious of the inherited tech­
niques is antithesis; inherent in any language, it is a 
more-developed stylistic element in the flexible word 
order of the Latin sentence. Latin thus fitted in providen­
tially well with Christian paradoxes and polarities, to 
whose expression it lent such a ready support that the 
results, in the hands of men who lacked the fullness of 
classical form and harmony, were an exaggerated atten­
tion to elaborate antithesis as a normal pattern for devel­
oping their thought. Such a stylistic imbalance soon 
reduced the impact of the paradoxical. Like much of the 
earlier pagan conceits of style, the striking became com­
monplace. 
In terms of the Christian Gospel itself, there was a 
more serious consequence: an overemphasis on the isola­
tion, and eventually the mutual exclusivity, of the two 
terms in the polarities of earth-heaven and flesh-spirit, 
rather than the promotion of their happy coalescence as 
contributing elements to one harmonious view of man in 
God's world. This was, after all, the greatest potential 
contribution of the Incarnation, the theoretical fusion of 
Alpha and Omega. It would be naive to blame the Latin 
language for this failure of the Christian potential; yet, 
in the developing Christian literature the ready use of 
these stylistic elements within the Latin tradition accen­
tuated the process. 
In this connection we must mention the phenomenon 
of vocabulary shift, a subtle tendency that may escape 
the notice of even the observant student of comparative 
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cultures and institutions—largely by reasons of its slow­
ness and of the easily overlooked difficulty of mastering 
any idiom other than one's native tongue. One recogniz­
able process is that by which originally undifferentiated 
words assume a new range of technical meaning. Ex­
amples abound in the Christianized glossary: presbyter, 
grace, baptize, martyr, pope—all become realities of a 
new order. Jerome contributed to the formation of more 
than 350 words; Lactantius and Tertullian provided 
many more. Many new words were required, and there 
were many new sources on which to draw: the Hebrew 
Old Testament, the Greek Koine, the specialized voca­
bulary of the New Testament. There were also many new 
concepts that still developed within the protective shell 
of the older words. Humilitas, for example, has already 
been discussed, as has humanitas. The nomenclature of 
the virtues might remain externally the same, but Chris­
tian self-control or continence does not correspond ex­
actly with the pagan concept of an inner harmony with 
the ideal. 
A more subtle shift lies in the connotative overtones 
that develop for many words, eventually forming an ob­
stacle against the recovery of classical humanism and its 
outlook. These words are to be found everywhere in the 
Christian writings: martyr, natura, saeculum, anima, 
mors, castitas, virgo. It is only the connotative overtones 
that change, and thus the bridge with the antique past 
appears to be continuous, whereas it is in fact a ghost 
over broken ruins. The Christian conception of the other­
world is largely responsible for this shift, and it is a 
natural phenomenon and thus to be anticipated. Failure 
to recognize these facts can weaken the reliability ol 
later judgment on the accomplishments, purposes, and 
humanitas of the patristic era. 
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Jerome 
Christianity had reached this stage in realizing its 
potential as a humanistic culture by the fourth century. 
With the cessation of persecution, Christian thinkers 
were in a position to address themselves to problems 
other than those of survival. The fourth century is also 
characterized by a significant measure of discontinuity 
with the classical past, as we have seen, so that any real 
sense of appreciation for that era was not largely a mat­
ter of rediscovery. It was a time when champions were 
needed, men whose grasp of Christianity was sympathe­
tic to humanism, who were acquainted with the classical 
heritage and able to understand with much the same 
eyes and ears as did the audience for which the mature 
products of classicism were first enunciated. 
Now there were, in fact, men of this caliber in the 
fourth century in the Latin West. Traditionally we num­
ber Augustine, Ambrose, Lactantius, and Jerome among 
the greatest of the Western Church Fathers. Here we 
shall consider only one individual Christian humanist 
who, among fourth-century Christian writers, far out­
ranks all others in his grasp of Roman and Greek anti­
quities. His peculiar frame of mind made him particu­
larly conscious of his debt to classical culture yet aware 
of those specifically Christian elements that needed to be 
safeguarded in any confrontation with the heritage of 
ages past. This man is Saint Jerome. 
Jerome has been presented as a man whose avowed 
mission it was to fuse all the best elements of both his 
worlds into the synthesis of Christian humanism.15 This 
traditional evaluation bears some sympathetic review. It 
is of course to be expected that his humanism would 
necessarily labor under the disadvantages of his time, 
when pagan humanism was neither well recalled nor yet 
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fully rediscovered in a Christian setting, and the Chris­
tian element itself had begun to suffer from improper 
definition of its ideal, citizenship in two worlds. 
Jerome's reputation is, moreover, essentially a product 
of the Middle Ages, whose judgment on the Church 
Fathers we have largely inherited and long tended sim­
ply to preserve. The medieval judgment on Jerome was 
based on much imprecise information and colored by 
the medieval community of purpose with the objectives 
of Jerome's own career. We need to reexamine particu­
larly those areas in which Jerome was most highly 
honored and esteemed: his erudition, his Vulgate trans­
lation of Scripture, his commentaries, his skill in using 
words, and his orthodox championing of the cause of 
asceticism. 
The shortcomings of erudition as a claim to literary 
fame could hardly be appreciated in an era like the 
Middle Ages, which were themselves more given over 
to erudition than to creative originality. In their way, 
they overvalued Jerome's actual acquaintance with the 
classical past. The unquestioned accomplishment of the 
Vulgate translation could too easily obscure the equally 
unquestioned weakness of much of Jerome's commentary 
and the tendentious intrusion of Jerome's own personal 
thinking into what he sets forth as the fuller meaning of 
the sacred text. The evaluation is, finally, largely a pro­
duct of monkish ideals. Only the clergy were in a posi­
tion to read and understand much of his work, and their 
enthusiastic appreciation of, and community with, his 
objectives have endowed his memory with a position of 
precedence, from which any subsequent evaluation has 
first of all to dislodge him before it can arrive at an 
objective point of view. In spite of detailed modern study 
of many of the points upon which Jerome's reputation 
rests, the essentials of the medieval attitude have not 
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been really touched, and scholars have not yet em­
barked upon a full-scale reevaluation. The attitudes in­
herited from the Middle Ages, though ultimately based 
on a set of judgments no longer entirely supportable, have 
nonetheless influenced our contemporary attitudes. When 
the Renaissance took up the subject of Saint Jerome, it 
had already inherited the traditional judgment; Renais­
sance writers took delight in the words Jerome had be­
queathed them and were not concerned to discover how 
superficial much of his familiarity with the classical 
ideals might be. They were concerned with the excite­
ment of rediscovery of what they presumed him to have 
known, and they were not put off by the strange bias of 
much of what passes for orthodox Christianity in Jerome. 
One curious and significant fact soon begins to 
emerge. The student of Jerome who takes pains to redis­
cover the venerable doctor in the light of the fourth 
century inevitably becomes aware of his many shortcom­
ings. Because Jerome was no proponent of the golden 
mean, his strong points each developed a contrary fail­
ing. The very elements in his career and makeup that 
enabled him to see the challenge and urgency of his 
ultimate objectives were precisely what hindered him 
from bringing his work to a successful conclusion. This 
statement is more far-reaching in application than might 
appear. It affects not only such obvious considerations 
as tendentious scriptural exegesis and overenthusiastic 
spiritual advice, but also his very methodology and direc­
tion. In this connection there are many individual points 
to be briefly considered. 
Erudition and Rhetoric 
Jerome's manifest acquaintance with, and apprecia­
tion for, Roman literature and philosophy would appear 
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to be an obvious claim to humanism. His erudition was 
the product of the best schooling available in his day 
(Donatus and Victorinus) and of an intense personal 
involvement with the literature and language of classical 
Latinity. But the true dimensions of this involvement 
need some sober appraisal and study. His indebtedness 
to earlier authors frequently goes beyond the relation­
ship of verbatim and acknowledged quotation. Whole 
sections are lifted from Cyprian, Tertullian, Theophras­
tus, Seneca; and there are constant briefer allusions, 
reminiscences, verbal plays, and echoes. His first book 
against Jovinian, for example, contains pages of this 
type of reference, a vast display of erudition if perhaps 
an unconvincing argument. 
Since A. Lubeck first delved into the question of what 
pagan authors were known to Jerome,16 succeeding gen­
erations of scholars have discovered more and more 
authors, pagan and Christian, Latin and Greek, that 
"Jerome knew." What has been generally ignored is 
the derivative character of much of Jerome's acquaint­
ance. He had read some of these authors, not in the 
original text, but in essays and anthologies. Latin litera­
ture had, since the time of Cicero, delighted in series of 
exempla, pointed anecdotes or quotations designed to 
illustrate a theme. The related genre of the prose medley, 
originally a forerunner of the classical Latin satura, 
grew in vogue with the developing appetite for secondary 
literature that marks the epitomes so popular in the 
decline of Silver Latinity. Jerome is here largely a child 
of his times. The history of this later literature is filled 
with the names of epitomizers of major literary works 
of the past, minor compendia and manuals, as well a« 
collections of curious anecdotes and antiquarian lore 
like the Attic Nights. Although much of this has come 
down to us, much more has mercifully been lost; and 
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most of what we have now recovered of classical an­
tiquity came into the hands of Jerome, and later of the 
Middle Ages, only in pericope. From another point of 
view, it is quite in keeping with the established Roman 
tradition to entertain this richness of quotation in one's 
literary work, in the expectation that the subtlety and 
brilliance of the allusion will be recognized and appre­
ciated by the equally erudite reader. The question in 
Jerome's case is rather how well he actually knew the 
various authors from whom he quotes. 
The question is further complicated by Jerome's less 
than candid manner of quotation. He appears to have 
made some deliberate effort to conceal the immediate 
sources from which he gathered material with which to 
grace his exempla. Jerome really appears to be quoting 
Seneca, Theophrastus, and others, in a rather loose form 
of reference, giving the impression that he has read them 
all at length.17 
One is forced to admit that this type of literature is 
not in the very best interests of the humanist tradition 
because it is not truly involved with classical ideals and 
models either in content or in form, that is, in the ideal 
of balance, nobility of expression, and aesthetic har­
mony. It is, rather, a curious, anthologizing, and even 
anecdotal, preoccupation with the trivia of classicism, 
an involvement with a footnote literature that can easily 
preclude any higher sense of appreciation. What we en­
counter here, in a word, is discontinuity with the spirit 
and continuity only with the formal ornaments of clas­
sical humanistic literature and spirit. 
Further disadvantages of such erudition are its pen­
chant for verbal association rather than sense and mean­
ing, and, at least in the case of Jerome, a well-indulged 
propensity to quotation. None of all this was known to 
the Middle Ages, who supposed instead that Jerome had 
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his is purely imitative satire: there are few proper 
names that are the product of his own experience, and 
there is little personal observation, simply the most 
generic statements, about wine, women, merrymaking, 
the faults of some of the secular clergy, or vilification 
of his opponents in set formulas. Jerome would thus 
appear not to be a satirist in the Roman style. 
Such an evaluation, however, fails to take into ac­
count some important facts. Jerome was justified in 
claiming spiritual kinship with the Roman satiric tradi­
tion in prose or verse. The mordant character of Roman 
satire is often dependent upon the careful manipulation 
of words. This careful attention to language precludes 
to some extent autopsia, that is, personal observation 
of the subject matter that is being satirized; animus, a 
strong held personal attitude against the objects of one's 
attack (like Juvenal's indignatio); and finally, even 
elaboration of the terms and topoi employed in the satire. 
The objective of the satirist is—at least, in part—to 
emulate his predecessor in the refined expression of 
commonplaces while making some personal contribu­
tion to the genre of satire. 
Jerome, too, achieves this objective, though with 
lesser invention and a rather heavier hand. It is in this 
sense that he is most truly a satirist, not a man pos­
sessed by indignatio that simply swells into spontaneous 
vilification or the righteous wrath of God's holy ones. 
There must always be something of this lack of im­
mediacy in Roman satire, with final composition sev­
eral times removed from inspiration. One cannot sustain 
animus throughout the time it takes to write cleverly; 
although the objects of satire remain and the purpose 
may still wax strong, there is more scope for verbal 
display than for violent feeling. 
We have seen that Jerome is not unsympathetic to 
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the Roman tradition of erudite quotation. Even when 
he is simply cataloging exempla from antiquity, Jerome 
could well count upon his readers' recognizing his 
sources and looking upon his use of them as stylistic 
embellishment and as evidence of his scholarly author­
ity. The extensive use of quotation is indeed a hallmark 
of the satiric tradition and reaches its climax in Juvenal. 
Jerome's satire in the fourth century, however, suf­
fers from a certain discontinuity with classical satire. 
What survives of the Roman tradition are largely the 
lesser ingredients of satire: topicality, quotation, the 
borrowed phrase. The larger framework had already 
dissipated, and together with it much of the careful 
discipline and skill of composition. There has been 
relatively little discussion as to whether Jerome ex­
pected or wanted his readers to recognize his sources. 
If this was his desire, it would be an example of con­
tinuity with other satirists—Juvenal, for example, and 
Horace—and of the anthologizing tendencies of later 
Latin literature in general. But, as we have seen, though 
Jerome makes a conscious effort to parade his "book­
shelf" of classical authors, he conceals its ultimate 
sources, which one must suspect are largely secondary 
—in Jerome's case, the lost misogynistic treatises of 
Porphyry and Seneca. 
Jerome's position in the history of misogynistic liter­
ature is well established. Not only does he sum up the 
combined topoi from antiquity, but he also stands as 
the fountainhead from which much of the antifeminism 
of the Middle Ages flows. Misogyny, like satire, is nei­
ther particularly Christian nor humanistic in spirit, 
although it antedates (and may well survive) both 
Christianity and humanism. Historically it forms an 
understandable continuity within both traditions. The 
Roman church, like the society of the antique and clas­
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sical past, was male-dominated. The Old Testament is 
male-oriented, as was the ancient Near Eastern culture 
upon which it drew. The fourth century had learned to 
view woman as something more than a ready target 
for satire. Woman presented an occasion for temptation 
and sin, which, in this context, is equated with unchas­
tity. The pairing of this vice and the repertory of an­
cient antifeminist bromides is a powerful combination, 
particularly in the hands of a man who has a way with 
words and an ax to grind. Thus the bearing and the con­
tent of commonplace witticisms at the expense of wom­
ankind were altered. Jerome is further concerned with 
promoting the monastic vocation, and he himself shows 
a serious psychological eccentricity. 
The curious taste of many of Jerome's examples and 
allusions is another case in point here.21 In itself, there 
is nothing especially humanistic about scurrility, for it 
is a violation of that balance between nobility of thought 
and its harmonious verbal expression. There has always 
existed, however, a literary convention of scurrility, 
with well-defined rules for its use. In Roman satire, 
point and spirit are gained by sophisticated language 
(like the educatedly ribald limerick), a mock-heroic 
quality that exploits the disproportion between the area 
of human experience being described and the vehicle 
of its description.23 Jerome's style often goes beyond 
these nice limits. 
There is, finally, a certain shock value in the use of 
less than perfectly decorous vocabulary and diction.24 
In Jerome's case one cannot always know what consid­
eration have determined the tone and taste of his writ­
ing, but there is evidence to lead one to conclude that 
it is not always sophistication. Fundamentally it is not 
the highest classical tradition: the subject matter is 
allowed to outweigh care and attention to expression. 
105 
Language and Style 
One point that emerges from an examination of the 
various genres and styles of composition that Jerome 
employs is his mastery and variety in mode and level 
of expression. This is in keeping with classical human­
ism: rhetorical propriety decrees that there he both a 
style and a level of diction for every occasion, and this 
is to be scrupulously observed, even in the breach, as, 
for example, in the case of mock epic. 
In the exegetical works and commentaries Jerome 
is objective and sober, granted the prejudice of the 
Christian exegete for the fuller sense and typologies. 
It is only in his letters that he indulges in the rhetorical 
flourishes that later seem to have been corrected or 
restrained by maturity. The Lives of the Desert Fathers 
are jewels of careful composition, and the polemics 
range between the descriptive style of satire (that is, 
careful attention to words and diction in the sophisti­
cated reviling of his adversaries) and the outpouring 
of ill humor against his opponents. In his use of the 
other genres he has some claim to classical humanism, 
but his polemical style argues a lack of true humanistic 
insight: Jerome reneges on the effort to couch his thought 
in the appropriate form and bring it to the proper level 
of elegance. 
We may profitably examine Jerome's unquestioned 
way with words. He is first of all as translator, involved 
with the precise range of meaning in rendering the origi­
nal Greek and Hebrew texts into Latin. Ancient transla­
tion in itself is not the finely accomplished rendering 
of sense for sense and poetry for poetry that we are 
accustomed to expect today, and, in the case of the 
Bible, there are other considerations as well. The force, 
sometimes the very presence, of idiom is often over­
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looked because of the conviction, already gaining in 
popularity during the lifetime of Jerome, that inspira­
tion is inherent in the words themselves and not just in 
the message or the meaning. This conviction, and the 
understandable effort to perpetuate the message, results 
in a tendency to concentrate on the rephrasing of the 
original text in a one-for-one relationship, reproducing 
the words rather than the meaning, so that any deeper 
message, latent in the word but not clear to Christian 
thinking at that time, would not be lost for the contem­
plation of later ages. 
Psalm 121 will serve as an example. The Vulgate 
translation contains the cryptic (and literal) rendition 
Jerusalem quae aedificatur ut civitas, cuius participatio 
eius in idipsum. The more recent Latin translation reads 
in se compacta tota. What is missed here is the force of 
an expression like the Greek eis TO avro or inl TO avro, 
"together." In 1 Cor. 7 : 5 this same failure to recognize 
the idiom gives the reading et iterum revertimini in 
idipsum, which is then made to take on the sinister im­
plication that the Apostle "blushes to refer to the sex 
act by name," using the phrase id ipsum as a substi-
tute.25 
Despite many errors, Jerome should be criticized 
only in the light of the better control enjoyed by mod­
ern scholars over the real meaning of words in ancient 
languages and of higher modern standards in the art 
of translation. The Vulgate is universally acknowledged 
as a supreme accomplishment, a brilliant wedding of 
reverential and elevated style with vocabulary and locu­
tion accessible to the common Christian and achieving 
the dignity and the immediacy proper to the sacred 
text. Further, the Vulgate, canonized in its turn, enjoys 
the same textual inviolability as did the original; pro* 
found theological argument has always exhibited a 
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retrograde tendency to revolve about the word and 
letter rather than the underlying message and spirit of 
the sacred text. 
The precise range of meaning, however, even in the 
translation of Scripture, is not what should always be 
most characteristic of the humanist's concerns. It is 
more the province of the theologian, a role Jerome was 
little qualified to assume. What the true humanist, in 
the fourth century, ought to have recognized was that 
considerable development had occurred and was still 
occurring in the very words he used. This is to be noted 
not only in Scripture, but in every area of the new 
Christian vocabulary. 
Although the detailed methodology for the study of 
comparative vocabulary and connotative uses of words 
is not yet complete, many examples can still be adduced. 
A number of these words have already been pointed 
out. Perhaps the most obvious instance of Jerome's 
tendency to equate the connotative values of the Chris­
tianized vocabulary with the less differentiated usage 
of the same words in earlier authors is at the end of 
his first book Against Jovinian, where the word virgo, 
in its fullest Christian connotation—that is, a woman 
who has dedicated herself to Christ in perpetual chas-
tity—is taken as a key word for stringing together a 
long list of virgines Romanae et Graecae who are held 
up as models for the Christian world and proof of the 
fact that virginity has ever been held in highest repute. 
As we shall later discover, the word virgo was dear to 
Jerome for other reasons as well. 
Analysis of Latin word order in the writings of a 
particular author, a study developed by Marouzeau,26 
has two specific purposes: first, to determine how nat­
turally the author writes Latin or to what era of Latinity 
his style must be assimilated; second, to determine 
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how far he exploits the potential of Latin to express 
subtle nuance by shifts in word position. The verb in 
the Latin sentence, for example, depending upon its 
position as initial, medial, or final, can assume fine 
overtones of meaning; and the adjective, to achieve con­
trast or in order to invest a word with new force, can, 
for example, precede rather than follow its noun or 
even be separated from it by a brief disjunctive element. 
Similar observations hold true for the other parts of 
speech, and these elements all lend themselves to statis­
tical analysis. Some work has been done along these 
lines with the text of Saint Jerome.27 
Jerome's style, like that of many of his contempo­
raries, leans heavily toward the nonperiodic Senecan 
prose style. It is characterized primarily by a less in­
volved syntax, shorter sentence patterns, and rhetorical 
display. The increased parataxis allows greater con­
centration on the potential for striking expression and 
clever nuance inherent in the nominal cluster (the noun 
and its adjectives or genitives) and the meaningful 
positioning of the verb.28 This tendency has reasonably 
been called baroque, in that the style appears to set 
higher value upon ornamentation and detail than it 
does upon the classical ideal of total form. Scholars 
have seen these developments as a deviation, a losing 
sight of the true classical spirit. But it is also, and 
equally important for our study here, a ready technique 
for developing the Christian paradox. As such, it was 
popular long before the time of Jerome—so much so, 
it has been observed, that the paradox as a Christian 
insight into reality had lost a good measure of the force 
of the paradoxical and had become something of Chris­
tian commonplace. Jerome seldom misses an opportu­
nity to exploit the emphasis or effect that can be 
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achieved by variation in the position of words within 
their proper syntactic group. This tendency is observable 
to different degrees in the various genres of composition, 
but it is always in evidence. 
There is, moreover, evidence that Jerome had suc­
cumbed to the temptation (or perhaps had fallen vic­
tim to the process) that seizes upon the humanist whose 
concern with capturing a culture not entirely contem­
porary in spirit to his own experience forces him to 
cast the substance of his thinking in the mold of a more 
antique expression. The antique language, in its terms 
and concepts and in its patterns of expression, exercises 
a sort of mortmain upon the content of what is said. 
This is particularly true of Latin, where the develop­
ment of an adequately abstract and plastic medium for 
the expression of the classical ideal of the Golden Age 
is intimately interwoven with the very essence of that 
ideal itself. Form and content are thus so interdepen­
dent that the vitality of the one cannot (or at least does 
not, historically) really survive the decline and eclipse 
of the other. 
If a modern scholar sets himself to compose in Latin, 
and really enters deeply into the spirit of the language, 
it is truer to say that Latin is writing through him rather 
than that he is writing Latin. There is evidence that this 
is already the case in the relationship between the fourth 
century and the classical past. A warm familiarity with 
the literary productivity of classicism is always a prime 
ingredient of the humanistic attitude, even if the quo­
tation and imitation are more a superficial jeu df esprit 
than a true allegiance to the ideal of the earlier hu­
manism. In the case of Jerome there are many other 
factors to substantiate and reinforce this argument: 
his love of classical rhetoric, his involvement with a 
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purely verbal level of experience, his preoccupation 
with words and meanings, his ready grasp of the actual 
patterns of writing and bon mots from the past. 
Scripture 
The patristic usage of Scripture reached a climax 
in Saint Jerome. One drawback to his undeniable ac­
complishments in this field was his extreme overfa­
miliarity with the sacred page. He knew it so well that 
willy-nilly the quotations flood his mind. The famous 
Letter 22, for example, might be studied as a classic 
example of the cento form, a composition made up in 
part of sheer scriptural quotation, not all of it apropos, 
and loosely stitched together into a patchwork. He 
personalizes and allegorizes Scripture and frequently 
quotes or alludes with such passing brevity that a series 
of determined editors have still not run down every 
reference. The principle of organization is frequently 
mere verbal association, facile but not always really 
accurate. This is in keeping with the inherited literary 
tradition: it functions as a sort of extension of the 
"Great Books" prescribed for the educated man and 
harmonizes well with the classical practice of learned 
quotation. By the fourth century firsthand acquaintance 
with Scripture gives rise to a body of Christian litera­
ture, and familiarity with its less widely known pas­
sages is the proud mark of the Christian scholar and 
man of culture. 
We have seen, however, that by the fourth century 
Scripture was also becoming source material for theol­
ogy. Hence, confusion arises as to the precise frame.of 
reference in which a given quotation is to be understood, 
whether as learned display or as an attempt to demon­
strate the infallible truth of a statement in a theological 
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context. This applies especially to the polemical use of 
Scripture, where context and purpose call for dogmatic 
proof based on the sacred text, but the style invites 
learned display in quotation and allusion. Whereas the 
commentary becomes the technical tool and repository 
of theology, and the homily applies Scripture for prac­
tical ends, the polemical usage of Scripture is often an 
excursus into a different realm, with little pretense to 
serious scholarship. The polemical application of Scrip­
ture in the Fathers is a subject that has received scanty 
attention. It is, however, especially in Jerome, a curious 
mixture whose basic elements can be at least briefly 
illustrated. 
An interesting example is the tendentious equation 
of the force of an expression used in one context with 
its quite different application in a different setting. In 
AJ 1.7d Jerome quotes the Apostle's advice, "Do not 
deprive each other except perhaps by consent for a time, 
that you may give yourselves to prayer" (1 Cor. 7 : 5 )  , 
in order to demonstrate that sex in marriage and Chris­
tian prayer cannot possibly coexist. He then points out 
that Paul also bids us to "pray always" (1 Thess. 5 : 17), 
and concludes that we are thus never "to be subject to 
the service of wedlock, for everytime I render my wife 
her due I cannot pray." 
A scriptural expression is often pressed to yield a 
meaning it was not intended to bear in the original text. 
In commenting on the force of God's command to the 
first parents, "Increase and multiply and fill the earth," 
Jerome points out that this does not apply to Christians, 
whose "citizenship is in heaven" (AJ 1.16). This ex­
ploitation of a secondary word can be carried further, 
as in Letter 22.10, where Adam's original sin is de­
scribed as being motivated by gluttony because it in­
volved eating. Again, drawing upon his expertise in 
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language and skill in translation, Jerome embarks upon 
learned if tendentious interpretations of such key words 
as almah in the Hebrew text of Isa. 7 :14, defending 
and further restricting the bearing of the prophecy 
of the virgin birth.29 He insists upon "chastity" as the 
proper rendering of sophrosyne, rather than "prudence," 
and coins a neologism castificat, "chastifies," in place 
of the more common reading "sanctifies" in AJ 1.27, 37. 
Jerome occasionally appears to miss the basic idiom, 
as we have already seen: ets or CTTI TO avro in 1 Cor. 
7 : 5, for example. In this connection, however, Jerome 
can always fall back upon the fuller sense, the wealth 
of hidden meaning with which God has filled his sacred 
text. This, in turn, leads to further extensions of the 
literal meaning. There is allegorization, sometimes quite 
extended, and typology in the treatment of the deaths of 
Moses and Joshua in AJ 1.2 ff. There is mystical in­
terpretation of proper names, of Rome at the end of 
the Treatise against Jovinian, or, more pointedly, of 
Lebanon (whiteness—of purity), of Sanir, of Hermon 
(which is said to mean "consecration"—of a virgin), 
AJ1.30. 
Jerome often indulges in numerology to support in­
terpretation. The number two (the number of the sex 
act) is not a good number because in the Hebrew text 
of Genesis, God is not recorded as having seen that the 
work of the second day was good, though he finds the 
work of the other days good in Genesis 1 (AJ 1.16) .80 
The Parable of the Sower furnishes ammunition in this 
same context: the 30, 60, and 100 that describe the 
yield refer to three ascending grades of virginity.31 
In establishing a framework for his interpretation, 
Jerome is willing to support either of two opposing 
positions. If an Old Testament example corroborates 
his argument, he asserts the radical continuity of Old 
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and New Testament revelation. If it contradicts his posi­
tion, he then argues for the lack of continuity and em­
phasizes the newness of the Gospel mandate. The same 
ambivalence is noted in references to pagan examples. 
If the pagan model reinforces his point, then "Chris­
tians ought at least to equal the accomplishments of 
noble pagans"; but if the pagan is opposed to the Chris­
tian, it is divested of all authority as being without the 
tradition of the Christian revelation. 
Jerome can also read between the lines of Scripture. 
In 1 Pet. 3 : 7, husbands are instructed to live with their 
wives iuxta scientiam, or secundum scientiam, and to 
"pay honor to the woman as the weaker vessel." This 
eventually is forced to mean that perfect chastity in 
wedlock is what the Apostle means to prescribe for 
Christians (^4/1.7e). 
In addition to adopting an intransigent interpretation 
of the Apostle's words about marriage and to develop­
ing his argument by an overly rigorous logic (AJ 
1.7-9), Jerome also determines that there is a differ­
ence between what the Apostle desires Christians to do 
and what he only concedes to them in view of more 
serious possible evils (AJ 1.8). He also develops an 
argument based on noblesse oblige: the Christian can­
not rest content with the imperfect moral obligations 
enunciated by the Old Testament (AJ 1.24a). Drawing 
upon superior familiarity with the sacred page, Jerome 
can easily outmaneuver the opponent who dares to close 
with him. Where Jovinian had appealed to Solomon 
as support for his argument in favor of a like reward 
in heaven for both the virgin and the married, Jerome 
takes up the same figure of Solomon as a man of con­
siderable marital experience who had spoken strongly 
against the advisability of taking a wife (AJ 1.28a). 
Again, against the interpretation of the story of the 
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wedding at Cana (John 2 : 1-9) that argues Christ's 
willingness to accept marriage as a way of life, Jerome 
counters that by going to a wedding party only once, 
Christ has instructed us to marry no more than once 
(,4/1.46). 
Now, much of the above might suggest the conclu­
sion that Jerome is involved in demonstrable error in 
the polemical application of Scripture. There is one 
other facet of the patristic use of the Bible, however, 
that still needs to be considered. All the specific types 
and instances of quotation considered above—and they 
are no more than representative of a much larger selec-
tion—can serve primarily not so much to demonstrate 
as to reinforce the writer's sense of the unity of his 
source and to reestablish a living contact with the autho­
rity for, and inspiration of, his Christian theology and 
religion. This reassuring sense of unity derives from the 
fact that both authority and inspiration come via the 
same medium, and a subtle reinforcement of the basic 
position is achieved by reflecting, in an aside at times, 
how a given quotation corroborates the central truths 
under discussion. This methodology centers the writer's 
subject matter within a setting of homogeneous doctrine, 
all of whose elements illustrate at least the general back­
ground upon which the exegete bases his argument. 
They may also serve to test the validity of one element 
by establishing the harmony with which it adapts to all 
the other elements of the Christian religion. This process 
need not always involve the most logical interpretation 
of the texts; often there are applications and interpre­
tations that derive allegory, interpretation of names, 
numerology, typology, and a "fuller sense." 
The quotation, then, is meant, not as a full and proper 
demonstration, but as a reflection upon how harmoni­
ously the whole edifice of Christian awareness fits to­
115

gether, and as an inspirational renewal of the sense of 
purpose and dignity of the Christian vocation that is 
dictating the objectives of the polemical writing. The 
liturgical setting of many of these texts further enhances 
the immediacy and effectiveness of the process. The 
purpose and methodology of the early Christian liturgy 
and homily involve constant and pointed repetition, in 
mythic form, of the basic truths of the faith, such that 
their very familiarity and the noble grandeur of their 
liturgical expression32 (and here the Roman gravitas 
stands out to fullest advantage, as does the Roman's 
involvement with exact expression of dogmatic truth) 
become a powerful tool for understanding the funda­
mentals of the Christian religion. If understanding is 
humanly impossible, these texts serve to fix the correct 
terms of the dogmatic statement of the mysteries and 
find practical application in motivating a life of special 
dedication. Scripture and the catechism of Christian 
doctrine take on a particularly compelling tone when 
the words are encountered in a sacral and liturgical 
context. This consideration, incidentally, explains why 
the quotation often runs far beyond the point where it 
properly applies to the argument and thus invites a 
sort of meditative vagary that, in its way, accomplishes 
the very same objectives. 
Even apart from this liturgical encounter, private 
reading of Scripture nourished the piety and conviction 
of these men, and the word of the Bible was always close 
at hand when they came to pondering the basic realities 
of Christian life. The patristic attitude toward Scripture 
is thus perhaps best described as omnidirectional, and 
the primary concern for one of the various possible 
applications of the sacred text must never be taken to 
exclude the simultaneous application of others as well. 
There is, in Jerome's case, the further element of 
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authority as an interpreter of the sacred word. The trans­
lator has a position of special privilege as interpreter 
of what he has translated, especially if he has in his 
youth copied and translated the commentaries of the 
mighty Origen and other learned men, and thus can 
support his own views and opinions with copious au­
thority. Jerome, however, goes beyond his depth in 
taking the position that his word is authoritative not 
only on matters of translation but also of canon, criti­
cism, and exegesis of the kind that produces doctrine 
and theology. This exaggerated claim, like other pe­
culiarities in Jerome's use of Scripture, could hardly 
have been recognized in its true light by the Middle 
Ages. Jerome was, in fact, rather an object for imita­
tion, personifying the ideal of a Christian scholar in 
command of his literary sources (the Bible) and able 
to quote and adapt, and so to deliver the sacred text 
of long-hidden meaning, which he can then enlist to 
bring about Christian reform. What has actually hap­
pened is this: the passage of time had invested the 
fourth century with that same aura of authority and 
holiness that the fourth century had held toward Apos­
tolic times. Jerome and the other great Fathers were 
thus endowed with a certain inviolability as vehicles in 
the continuing chain of revelation and tradition. 
Temperament and Character 
There is one final area that must be briefly touched 
upon, evident on the most superficial examination of 
Jerome's career and writing, yet difficult to substan­
tiate. Although one must exercise extreme caution, in 
assessing the psychological balance of great men solely 
on the basis of literary evidence, the question does have 
some direct bearing upon Jerome's career as a human­
117 
ist. P. Steur has drawn up a sort of psychological check­
list as a control on Jerome's character,33 and, more re­
cently, Dr. Charles-Henri Nodet has published a lengthy 
article on the degree to which Jerome's character and 
temperament influenced his literary output.34 Both stu­
dies draw heavily upon the corpus of the saint's writings 
for their major evidence, and both are properly judi­
cious in their avoidance of the many pitfalls that could 
arise from misreading the many commonplace refer­
ences. 
The conclusions arrived at by Nodet are of the most 
interest in evaluating Jerome's contributions to human­
ism. Many scholars have already pointed out, apropos 
of Jerome's dreams and temptations, that had the saint 
eaten more decently and slept more regularly, he might 
have fared better in his daily encounters with the noon­
day devil. Nodet delves deeper into the underlying psy­
chology and finds Jerome's sexuality obsessive and re­
gressive. Evidence for this is his contempt for marriage, 
his inability to fathom the meaning of conjugal love, 
and the extreme nature of the advice he offers for the 
preservation of chastity. His aggressiveness was strong 
and poorly sublimated—witness the perennial irasci­
bility, the suggestive remarks, and the character of the 
relationship he maintained with his few real friends. 
Intellectually mature, he was sexually quite immature. 
He was satisfied with a life of subtle dialectics, stub­
born and unsubtle in his thinking, drawing upon his 
vast erudition largely for the permanent confirmation 
of his own prejudices. 
Now, these are damning judgments indeed, and they 
are conclusions that we should be inclined to moderate, 
in view of the above discussion, or simply even to dis­
miss as having little bearing on the discussion of hu­
manism. There is, however, one significant point in a 
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study where vocabulary is of prime importance. Once 
again we must be aware of the facile assumption that 
words mean the same thing to everyone who uses them. 
It is impossible not to note a certain equivocation 
in the specific vocabulary Jerome employs in his at­
tacks upon sex, womankind, marriage, and things un­
ascetical. He is using the same words that the theologian 
or master of spiritual direction uses, and to the casual 
observer, they appear to be the same: the vocabularies 
do in fact overlap. But there are fundamental varia­
tions in the formal approach. The language of the ascetic 
or spiritual director is objective, whereas that of Jerome 
is subjective and psychologically ridden with overtones 
and innuendos that inevitably but subtly vitiate the 
nature of the advice he is giving, so as to turn it into 
the projection of his own shortcomings and deep-seated 
fears. Virgo, for example, is a technical term in the 
vocabulary of the master of ascetic direction. In the 
earlier Roman vocabulary it was a less differentiated 
term, signifying maiden or marriageable girl or recently 
married young woman—or virgin. In the Christian con­
text it is always laudatory, but in Jerome the word is all 
but an obsession. The same is true, in the inverse order, 
of concupiscentia, which always means evil desire. 
We have already observed how Jerome could be 
unaware of the shift in connotative meanings of words, 
simply assuming they had always been the same for 
everyone whoever used them as they were in his own 
mind. He can thus construct what are to his mind telling 
arguments based on this material continuity in expres­
sion, and never realize the differences involved. It has 
been observed that men of considerable psychic energy, 
which should be applied to the totality of human living, 
when they focus it instead upon a rigidly circumscribed 
ascetical ideal, tend to overdevelop their verbal level 
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of experience to the atrophy of their life experience. 
Thus words take on a life apart, like Plato's Ideas, en­
dowed with a meaning, reality, and value all their own 
and capable, in the hands of a master, of enjoying an 
afterlife as well. 
Thus it is Jerome's vast influence upon the sympa­
thetic audience of the Middle Ages that puts him in a 
unique position to contribute to the definitive setting 
of the laudatory and pejorative overtones of the West­
ern Christian vocabulary—a fact unknown to the ages 
who accepted his authority so unreservedly. The people 
to whom Jerome addressed most of his work were men 
and women of the perfect or "desexualized" type, and 
it must be admitted that much of what he writes, if in­
terpreted as bearing on upon the smaller community of 
the would-be elect, has considerable relevance. Even 
so, the pride of God's saints was visited upon Jerome 
long before their holiness. His reputation for being an 
uncompromising ascetic is owing more to a deep-rooted 
antisexual orientation and a morbid indulgence of neu­
rotic insecurities than to any deliberate and manly 
sacrifice of something good for something better. 
Although this conclusion can be easily overstated, 
the fact remains that the content and bearing of Jerome's 
writings were congenial to his spiritual descendants, 
the medieval monks who depended upon his teachings 
and shared his ideals. There is a deeper medieval at­
traction for Jerome that mere admiration and emulation 
of his classical erudition and literary brilliance. The 
position of the medieval scholar is easily appreciated. 
Scripture, and commentaries on Scripture, and the or­
thodox opera of the great Church Fathers were so much 
his literary and religious diet that the common words 
of the Bible (words that can be applied to philosophy 
or humanistic education before they become part of the 
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specialized vocabulary for theology or Christian asce­
tical ideals) were so charged with new force of meaning 
as to overwhelm the medieval monk with their new 
message. After the long struggle with the secular clergy, 
the monks emerged victorious, and it was their ideals 
that formed the pattern for Christian aspiration and 
Christian humane education. The good words had all 
been preempted, and it was hard to find a spokesman 
for the other side—mere orthodoxy. The words heard 
by the Christian people were invested with a traditional 
authority, and their application extended equally well 
to the intellectual and to the spiritual spheres. Jerome 
is certainly not the only source responsible for the medi­
eval state of affairs. No other single figure, however, 
serves as a point of convergence for so many streams 
of influence: mastery of Scripture, psychological bias, 
classical erudition, reputation for asceticism and holi­
ness, champion of the monastic cause, role as spiritual 
adviser, mastery of words, and absolute quotability. 
Jerome and Humanism 
A humanist must have a wide appreciation of all 
of those artes quae ad humanitatem pertinent. Jerome 
really does not. Despite his boast of being Ciceronianus, 
Jerome has taken Cicero's way with words and has 
missed much of the fullness that Cicero gave to them, 
although he shares the humanist's enjoyment of words 
simply for their own sake. Aesthetic intuition is an in­
tegral element of classical humanism, and the Chris­
tian view in general, Jerome's in particular, is at vari­
ance with this fundamental attitude. Jerome's largely 
verbal level of involvement with the inherited ideals, 
moreover, precludes much of this fuller humanist per­
spective. He does indeed draw upon the past, and he 
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does so for the sake of the present; but he misreads it 
by presuming a continuity of meaning in words and 
language. More fundamentally, he enlists the past to 
serve the present not as a model but as material to be 
subordinated to the building of a new edifice. This dis­
tortion dilutes, and even contaminates, the purity of 
his draughts from the fountain of classical pagan hu­
manism. 
Now, it is true that no Christian could have been 
entirely free of this failing, certainly not any Christian 
of the fourth century. Thus Jerome only shares a more 
fundamental attitude of the religion of his time—the 
tendency to make nature and human experience ancil­
lary to the supernatural and to the prerogatives of grace. 
The Christian, even the Christian who had retained or 
rediscovered as much as was humanly possible of the 
legacy from the past, could no longer comfortably abide 
by such a large portion of its ideals as to accept clas­
sical humanism as a model for human endeavor, even 
upon earth and within the lesser span of man's terres­
trial career. There was everywhere too little genuine 
formal continuity, too little trust, too great a hesitancy 
to focus upon the human or upon humanism. Ideally, as 
in Augustine's vision, the prospect of Christian man as 
a dilemma of warring worlds of flesh and spirit can 
be solved by granting each element its due, but the 
vision applied is less convincing. Historically, the Chris­
tian view of man is overly divinized. When Renaissance 
man appears, he is a sinner made to aspire after sanc­
tity. The saints' lives became background for other, 
more human feelings, an admission of general inade­
quacy, a human pride at seeing some people achieve 
such lofty heights and the comfortable realization that 
this is not for all men. Goals and ideals were balanced 
with potential and experience in the rediscovered hu­
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manity that could be Christian without forfeiting man's 
capacity for humanism. 
This did not happen in the fourth century, which not 
only missed something essential of what later Chris­
tianity was destined to develop into, but also directed 
its development along some awkward lines. It did in 
some measure prescribe the pattern for a future Chris­
tian humanism; and Jerome himself, though he did not 
draw everything he should have from the classical ideal 
and though he is guilty of demonstrable misdirection 
in his championing of the classical cause, did, for his 
time and age, represent a high degree of continuity 
with the classical culture. 
One might be tempted to conclude that it is to the 
credit of the inherent vitality of both humanism and 
Christianity that the false avenues were eventually 
abandoned and the harm in large measure undone. I 
believe that Jerome, in the fourth century, had made a 
real beginning, for all his shortcomings, and an impor­
tant beginning at that, in that it was in imitation and 
admiration of his humanistic learning that subsequent 
scholars were inspired to labor more successfully at 
the task of wedding Christianity and humanism in a 
cultural fusion whose ideals are still vigorous today. 
This is no mean accomplishment for the crotchety 
hermit. 
The Renaissance has left us two distinct portrayals 
of Saint Jerome. There is Diirer's gentle recluse with 
the serene expression—the ideal of comfortable mo­
nastic formation. But there is also El Greco's picture 
of Jerome as the dark and troubled soul of medieval 
Christianity still searching for the vision of a Renais­
sance. If Jerome is too much a Christian, he is less a 
humanist for that. And if the Christian excesses of his 
asceticism are prompted less by a true appraisal of 
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the Gospel challenge than by a certain imbalance, he 
does at least tower above the Middle Ages as the one 
paradoxical embodiment of Christianity and human­
ism: Christian to excess in the eyes of the Middle Ages 
and humanist to what they could only regard as per­
fection. 
What is lacking is the balance: Christian humanism 
must be something more than Christianity plus hu­
manism or humanism plus Christianity. There must be 
a fusion that results in a new reality: Christianus simul 
et Ciceronianus. Insofar as this happy coalescence in­
volves compromise and a vision of something that is 
both essentially new and essentially old, it is beyond 
the ken of Saint Jerome. His was the sterner task of 
perpetuating the individual elements without recogniz­
ing their potential. And although this is essentially a 
thankless task, surely we, who lay some claim to the 
profession of both Christianity and humanism, cannot 
ever be wholly without gratitude. 
1. W. Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture 3 vols. 
(New York, 1939), 1 : 279. There are many definitions of 
humanism as a concept. We are concerned here not so much 
with the task of comparing or discussing their relative merits 
as with the work of isolating some of the more important ele­
ments and examining how they can or cannot be applied to the 
figure of Jerome and the fourth century. 
2. This distinction and its consequences for the evaluation 
of history are discussed in greater detail by M. L. W. Laistner, 
Christianity and Pagan Culture in the Later Roman Empire 
(London, 1931; and Ithaca, N.Y., 1951); and Thought and 
Letters in Western Europe A.D. 500 to 900 (London, 1931). 
3. We must not overlook the ease with which the Roman 
philosophies and ethics, equally practical and moral in their 
orientation, fell in with the Christian moral Gospel. The com­
munity of interest was, in fact, so great that the Moral Letters 
of Seneca came to be regarded as Christian literature of a sort, 
124

their author presumed to have been converted by Saint Paul in 
Rome. 
4. The Christian draws not only from the Old Testament 
prophets but from Roman tradition as well. The Sibylline Books 
and the feeling for omens and auguries are easily Christianized. 
Witness Vergil's paulo maiora canamus and its devious inter­
pretations over the Christian ages, and the express linking of the 
two streams of prophecy in the Dies Irae: teste David cum 
Sibylla. 
5. Sortes Biblicae and Sortes Vergilianae made their way 
into the Middle Ages side by side. 
6. Jerome's own writing, it must be noted, exhibits unquali­
fied reverence for, and acceptance of, the status quo in scholar­
ship and religion that are normally associated with the Chris­
tian tradition of a much later era. 
7. This Christian intolerance is not always the result of 
deliberate and honorable concern for the purity of the Christian 
philosophy. It easily lapses into obstinate refusal to entertain, as 
a matter of principle, any alien sources of authority. In a man 
like Saint Jerome, this tendency is rather more in evidence. 
8. The Church Fathers argue, for example, that revelation 
does indeed give insights into truths that would otherwise either 
be totally unknown, less accurately known, harder to acquire, 
or less surely believed in, and so on. 
9. One could easily make the case that antiquity had also 
felt the need of similar reassurance. In the periods of decline 
from the classical ideal, we find a lack of direction and certitude 
that is generally called a failure of nerve, from the humanist 
point of view an apt enough term for a reaction that seeks to 
fix upon the metaphysical or transcendental. Christianity is 
sometimes made to appear as simply another of these mystery 
cults, like the later developments of Greek philosophy or 
Mithra, but there are some fundamental differences. There is a 
good historical survey of these trends in J. H. Randall, Jr., 
Hellenistic Ways of Deliverance and the Making of the Chris­
tian Synthesis (New York, 1970). 
10. Cf. especially the Letters to the Thessalonians. 
11. Exaggerated asceticism is the hallmark of the gnostic 
spirit as well. 
12. H. Hagendahl, Augustine and the Latin Classicsy (Stock­
holm, 1967). 
13. One caution must be observed here: in their literary 
endeavor the Fathers are always essentially "more antique 
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Romans than the Christians." It is largely a question of degree: 
form and expression are never allowed to gain the upper hand. 
14. The best introduction to this study is E. R. Curtius, 
European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages (London, 
1952). 
15. The position taken by E. K. Rand, for example, in his 
chapter on Jerome in Founders of the Middle Ages (Cam­
bridge, Mass., 1928), fails to raise many important questions. 
16. A. Liibeck, Hieronymus quos noverit scriptores profanos 
et ex quibus hauserit (Leipzig, 1872). 
17. A good example is the Treatise against Jovinian (AJ), 
1.41-49, with its catalogue of examples from antiquity, and 
2.1-14, on the medicinal properties of certain foods and the 
dietary habits of various nations. These chapters have been 
extensively studied by E. Bickel, Diatribe in Senecae philosophi 
fragmenta (Leipzig, 1915), who makes a fairly convincing 
argument for charting their transmission to AJ via the agency 
of the now lost writings of Porphyry, a dependence never 
acknowledged by Jerome. 
18. Letter 48, p. 13. 
19. D. S. Wiesen, St. Jerome as a Satirist, Cornell University 
Studies in Classical Philology, no. 34 (Ithaca, N.Y-, 1964). 
20. Wiesen, chap. 7. 
21. The terms of comparison are sometimes indelicate {AJ 
1.4, 7), as is the reference to incommoda nuptiarum (Letter 
22), or to sexual differences (AJ 1.36d), or to functions of 
nature (AJ 1.36b). 
22. Apparent, for example, in the Epodes and earlier satire 
of Horace as it is influenced by Lucilius. 
23. Juvenal develops this strain to perfection. 
24. Some of the writing of Catullus is a good example of 
this usage in the hands of an unquestioned master. 
25. AJ 1.8. The reduplication cuius-eius is also character* 
istic of translation from the Hebrew where the relative, being 
undifferentiated in case, gender, and so forth, requires the 
addition of a personal pronoun or a possessive adjective. 
26. J. Marouzeau, UOrdre des mots dans la phrase latiney 
3vols. (Paris, 1922-49). 
27. There is a study on Jerome's use of clausulae by Sister 
Margaret Clare Herron, A.M., A Study of the Clausulae in the 
Writings of St. Jerome (Washington, D.C., 1937). The word 
order of the Lives of the Desert Fathers has been analyzed by 
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David F. Heimann, "Latin Word Order in the Writings of St. 
Jerome," (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1966). 
28. This can be interpreted as the application of the tech­
niques of verse writing to prose. 
29. AJ 1.32. Almah is perhaps better translated as "girl of 
marriageable age," like the Latin virgo. Jerome is determined 
to defend the technical force of the word. 
30. He defends this position in Letter 49.19 by appealing to 
the authority of Vergil, numero deus impare gaudet (Eel. 8.75). 
31. The interpretation is further supported by a sort of 
natural-law argument derived from the Roman method of 
counting on the fingers. AJ 1.3. 
32. Cf., for example, the formal Roman liturgical prayer, 
the Collect, which is constructed upon the most classical lines, 
observing great nicety in form, word positioning, and metrical 
cadence or cursus. 
33. P. Steur, Het Karakter van Hieronymus van Stridon 
Bestudeerd in Zijn Brieven (Nijmegen, 1945). Other scholars 
have also discussed Jerome's character: Ch. Favez, "St. Jerome 
peint par lui-meme," Latomus 16 (1957): 655-71; F. Cavallera, 
"The Personality of St. Jerome," in A Monument to St. Jerome 
(New York, 1952). 
34. Charles-Henri Nodet, "Position de S. Jerome en face 
des problemes sexuels," in Mystique et Continence, Etudes Car­
melitaines, no. 31 (Paris, 1952), pp. 308-56. 
by Oskar Seidlin 
IV 
Goethe's 1phigenia in Tauris: 
A Modern Use of a Greek Dramatic Theme 
Let me start, in order to identify myself, with a very 
German question, a question that has worked a spiri­
tual upheaval first in the country in which it was so 
insistently asked and that, eventually, was to redirect 
the whole course of Western civilization: How can I 
justify myself? To put it less theologically and dra­
matically: What am I doing here, and what gives me 
the right to be here? Am I just a guest from the outside, 
or do I belong here? I do belong—and not only for 
personal reasons—for men of Classics and I belong 
together, because there is no German spirit without 
the spirit of the classics; and whenever my home coun-
try's spirit reached its highest heights, it was anointed 
with a drop of sweet honey from Mount Hymettos. 
Starting out by putting the shoe on the wrong foot, I 
want to remind my classical readers that they owe the 
German spirit a profound debt of gratitude, because 
surely they cannot forget the monumental contributions 
that Germany made to their discipline. Yet these con­
tributions assuredly were nothing else but a loving, 
though modest, payment of the debt that Germany, the 
finest of Germany, owes to Greece and the Greeks. In 
the heroine's opening monologue of the greatest German 
classical play, Goethe's Iphigenia in Tauris, which I 
will discuss, the line rings out: "Seeking the land of 
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the Greeks with my soul"; and it is this search that has 
haunted the German mind, the best of the German 
mind, more powerfully, I think, than that of any other 
nation from the earliest times, especially from the days 
of Johann Joachim Winckelmann, who rediscovered the 
greatness of Greek plastic art around the middle of the 
eighteenth century, to the days of Nietzsche at the end 
of the nineteenth, and well beyond. 
But let me dwell for a moment at least, before I turn 
to my subject, Goethe's Iphigenia, on Friedrich Hol­
derlin, the most exalted, intoxicated, and heart-rending 
German traveler to Greece between Winckelmann and 
Nietzsche, the purest vessel of the Saificov of iroiijcri?, if 
ever there was one. No, I am wrong; he was not a 
traveler to Greece. What makes him so unspeakably 
moving is the fact that, his heart and mind filled with 
his love for the woman he called Diotima, he literally 
saw Jupiter discharging lightning and rain over the tiny 
garden patch in his Swabian village; and when he 
watched the vintagers coming down from their vineyards 
above the Neckar river, he took them for Dionysos 
sweeping down the hills with his followers, all the Greek 
Gods poised to set sail for his homeland, and he the 
herald of their arrival, which would transform his poor 
and barren Germany and make her the "holy heart of 
all peoples." To be sure, it was madness, and in mad­
ness it had to end. But Holderlin's insanity is the most 
noble sacrifice ever offered by a nation upon the altar 
of Greece, a price so precious that it fully pays for the 
gift received. 
There are some to whom this price seemed exorbitant 
and this search for Greece so obsessive and misguided 
that they diagnosed it as a positive disease and an 
aberration of the German mind. For instance, an im­
mensely intelligent writer of the recent past, the Eng­
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lishwoman E. M. Butler, published a book thirty-five 
years ago entitled The Tyranny of Greece over Germany 
(the year was 1935, a time when, I am afraid, a very 
different tyranny held sway over that country), in which 
she claimed that Winckelmann's magic formula "noble 
simplicity and serene grandeur," by which he had tried 
to capture the spirit of Greek sculpture, had detracted 
the greatest German poets from their genuine essence 
and true destiny. She ends her fascinating presentation 
of Goethe, or rather should it not be called her fascinat­
ing settlement of accounts with Goethe, by proclaiming: 
"The potent spell of Winckelmann's Golden Age had 
proved a sinister one for Goethe. It had deflected the 
greatest Northern genius of modern times from his true 
and pre-destined bent." 
I shall not argue against Miss Butler's thesis. I just 
want to cast a short glance at this "sinister spell" at its 
most potent in German literature, Goethe's Iphigenia, 
and, in so doing, address myself very modestly to the 
topic of ancient and modern use of dramatic themes. In 
no other instance of his entire literary production has 
Goethe so closely followed a canonical model, in this 
case the Euripidean tragedy, and yet given us, in his 
reworking of the ancient myth, so intensely personal 
and intimate a confession. By this I mean not only that 
a transmutation has occurred, which any of the old 
stories is bound to undergo when recast by a son of a 
later age, from Seneca to Jean-Paul Sartre, but that 
the given material has been infused with the spirit, the 
ideals, the demands, the hopes, and the despairs of 
his own times. Of course, Goethe's Iphigenia is a docu­
ment of the intellectual climate of his period, and very 
decidedly so. It is the reflection of a guardedly opti­
mistic, enlightened humanitarianism as it could emerge 
only at that particular place in Europe and at that par­
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ticular moment in European history. But underneath it 
is—and we may, indeed, call this a modern use of a 
Greek dramatic theme—a direct projection of the poet's 
very personal and very unique existential problem 
and condition: curse-laden and curse-driven Orestes is 
Goethe himself, in the anguish of his heart, pursued 
by the furies of his own restlessness and uncontrollable 
tensions; Iphigenia, both sister and beloved, is the 
woman he met in Weimar, who by her strength, patient 
endurance, and purity was to lead him back to his lost 
and forfeited "home" and to lift the curse that he felt 
to be his inexorable inheritance. This is not only an old 
myth in a modern dress but a handed-down, again-and-
again transformed story as a vessel of the most intimate 
personal confession. 
It was perhaps this intense personalization of the 
ancient theme that induced Schiller, Goethe's most 
perceptive and intelligent critic, to call his friend's 
Greek play "astonishingly un-Greek." Right he was, 
and for another reason as well, a reason that, at first 
glance, seems to contradict what I have just said about 
the eminently confessional character of Goethe's Iphi­
genia. No matter how poignant a projection of his own 
emotional travail, his play is at the same time a con­
scious formulation of the human condition as such. 
And here we encounter, I think, another modern use of a 
Greek dramatic theme. Even though the great tragic 
writers of Greece rendered in their tragedies situations 
and constellations that were generally applicable to, 
and seen as, manifesations of man's fate, they did, it 
seems to me, consider their fables a presentation of a 
specific human case or a specific human situation, often 
linked to identifiable local establishments, cultic estab­
lishments of the Greek oiKovpevri—as, for example, 
Pallas Athena's inauguration of the Athenian Areo­
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pagus in Aeschylus' Oresteia, or the veneration of the 
statue of Delphian Artemis to which the Iphigenia ma­
terial is linked. By this I do not want to suggest even 
faintly that the Greek writers ascribed historicity to the 
events of and in tragedy. It was, after all, Aristotle 
who drew a sharp dividing line between history and 
fivdos, when he defined, "History relates what, let us 
say, Alcibiades did or suffered, poetry represents the 
general, and this consists in how a human being of a 
certain character is likely or compelled to speak and 
act." A human being of a certain character—this given 
individual—this "case"; and I think cases, sensational 
and often gory, were given to us in all the reworkings 
through the centuries, psychologically or psychopatho­
logically enriched as in Racine's Phedre or O'Neill's 
Mourning Becomes Electra, interlaced with the author's 
personal philosophy or the intellectual temper of his 
age as in Voltaire's Oreste or in Alfieri's Agamemnon, 
or used as vehicles for some timely political concerns 
as in Werfel's Trojan Women, Girardoux's La guerre 
de Troie n'aura pas lieu, or Anouilh's Antigone. 
Goethe's Iphigenia is different. He presents her story 
as what we today would call archetypical in the strictest 
sense, not only speech and action of a certain character 
under a set of given circumstances, but as a projection 
of the condition humaine per se, the breaking through 
of man into his authenticity. It may very well have 
been this redirecting of an ancient dramatic theme that 
made it possible for a great anatomist of the human 
soul, coming a little over a century after Goethe's clas­
sical play, to discover in Sophocles' Oedipus the most 
powerful ancient dramatic theme, the basic and un­
changeably valid pattern of every son's position be­
tween his father and his mother, a conception that I 
venture to guess, is far from what the old Greek legend 
132

had even remotely in mind. And what Goethe did with 
the Iphigenia material is, so I believe, equally far re­
moved from what the ancient story had in mind. 
What he did with it amounts, indeed, to the search 
for, and conquest of, man's authenticity, and it is for 
this reason that his whole play centers around the dis­
covery and the confession of truth. The play celebrates 
that which alone can lift the curse imposed upon us by 
suprapersonal forces, by the inexorable decree of the 
gods: the veracity of man's existence, his breaking 
through the shell and the snares of an unalterable de­
termination into the recognition of his autonomous sub­
stance. Exactly in the middle of the play, at its very 
center—and center here is not simply an indication of 
place—Orestes, facing the unknown priestess of Ar­
temis, Iphigenia, who does not know him either, ex­
claims: "Between us twain be truth. I am Orestes." At 
first glance, this may seem no more than the standard 
scene of recognition—avayvateuris the Greeks called it— 
that forms one of the high points of so many Greek 
tragedies. But it is, in the case of Goethe's Iphigenia, 
much more than that. It is not only, as in the Euripidean 
tragedy, the moment when the two protagonists reveal 
their identities to each other; it is, rather, the moment 
of truth: Orestes cutting through the veil of deceit, of 
inauthenticity, with which he, or to be exact his friend 
Pylades, had shrouded his very existence by making 
Iphigenia believe that he was not who he really is. 
What Orestes lives through here is an agonizing act of 
confession, because by naming himself, he names and 
confesses his unspeakable crime, the murder of his 
mother. It is this confession, this making himself known, 
that is the beginning of his recovery and of his libera­
tion from the suffocating grip of guilt and corrosion. 
"Between us twain be truth"—Iphigenia, Goethe's 
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Iphigenia, could repeat these very same words when she 
faces King Thoas and informs him of the deceitful strat­
agem that with her consent, has been hatched against 
him: the theft and abduction of the statue of Taurian 
Artemis and the surreptitious flight of the three Greeks. 
It is a confession fraught with mortal danger—and 
Iphigenia is fully aware of it—because the irate king 
could easily destroy her, her brother, and his friend. 
Again, the moment of truth has come, the demand to 
assert and confess one's own verity, no matter how 
deadly the risk, no matter how cruel the price this 
truth may exact. It is at this point that Goethe has 
strayed decisively from his model, for the act of Iphi­
genia is a clear defiance of the god Apollo, who had 
ordered her brother to travel to the land of the Tauri 
and to bring back to Greece the statue of his sister-
goddess Artemis languishing in the barbarian land. Yet 
Iphigenia, fully aware of the god's decree and of the 
promise that its execution holds for her brother, for 
herself, and for her whole house, will—at the critical 
moment—thwart the fulfillment of the divine command 
because to her it is inconceivable that the gods want a 
deed carried out that involves deceit, betrayal, and 
trickery. 
In Goethe's version Iphigenia's courage to recognize 
and speak the truth, her own and that of the situation 
in which she finds herself, has the farthest-reaching 
ramifications. After she has broken through to the very 
core of her personal truthful existence, and only after 
she has done so, the truth of the gods, the true meaning 
of their will, stands revealed. As it now turns out— 
and this is Goethe's most radical departure from the 
ancient version of the fable—Apollo, when ordering 
Orestes to bring home the sister, was not thinking of 
his own sister, Artemis, but of Orestes' sister, Iphigenia. 
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This reinterpretation of the divine oracle and its ful­
fillment may seem no more than a bit of dramatic 
sophistry designed to assure a happy ending, which will 
include, besides the three Greeks, the barbarian king 
as well, who, losing the beloved priestess of Artemis as 
he must, will at least keep the hallowed statue of the 
goddess. Yet, it is, of course, more than that. It is proof 
of the Goethean conviction that only when and after man 
has found and professed his authenticity, the divine is 
free to speak truly and to announce the very meaning of 
its will. The act and triumph of self-recognition, of dis­
covering one's veracity and very substance extends, be­
yond the human sphere, to the godhead itself. 
To be sure, this is a twist astonishingly un-Greek, a 
radically modern use of an old theme in which the dra­
matic action as such, the events of the myth, are no 
longer of primary importance as Aristotle had insisted 
they should be, but the whole play is turned into a 
paradigm of the process that leads to man's self-aware-
ness and self-realization. And as such, as a catalyst in 
the experiment of discovering one's own truth, Goethe 
experienced all themes, dramatic and otherwise, that 
Greek poetry had bequeathed to mankind; exactly the 
opposite, it would seem to me, of what Miss Butler di­
agnosed as a "potent spell" deflecting one's true and 
predestined bent. Late in his life, in one of his many 
general maxims, Goethe explained of what use the an­
cient Greeks were to him, and it is exactly this use that 
he had made the very topic and action of his own Greek 
play. He offers this clarification in the form of a little 
imaginary dialogue that runs as follows: "Someone said 
to me: 'Why do you trouble yourself so much with* 
Homer? You can't really understand him anyway.' 
To this I answered: 'Neither do I understand sun and 
moon and stars; yet they are passing over my head and 
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I recognize myself in them while gazing up there, and 
doing so I wonder whether perhaps, one day, I might 
amount to something, too. '" To recognize oneself so 
that one day one might amount to something, too—this 
means, indeed, putting the ancient themes to new and 
good use. Upon reflection, such an attitude may be the 
most desirable outgrowth of that self-critical spirit that 
developed in Greece during her most glorious period. 
In any case, it is answer and echo of the admonition 
that was inscribed on Apollo's temple in Delphi as the 
highest task the god of light and poetry had assigned 
to man: yvS>0i creavrov. 
by Harry C. Rutledge 
V 
Classical Latin Poetry: An Art for Our Time 
turn canit, errantem Permessi ad flumina Gallum 
Aonas in montis ut duxerit una sororum, 
utque viro Phoebi chorus adsurrexerit omnis 
—Vergil, Sixth Eclogue 
This essay is a broad discussion of the artistic climate 
of our times and of the possible meaning of classical 
Latin poetry for these times.1 The view presented is a 
broad one, for I have come to have an increasingly 
eclectic appreciation of literature and the whole "world 
of art," 2 and to see that world as a unity. I hope to 
show my concern for the immediacy, the pertinence, of 
classical Latin poetry for our time. I want to discuss 
Roman poetry of the "Golden Age" as it both affects 
and is affected by our life today. Though I shall restrict 
myself to illustrations from the poetry of the late first 
century B.C., a similar presentation could be made of 
other classical literature. In order to see how Roman 
poetry is related to the artistic climate of the twentieth 
century, in particular to the present artistic climate of 
the United States, we need to examine the nature and 
the composition of this climate. Obviously, we cannot 
examine the present without a consideration of a num­
ber of its artistic and cultural antecedents. No discus­
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sion of the American artistic climate would be complete 
without a consideration of our European connections. 
To begin, let me suggest that the work most character­
istic of the temper of this century is the novel by Thomas 
Mann, Doctor Faustus. This complex work intertwines 
the history of the Devil-beset musician, Adrian Lever­
kiihn, with the rise and fall of Nazi Germany. Employ­
ing that total awareness of history and adroitness of 
narrative that we admire so much in Vergil, Thomas 
Mann weaves together a picture of Germany in Adrian's 
lifetime (the first part of this century) with Germany 
during the Second World War. In addition, Thomas 
Mann depicts Leverkiihn's development as a modern 
artist whose work resembles that of Arnold Schonberg.3 
The climax of the story comes in the scene where Adrian 
has invited his friends to a private recital of his new 
oratorio The Lamentation of Doctor Faustus. To the 
consternation and horror of the assembled party, Adrian 
proceeds to confess his past sins and his compact with 
Satan. The scene concludes with the following passage 
in which Adrian is speaking: 4 
"But since my time is at an end, which aforetime I bought 
with my soul, I have summoned you to me before my end. 
. .  . I beseech you hereupon, ye would hold me in kindly 
remembrance. . . . All this bespoke and beknown, will I 
now leave to play you a little out of the construction which 
I heard first from the lovely instrument of Satan and which 
in part the knowing children sang to me." 
He stood up, pale as death. 
"This man," in the stillness one heard the voice of Dr. 
Kranich, wheezing yet clearly articulate: "This man is mad. 
There has been for a long time no doubt of it, and it is most 
regrettable that in our circle the profession of alienist is not 
represented. I, as a numismatist, feel myself entirely incom­
petent in this situation." 
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With that he too went away. 
Leverkiihn, surrounded by the women, Schildknapp, 
Helene, and myself, had sat down at the brown square piano 
and flattened the pages of the score with his right hand. We 
saw tears run down his cheeks and fall on the keyboard. 
. . . He spread out his arms, bending over the instrument 
and seeming to embrace it, when suddenly, as though smitten 
by a blow, he fell sidewise from his seat and to the floor. 
The collapse of Adrian Leverkiihn is dramatic and 
sensational. There are those readers who might find it 
extravagant. In fact, however, the fall of Adrian is just 
as logical and is prepared for as thoroughly as the fall 
of Oedipus in Oedipus the King, Phaedra in Hippolytus, 
Pentheus in The Bacchae, or Dido in the fourth book 
of Vergil's Aeneid. The scene is dramatic in the grand 
classic style, but though we could find further parallels 
in classical Greek literature, it is only in Roman poetry 
that we have in the Latin language the display of such 
a tragedy as that of Mann's novel. Before I pursue, how­
ever, the significance of Roman poetry in comparison 
with modern literature, or before I claim too strongly 
that Adrian Leverkiihn is symbolic of our age, let me 
describe the world of art that we have today and then 
relate the poetry of Rome to this world. 
It has been the age of "the nightmare cry of Dada." B 
As Calvin Tomkins has observed, Dada, a movement 
that began about 1916, was "first and foremost a rev­
olutionary state of mind, a violent assault on all ac­
cepted values." 6 A product of the First World War, 
Dada produced in its adherents the feeling that "these 
humiliating times have not succeeded in wresting re­
spect from us." 7 This attitude, expressed by Hugo Ball, 
a German conscientious objector, is one that we have 
repeatedly heard in recent years. The world situation 
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has improved very little since 1916, and the arts are 
still in a revolutionary state; thus we are still hearing 
the cry of Dada. Many of us may not realize it, but 
we are living among Dada's reverberations today, which 
at least partially accounts for what appears to be the 
continuous decline of the still widely admired cultural 
and artistic values of the eighteenth and nineteenth cen­
turies. 
The advent of Dada signaled the withdrawal of the 
creative artists of Europe and America from the Cult 
of Beauty. The world was rotten, and it was the task 
of art to reflect that world. The high priest of Dada 
was the painter Marcel Duchamp, who was capable of 
putting a mustache and goatee on a reproduction of the 
Mona Lisa and of entering a toilet fixture, signed by 
himself, in an art exhibit.8 More serious and more 
prolific was Pablo Picasso, whose shocking and hideous 
pictures of women painted in the 1930s show his own 
disenchantment both with the state of affairs in Spain 
and in a Europe plainly headed for a holocaust.9 
It was in the 1940s that Paris and London ceased 
being the art capitals of the Western world and New 
York assumed her present regal ascendancy. It was in 
New York during the forties, after the outbreak of the 
Second World War,10 that the painter Jackson Pollock 
developed the expressionism of such European artists 
as Wassily Kandinsky and Oskar Kokoschka into paint­
ing for the sake of painting, "action painting." n With 
the unveiling of Pollock's Blue Poles in 1953, the re­
quirement that painting should be representational was 
declared null and void. This picture, a major example 
of the new megalography (Monet's water lily sequences 
are among the first such specimens of modern art), is 
energy and action on canvas; it is color and dynamism 
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for themselves, because there is nothing that is solid in 
the painting except, perhaps, the dancing "blue poles" 
themselves. 
Blue Poles and Dada are related, and both, as sug­
gested by my reference to Monet, have origins in the 
years prior to 1916. We are unrealistic if we fail to rec­
ognize the central position in the history of this century, 
and in this century's artistic and intellectual temper, that 
is held by the First World War. Here in 1972, it is 
very clear that the massive and complex problems that 
have beset the world since 1930 all stem from older 
issues that were germinating before the First World 
War and were not settled by that conflict. It has been a 
century, seven decades so far, of revolt and rebellion. 
The mold of European civilization that began with the 
reign of Caesar Augustus and continued until the reign 
of Edward the Seventh, though punctuated by such 
major developments as the rise of Protestantism, the 
collapse of the monarchy in France, and the Industrial 
Revolution, remained, in a remarkable way, the same. 
In this world the powerful and the obedient were easily 
distinguished. In the arts, for the most part, accepted 
taste and artistic direction were set up by the people of 
wealth and culture, who took their example and stan­
dards from the noble heyday of Athens, Rome, Florence, 
and Paris. The Cult of Beauty, as would have been 
understood by both the Platonists and the Neo-Platonists, 
was supreme. 
There were a few vocal critics of this universal stan­
dard. The most notable, I think, was the Marquis de 
Sade, whose works are a negation of normal Western 
standards. To the Marquis de Sade the universally 
admired human being who is imbued with physical 
beauty combined with a sense of morality, meant noth­
ing. But the works of de Sade were banned for more 
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than a century after his death in 1814 and had little 
overt influence until recent years. 
More widespread criticism of the standards of the 
past and serious concern with its burden began in Eu­
rope in the 1880s. In painting, it has been suggested, 
the revolt is marked by the work of Paul Gauguin, 
whose Jacob Wrestling with the Angel (1888) is like 
no picture seen before in Europe 12 (at least in the nine­
teenth century), because neither its form nor its ico­
nography has any immediate significance for the ob­
server. The revolt against tradition and the old Cult 
of Beauty that Gauguin had begun was advanced es­
pecially by Matisse, who as a leader of a new group of 
artists nicknamed les fauves brought painting even fur­
ther away from traditional representation.13 
Today, with the perspective and scholarship of sixty 
years to help us, we can see how radical and influential 
Matisse's paintings of the 1910s were, particularly the 
two-dimensional Harmony in Red (1908—9) and those 
deceptively simple pictures, now in the Hermitage, 
Dance and Music (1910). These extraordinary innova­
tions in painting were paralleled in music by Stravin-
sky's The Rite of Spring, performed for the first time in 
1913.14 
In literature there began at the same time a similar 
reaction to the social standards of the past and a ques­
tioning of the old presentation of the human condition,15 
a presentation related mainly to the aristocracy or up­
per bourgeoisie. The new spirit is shown most strikingly 
by two novels, Robert Louis Stevenson's masterpiece The 
Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (1886), and 
Oscar Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray (1891). Ste­
venson makes a probe into human nature, and Wilde 
criticizes the leisured class with a severity that is totally 
at variance with the depiction of life found in earlier 
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Victorian work. Nothing could be farther removed from 
the attitude of such a high Victorian work like Trol-
lope's Barchester Towers (1857) than Wilde's Dorian 
Gray. Jackson Pollock and all the members of the "New 
York School" could only approve of those seminal ob­
servations in Wilde's preface to his novel: "All art is 
at once surface and symbol. Those who go beneath the 
surface do so at their peril. Those who read the symbol 
do so at their peril. It is the spectator, and not life, that 
art really mirrors." "All art is quite useless." 
It was, however, the First World War that launched 
irrevocably the cultural and aesthetic revolution in 
whose whirlpool we are still struggling. The First World 
War, we can now see clearly, brought about "the death 
of Europe." 16 It was, furthermore, after 1918 that, 
slowly but surely, the cultural center of the West began 
to shift from Paris and London to New York. Paris, of 
course, continued to be an important center, though in 
the 1920s it was the Americans in Paris—Gertrude Stein 
and her circle, Hemingway, and the Fitzgeralds—who 
were a dominant element. After the Second World War, 
Paris once again assumed something of her old influence 
and position, especially in philosophy. The recently 
published diaries of the American musician and Fran­
cophile, Ned Rorem, describe a postwar Paris that is 
attractive, though the elegant circle of the Countess de 
Noailles has much of the genteel tone of Mme de Vion-
net's group in James's The Ambassadors. Missing is the 
exuberance of Gertrude Stein and of the earlier belle 
epoque. In painting the work in France of both Matisse 
(who died in 1954) and Chagall was still of the greatest 
importance. But since the Second World War, no city 
has had such advantages from municipal and private 
patronage of the arts as New York City. In my opinion 
New York is today what Rome was in the age of Herodes 
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Atticus and the Antonines; London and Paris are in the 
position of Athens in the second century A.D. It was the 
emigration of European intellectuals and scholars and 
the first prominence of the "New York School" of paint­
ing in 1940 that made our "new Rome" and this country 
the active heirs of an exhausted Europe. 
More fundamental, however, than this transfer of 
cultural leadership and authority from one city to 
another was the irreparable damage that was done to 
traditional values by the catastrophe of the First World 
War. Only gradually has the damage been understood. 
In 1959 Hugh Kenner could refer to "the death of 
Europe." In 1971 nobody would quarrel with Walter 
Kerr's statement that "the back of our world has been 
broken, we have heard the snap, whatever we see as we 
turn the next corner will in itself be as bizarre as a 
Bosch or a Swift could wish it." 17 It has taken us fifty 
years to recognize and understand that the standards of 
the nineteenth century, represented primarily by un­
questioning acceptance of vested authority whether in 
government or art, have become moribund. 
One artist who saw clearly what was happening and 
appreciated the changes, however unhappy, that were 
taking place before his very eyes was T. S. Eliot; the 
work, The Waste Land, published in 1922. With this 
major poem Eliot anatomized the state of the postwar 
West and demonstrated that literature, too, was about to 
go the way of painting and music. (Literature is ever the 
most conservative of the arts.) The literature on Eliot 
is almost Vergilian in proportion, and I have listed in 
an earlier essay some of the more penetrating and help­
ful critiques.18 Moreover, it is not my intention here to do 
more than remind you of the importance of Eliot as 
critic and observer. Like Vergil, like Janus, Eliot looked 
behind and ahead in the sharpest possible way in his 
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poetical description of the state of Europe, the "death 
of Europe," in The Waste Land. 
This utterly engrossing, fascinating poem reflects, and 
yet breaks with, the past; it blends the historical past 
with the historical present; it freely combines the majes­
tic mythological prophet Tiresias with a pathetic stenog­
rapher and her coarse "young man carbuncular"; mixes 
such grandiloquent phrases as "The Chair she sat in, 
like a burnished throne" with the lingo of the music hall 
"Well, if Albert won't leave you alone, there it is, I 
said, / What you get married for if you don't want 
children?" And through it all we move from the awe­
some death wish of the Sibyl at Cumae, in "April . . . 
the crudest month," to an expression of both hope and 
grace: "I sat upon the shore / Fishing, with the arid 
plain behind me / . . . Shantih shantih shantih." 
It seems to me that The Waste Land is the most origi­
nal and modern work of art of the century.19 In this 
poem there are representations of ordinary life and the 
use of ordinary language (one is reminded of the novel 
use of unelevated language in the poems of Lucilius 
and Catullus); at the same time there are gorgeously 
colored descriptions (the burnished throne and the 
church of Magnus Martyr) worthy of Chagall or Stra­
vinsky. There are violent transpositions that are like the 
switching of channels on a television set or the multi­
sensory narrative of a modern novel like William Bur-
roughs's Naked Lunch (1959), or the jagged streaks 
and flashes of paint employed by the expressionist 
painters. And in the dramatic scenes that deal with vul­
gar life so theatrically, there are the seeds of episodes 
found later in the plays of Tennessee Williams and Ed­
ward Albee. 
On the other hand, though Eliot's work is typical of 
the creative work of the twentieth century and though 
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there is much that is strikingly novel and wonderfully 
immediate for the social and intellectual mood of "the 
years Ventre deux guerres" Eliot proves in The Waste 
Land that the burden of the past need not be intolerable, 
that the past very much has its still important uses. 
Throughout this century, at least since 1910, all too 
many writers and artists in the other arts have been 
weighed down by the burden of the past and, in a wild-
eyed search for novelty, have often succeeded in pro­
ducing only what is ephemeral. As W. Jackson Bate ob­
serves in discussing the intellectual malaise of the 
eighteenth century in England, there are many similari­
ties to be found in that era and our own. Today there 
is the same attraction to primitivism, a search for "es­
cape from drab complexity into color and vigor, the 
yearning for simplicity," the presence of "fatigue and 
depression that so often seem to accompany success." 20 
The careers of F. Scott Fitzgerald, Eugene O'Neill, Ten­
nessee Williams, and Ernest Hemingway, among others, 
illustrate the last point particularly. The present wide­
spread concern with world conditions and the retreat of 
countless young people into a primitive and simple way 
of life are documented facts. The arts of today plainly 
"mirror the greatest single cultural problem we face, 
assuming that we physically survive: that is, how to use 
a heritage, when we know and admire so much about it, 
how to grow by means of it, how to acquire our 'identi­
ties,' how to be ourselves." 21 Eliot clearly and cogently, 
more definitely than other modern artists who continued 
to be influenced by classicism, for example, either 
Picasso or Yeats, has shown us "the present-day vitality 
of the classical tradition," 22 and he demonstrated this 
vitality in his superbly original The Waste Land. 
The fact remains, however, that although Eliot's mod­
ern idiom has been very influential, his classicism has 
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been little imitated. And so today, we find ourselves 
agonized by the classical languages' "melancholy, long, 
withdrawing roar." Many artists will not tolerate the 
burden of the past; many devotees of the classics are 
only too like Thomas Mann's Dr. Kranich, the numis­
matist, who found himself appalled by the furor of 
Adrian Leverkiihn and went away, feeling himself en­
tirely incompetent in this situation. 
But I would suggest that Greco-Roman literature, es­
pecially Roman poetry, has never been more pertinent. 
Indeed, I know of no time besides the present, except the 
age in which the poetry was written, when Roman po­
etry has had more to say to humanity, or when the condi­
tions of society would allow a deeper, more honest, and 
open appreciation of the subject matter of classical 
Roman poetry. 
It is a commonplace of the classroom that in modern 
art we have a return of "Alexandrianism," and that the 
esoteric nature of such poems as those of Cummings, 
Eliot, Stevens, and Yeats, or paintings like those of 
Willem de Kooning, recall the private approach to art 
employed in the last three centuries before Christ. I 
have no doubt that Apollonius and Lycophron would 
comprehend the method and the manner of modern po­
etry; the later Hellenistic artists, especially the sculptors, 
would understand the problems involved in abstraction, 
whereby the plastic arts are pushed to their very limits. 
Both eras have experienced novelty produced for the 
sake of novelty, art for the sake of art. It is easy to see 
T. S. Eliot, with all his learning, invention, and author­
ity, as the new Callimachus.23 
To be more precise, we need to see that many of t|ie 
characteristics of the years from 1910 to the present are 
very like problems and attitudes prominent in the first 
century B.C. Some of these problems and attitudes are: 
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the widespread sense of futility and despair, of helpless­
ness; the passion for novelty; a yearning to escape; an 
egocentrism or fascination with the self that borders on 
a sentimental self-absorption. Particularly prominent 
then and now is the hatred of war, an attitude to which 
so many patriots have in their turn violently reacted. In 
addition, as in the Hellenistic sculptors' representation 
of the sensual (whether Aphrodite or a drunk old 
woman) or the writers' depiction of the tormented 
(whether Catullus's Ariadne or Vergil's Dido), so in 
recent years have we beheld the utterly candid presen­
tation of human nature. The stage has offered particu­
larly conspicuous examples of this new candor, begin­
ning, we might say, with Ibsen's Hedda Gabler (1890), 
continuing with O'Neill's The Great God Brown (1926), 
and later in Williams's powerful A Streetcar Named 
Desire (1947), Friedrich Diirrenmatt's The Visit 
(1956), and Edward Albee's Who's Afraid of Virginia 
Woolf (1962).24 
We find ourselves today, I venture to suggest, with a 
greater understanding of human nature and a greater 
compassion than have been generally exhibited in any 
other age. The experience of the past sixty years, the age 
of Thomas Mann, Sigmund Freud, Mahatma Gandhi, 
and T. S. Eliot, has made our era particularly receptive 
to the famous line of Terence: Homo sum: humani nil 
a me alienum puto (Heauton Timorumenos 77). And 
we can also assent more knowledgeably than our ances­
tors to Vergil's line: Sunt lacrimae rerum, et mentem 
mortalia tangunt (Aeneid 1. 462). The experience of 
the last sixty years has given many of our writers a 
remarkable understanding of the vagaries of the human 
condition and a sense of tragedy that hitherto were the 
special attributes of observers like Thucydides in the 
late fifth century and Vergil in the late first century B.C. 
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The world of classical Greece, especially the ages of 
Homer and Pericles, has always had a great immediacy 
and pertinence. For this reason Greek studies have al­
ways been more popular, more fashionable, than Latin 
studies; and Greek literature has always seemed to be 
easier to teach than the literature of Rome. It was in 
1939, with the publication of Sir Ronald Syme's The 
Roman Revolution (one of the most illuminating and 
influential studies in the classics completed in this cen­
tury), that the world of Rome, particularly the first cen­
tury B.C., began to be seen as an age remarkably like 
our own. In our own country several pioneering historians 
and literary scholars have complemented Syme's work: 
among others Bernard M. W. Knox, Paul MacKendrick, 
Lawrence Richardson, Jr., and Lily Ross Taylor have 
been Ariadne leading us through the labyrinth of Ro­
man history and literature. With their help we have come 
to a state of revelation, in seeing how very similar to 
our own were the values and problems of the first cen­
tury B.C.25 As was the case for Aeneas when he came to 
the mural in the Temple of Juno that depicted his past 
in the Trojan War, so too have we experienced the shock 
of recognition. 
To be more specific, though we would be wrong to 
attempt to draw exact parallels, we have come to see how 
very maladjusted society was in Italy in the first century 
B.C. The economic depression of the 1930s and the out­
break of World War II resemble similar situations in 
the first century B.C. The people of wealth, privilege, and 
selfishness (or public irresponsibility) were present in 
classical Rome as well as in the Russia of Nicholas II, 
or in Harding's America, or in the Weimar Republic. 
The desire of people of an inferior social and economic 
status to improve their lot, as in the cases of Spartacus 
and his band or some of the followers of Catiline, re­
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sembles a similar longing seen in recent decades in this 
country, in Germany, in India, and in Africa. The "new 
deal" of Caesar Augustus and the "welfare state" that 
he inaugurated bear resemblances to the regimes of 
both Franklin D. Roosevelt and Benito Mussolini. It was 
the perspicacious Syme who first stated in plain lan­
guage the ways and means of Caesar Augustus.26 Not 
that this revelation should spoil our appreciation of the 
Augustan accomplishment. That world was so sick that 
it could not get any worse, and only drastic remedies 
could possibly help. 
For the literary critics, the candid view exercised by 
Syme in 1939 was reinforced by the new approach to 
the criticism of poetry as advocated particularly by 
John Crowe Ransom in his The New Criticism of 1941. 
Soon thereafter, classical scholars began to be interested 
in Greek and Roman poetry as pure poetry, without 
such a strong emphasis as before on the biographical, 
sociological and historical aspects of the poems. 
Of course, it is a coincidence that the year 1940 is a 
pivotal one for classical scholarship, literary criticism, 
and the beginning of the "New York School" of paint­
ing. We might also regard 1940 as a very important one 
for our arch-poet, T. S. Eliot, considering that his play 
The Family Reunion (based on The Oresteia) was pub­
lished in 1939; "East Coker," the second of the Four 
Quartets, appeared in 1940, with the work concluded 
by "Little Gidding" in 1942.27 
What we have here, in the years around 1940, is a 
combination of circumstances that began quite sepa­
rately but became related. The rise of fascism, the con­
tinuing influence of the Dada movement, the widespread 
yearning for a truly original development in art, the 
need for a new approach in literary criticism, all were 
circumstances of the 1930s that, it appears to me, were 
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accentuated and pushed into maturity by the new col­
lapse of Europe in 1939-^10. I would not want to say 
that the war was the only catalyst for these rumbling 
intellectual movements. Certainly, however, Eliot's Four 
Quartets owe not a little to the state of Europe at that 
time; the furor of Germany and her resulting agony are 
at the heart of Doctor Faustus; and the world at war gave 
abstract expressionism a new impetus and a new validity. 
Very like the first century B.C., this century has been a 
time of chaos and flux, for years on end. Yet, out of 
the confusion and the rubble, some remarkable works of 
art have emerged. Whether these works will prove to be 
as significant for their own age and for the future as the 
De Rerum Natura, the Aeneid, or the "Laocoon" re­
mains to be seen. Moreover, our international conflicts 
have not come to a definite conclusion as did the conflicts 
of the first century in 31 B.C. Nor has the new Augustus 
yet appeared. 
Nevertheless, our era is strikingly similar to the ear­
lier Hellenistic Age both in political circumstances and 
in artistic trends. Both eras have been caught up in a 
passionate enthusiasm for artistic novelty and origi­
nality; in both periods there has been an obsessive fas­
cination with the individual personality; both centuries 
have brought men to a deep appreciation—owing to 
intimate experience—of tragic occurrences and tragic de­
velopments. 
Let me illustrate briefly how particularly interesting 
in the 1970s are some works of literature from the 
Golden Age of Rome. I want to point out the modern 
character of these works both in attitude and in per­
tinence, and to suggest that the temper of our times, is 
ideally suited to the proper appreciation of some of 
these Roman works that have not always been well re­
ceived or properly understood. My illustrations will be 
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from the poetry of Horace, Lucretius, and Vergil, but 
not the brilliant and ever appealing Catullus, whose 
novel contributions have been discussed by so many 
critics, notably Kenneth Quinn in his The Catullan Rev­
olution (rev. ed., 1969) . 
Turning first to Horace, whose delicate, subtle, richly 
suggestive, tantalizingly allusive poems now support the 
weight of almost innumerable critical essays and books, 
I will refer only to one poem, the first Ode of the Fourth 
Book: 
Intermissa, Venus, diu 
rursus bella moves? parce, precor, precor. 
"The wars of love . . . spare me Venus, I beg you 
spare me." Published in 13 B.C., when Horace was fifty-
two, the poem and the book it introduces appeared at 
the apogee of the reign of Augustus, the year the Senate 
voted the erection of the Ara Pacis. This poignant un­
sparing poem knows no peace. The poet begs the relent­
less mother of Love {mater saeva Cupidinum) to work 
her ways on a young man, one who (ingenuously) 
wants to be in love. By such a worshipper, Venus will 
find herself richly honored by the Alban Lake in a 
shrine of citron wood. But the poet knows only too well 
that this goddess is "la belle dame sans merci"; and, 
besides, "I grow old . .  . I grow old." 28 
The last two stanzas, the final eight lines of the poem, 
are among the most quiveringly sensual, disarmingly 
poignant lines in all Latin poetry: 
Sed cur heu, Ligurine, cur 
manat rara meas lacrima per genas? 
cur facunda parum decoro 
inter verba cadit lingua silentio? 
nocturnis ego somniis 
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iam captum teneo, iam volucrem sequor 
te per gramina Martii 
campi, te per aquas, dure, volubiles. 
"But, but why, oh why, Ligurinus, does a tear now and 
then slip down my cheek? Why does all my brilliant 
talk suddenly stop, indiscreetly? In my dreams at night 
one moment I hold you fast, in the next I pursue you 
racing over the field of Mars and then, unyielding one, 
through rushing waters." 
In 1911 Lord Dunsany, the translator of the Odes 
for the Everyman's Library edition (1961), refused to 
deal with the last eight lines of the poem saying: "As 
a convinced Unionist and, usually, an admirer of 
Horace, I am very reluctant to prefer Mr. Gladstone to 
him, but I do so on this one occasion, and I follow Mr. 
Gladstone in not translating the unpleasant last lines of 
this ode." 29 We are, for the most part, past that stage; 
and in the modern climate that takes love as love, just as 
it was in antiquity from Sappho to "Longinus," we can 
deal with Horace's poem today honestly and as it de­
serves. 
The poem is typical of the quicksilver mind and art of 
Horace in which several views are always simultaneously 
entertained. Steele Commager's analysis of the poem is 
generally as penetrating and understanding as is his 
treatment of other odes. I do not think, however, that 
Horace for one moment is the conventional miser amator 
in this poem. Commager's own reversal a few lines later 
brings him to the truth when he says, "The overwhelming 
sensuousness of the final image irretrievably banishes not 
only Horace's earlier excuses but the whole atmosphere 
of stylized complaint as well."80 Whether or not this 
poem reflects Horace's own experience has no bearing 
on our appreciation of the poem. But certainly the poem 
153 
can be taken as the perfect expression of loveless man 
at middle age, whether the person be Horace, Gustave 
von Aschenbach (Death in Venice), or Blanche Dubois 
(A Streetcar Named Desire). Horace's poem deals with 
human nature with all the understanding and honesty 
that characterize more recent writing, and I am thinking 
particularly of the work of Conrad Aiken, Edna St. 
Vincent Millay, and Dylan Thomas. The terms posture 
and convention are contemptible ones today. Although 
there is much artifice in the poetry of the Augustan 
period, particularly in the work of Ovid and Tibullus, 
the great writing, full of art, rises above artifice; and 
Horace is one of the great writers.31 His sometimes hu­
morous, sometimes serious, but always accurate de­
lineation of the human condition is just as compelling 
today as it was in the first century B.C. 
Horace's poem begins with a reference to Venus and 
ends with the Field of Mars. Venus and Mars, Love and 
War, Love and Death. Let us move backward in time to 
Lucretius, whose incomparable poem begins with the 
famous invocation to Venus and ends with a description 
of the merciless plague at Athens in 430 B.C. In Lucre-
tius's deep concern with the physical world, in his quest 
for knowledge, in his passion to understand everything, 
and in his scientific humanism, he is one of the most 
modern of ancient authors, though only quite recently 
has his work begun to be understood.32 In Lucretius's 
pursuit and praise of the dynamic and the concrete, of 
action, choice, and commitment, in his zeal for the 
authentic and his denunciation of unauthentic existence, 
he is the most compelling "existentialist" of all the 
classical poets and philosophers.33 
It is his passion for reality and rationalism and the 
honor he pays to the physical world that make Lucretius 
important to the modern reader. It is in Lucretius that 
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we come to feel the distinction between "sensuous" and 
"sensual," because though Lucretius loves the physical 
world, he despises lust.34 In his poet's desire to depict 
Life, he equates Life with Venus herself in his prologue 
(1. 1-49). Thereafter, Lucretius generally avoids myth­
ological analogues in order to keep to the facts of Life. 
His praise of decent marriage is plain (4. 1195-1224). 
But in his love of ratio Lucretius hates furor in any 
form and so despises sensual self-indulgence (4. 1073­
1191). 
As an observer of the phenomena of life, Lucretius is 
unsurpassed. What finer, sweeter observation is there 
than his pertaining to evaporation and the gradual dis­
solution of hard objects: 
denique fluctifrago suspensae in litore vestes 
uvescunt, eaedem dispansae in sole serescunt. 
at neque quo pacto' persederit umor aquai 
visumst nee rursum quo pacto fugerit aestu. 
in parvas igitur partis dispergitur umor 
quas oculi nulla possunt ratione videre. 
quin etiam multis solis redeuntibus annis 
anulus in digito subter tenuatur habendo, 
stilicidi casus lapidem cavat, uncus aratri 
ferreus occulte decrescit vomer in arvis, 
strataque iam vulgi pedibus detrita viarum 
saxea conspicimus; turn portas propter aena 
signa manus dextras ostendunt attenuari 
saepe salutantum tactu praeterque meantum.85 
Such a joy in life! "Wet clothes, the familiar ring grown 
thin, the iron plow in the earth, the hand of the statue 
repeatedly touched by the faithful." The sixteenth cen-. 
tury was not without such appreciations, nor was the 
nineteenth; but the fervent directness of Lucretius fits in 
especially well with the attitudes of the twentieth. If the 
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passage just quoted needs any elucidation at all, I 
should do so with a poem of Richard Wilbur, "Love 
Calls Us to the Things of This World," which has these 
excited lines: 
"Oh, let there be nothing on earth but laundry, 
Nothing but rosy hands in the rising steam 
And clear dances done in the sight of heaven." 36 
Sensuous, but not sensual. Lucretius's poem is anti­
thetical to that part of the modern mood typified by the 
work of Henry Miller. That there are many admirers of 
Henry Miller, but even more of his idiom, cannot be 
denied. But in other writers what appears to be the 
Milleresque spirit is deceptive. The greatest literature of 
recent years, though concerned with the sensual, more 
often than not contains, in fact, a plea for rationalism 
and control.37 The parable is obvious in the story of 
Adrian Leverkiihn and his pursuit of the Hetaera Esmer­
alda. Those who feel that Lady Chatterley's Lover is the 
model for our liberated era should reread the very end 
of the book, Mellors's letter to Constance, and notice 
how Mellors really advocates the temperance and the 
achieving of a beauty in physical love that is supported 
by Lucretius in Book Four of De Rerum Natura. The 
tragedy of the hedonistic Gatsby in F. Scott Fitzgerald's 
famous novel has always been apparent. The wretched­
ness of the flamboyant Scott and Zelda Fitzgerald them­
selves, partially due to their voracious hunt for pleasure, 
has recently been drawn with new clarity by Nancy 
Milford in her biography, Zelda (1970) . 
Lucretius is unflinchingly and relentlessly honest. His 
description of life is perfectly faithful to the facts. There 
is no delusion, no sham in his poem. He depicts the 
cycle of creation and destruction. The description of 
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death in the form of the plague, at the end of the poem, 
is simply a truthful conclusion of Lucretius's "Hymn of 
Life." It is not, however, a discouraging ending; the 
careful reader will realize that the cycle will begin anew 
immediately. On the other hand, it is certainly true that 
one leaves the poem with a sense of humility and an 
appreciation of moderation as the natural principle of 
all human action.38 Man will be foolish; life is tragic; 
but the cycle of life goes on. At the end of Doctor 
Faustus, though we are filled with pity for the unhappy 
Adrian, there is one consoling thought: his music will 
be immortal. Non omnis moriar. 
And so to Vergil, the most Roman of Latin poets, 
whose masterpiece the Aeneid has an extraordinary im­
mediacy for us and our times. It is Vergil's works that 
most fully reflect the turbulence in both art and life of 
the late Hellenistic Age. Thus in the parallels that I have 
worked out between the first century B.C. and the twen­
tieth century A.D., it is Vergil to whom I have been lead­
ing as the most classical of poets, the one that is of con­
stantly universal interest. 
I cannot possibly do justice to Vergil in only these 
concluding pages. The Vergilian bibliography has be­
come impossible for one person to master; but it is note­
worthy that some of the most influential studies have 
appeared in the last ten years: Viktor PoschPs, as trans­
lated into English in 1962 (originally published in 
German in 1950); Brook's Otis's in 1963; Michael Put-
nam's in 1965; and Kenneth Quinn's in 1968.89 As I 
observed earlier, it has been since the publication of 
Syme's Roman Revolution (1939) that we have begun to 
take a searchingly honest view of Augustan Rome and 
to analyze the real, the underlying feelings of the writers 
of that period. Our own disillusionment that began at 
the end of the Second World War has deeply affected 
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our study of the arts. Many critics and scholars can work 
only with the feeling quoted previously of the German 
conscientious objector Hugo Ball: "These humiliating 
times have not succeeded in wresting respect from us." 
It has been in recent years, then, that the melancholy of 
our condition has made many critics acutely sensitive to 
any such pessimism in the works of the Greek and Ro­
man writers. In the face of so much divided public opin­
ion on the issues of our time, we have become deeply con­
scious of, and sensitive to, "the outsider," with the result 
that it has occurred to many of us, I am sure, to write 
supplementary essays for Colin Wilson's famous book 
so as to include such ancient figures as Achilles and 
Aeneas, Euripides, Catullus, Vergil, and Propertius. All 
these figures might well answer the question in Wilson's 
Shavian epigraph, "You feel at home in the world then?" 
with a reply "(from the very depths of his nature): 
No."4 0 
Vergil has three memorable characters who represent 
his poetry at its essence and who have a symbolic value 
for both Vergil's time and ours: Tityrus, Orpheus, and 
Aeneas. Tityrus, whom we see as a benevolent shepherd 
playing a flute at the beginning of the First Eclogue, 
is all of us who, by some virtue or by the grace of 
authority, are spared the more difficult involvements, 
decisions, and agonies of life. He is Lucretius's philoso­
pher standing in his isolated tower as life surges about 
him (De Rerum Natura 2. 1—4); he is Horace in his 
reducta valle {Odes 1. 17. 17); he is Matisse rejoicing 
in life despite life. Tityrus is perfectly aware of the arid 
plain behind him and has seen London Bridge falling 
down; still, today, he sits upon the shore (cf. The 
Waste Land 424-27). 
Orpheus, whose entrancing yet appalling history is 
the end of die Georgics, is Adrian Leverkiihn. Here is the 
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artist, seeing all and suffering everything, who dies in 
torment but whose work transcendently survives.41 Or­
pheus, Adrian—here is Man, in our century, enduring 
more than any character of Kafka and not really under­
standing why he should deserve such punishment. In the 
passionate, innovative, anguished lives of Hart Crane, 
Jackson Pollock, Dylan Thomas, and Virginia Woolf, 
we have had Vergil's Orpheus among us in recent years. 
As after Adrian's death in any asylum, we remember the 
music, so in Orpheus's violent death we remember the 
music that caused Hell itself to stand still (Georgics 
4.481-84)  . 
The Aeneid is the supreme artistic achievement of the 
Hellenistic Age. It embodies the literary and artistic 
ideals and goals of the last three centuries before Christ. 
At the same time, Vergil fulfills his desire, announced 
in the prologue of the third book of the Georgics, to give 
up novelty for the sake of novelty. In the Aeneid Vergil 
does create a classical masterpiece equal to such Greek 
classics as Homer's Iliad, Aeschylus's Oresteia, and 
Sophocles' Theban cycle. Vergil's dream of erecting a 
marble temple—a regular Parthenon—beside the Min­
cius River in Roman Italy (Georgics 3. 12-18)  , before 
which he will parade as a triumphant charioteer, that 
sublime dream, is realized in his epic poem. 
The passionate actions, richly colored backgrounds, 
highly individualized portraits, frustrated love, a world 
in turbulence, a highly charged atmosphere of tragedy— 
all these attributes of Hellenistic art, the same attributes 
of the great art of our time, are found in the Aeneid, 
In the first six books are particularly sharp reflections 
of the artistic climate of Vergil's day, the climate of late 
Hellenistic art. It was a climate that favored highly 
original uses of traditional forms, whether the forms of 
Homer or of Callimachus (from the second of whom 
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Vergil was removed by more than two hundred years). 
The Georgics are a model production of that late Hellen­
istic taste. With the Aeneid, however, Vergil brought 
late Hellenistic art to its highest possible development. 
There is nothing in ancient literature to equal the 
color, the flash, the sustained atmosphere of excitement, 
and the swift but impressive action of the first six books 
of the Aeneid. Here is Vergil's most arresting contribu­
tion to literature, and here Vergil excels the great and 
original contributions made by Catullus in the epyllion 
of poem 64 as well as his own tour de force in the 
Aristaeus epyllion at the end of the Georgics. Vergil's 
narrative art has never been excelled, and subsequent 
European literature owes everything to Vergil. In the 
Aeneid we have the consummate achievement, the ulti­
mate show of originality, the Blue Poles, of the Hellenis­
tic Age. Borrowing everything from the past, as do Mann, 
Joyce, and Eliot, like these writers Vergil goes on to 
achieve the height of originality and to give a new 
direction to art as did Picasso, Matisse, and Jackson 
Pollock. 
Let me, however, recall some of the particularly Hel­
lenistic features of the poem. For one thing, Iopas's 
song of the seasons (1. 740-46) recalls the work of the 
great Alexandrian scientist-poets Aratus and Eratos­
thenes. In Book 2, the Laocoon scene (2. 199-233) 
seems to be based on the famous statue itself, which, 
though possibly not in Rome as yet, Vergil undoubtedly 
knew by reputation. Dido, whose melodramatic back­
ground we hear of in Book 1, is a superbly composite 
figure whose great scenes come in Book 4. She is at 
once Clytemnestra, Medea, and Phaedra from classical 
Greece; but Vergil's rendering of the Tragic Queen, the 
domina infelix, would have been impossible without 
Apollonius's Medea and Catullus's Ariadne (Poem 64). 
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In Book 6 Hellenistic science and philosophy are briefly 
but distinctly acknowledged in Anchises' speech to 
Aeneas describing the workings of the universe. Vergil's 
indebtedness to Lucretius is clear time and time again.42 
Behind all the dramatic action of the first six books 
looms the shadow of the Rome and the Italy that are to be 
(just as in Eliot's Waste Land and the Four Quartets, 
there are always present London and England). This 
great emphasis on City and Society, on the undeniable 
fact of man's membership in a society, is a particular 
contribution of Vergil to late Hellenistic literature; and 
it is this contribution that makes Vergil's Aeneid such 
a substantial bridge between antiquity and modern 
times.43 
Anchises' speech about the universe and the life of the 
soul owes as much to Plato as to Lucretius. The end of 
the Sixth Book, with its depiction of the future glories of 
Rome's Italian past and her Augustan present, leads us 
from the Odyssean first half of the poem to its Iliadic 
denouement. Here Vergil recovers and creates anew (in 
Latin at the end of the Hellenistic Age) the atmosphere 
of Homer's war-torn plain and its proud reckless 
leaders; here anew and just as poignantly is the keening 
of the Trojan Women; here is a man—so much an anti-
hero—as tortured and beleaguered as Orestes but with 
as fixed and determined a purpose as Oedipus. Vergil 
re-creates and infuses with a special Italian vitality the 
sense of tragedy, the presence of tragedy, that charac­
terize Greek classicism. 
It is the character of Aeneas to which we today can 
particularly respond. Whereas there is starkness, and 
thus the two-dimensionality of a vase painting, in sucji 
figures as Achilles, Hector, Oedipus, and Phaedra, there 
is in Aeneas all the complex roundness of a Hellenistic 
statue. We are constantly aware of his many sides and 
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thus find him both as fascinating and as elusive as a 
portrait by Picasso in which the sides of the face are 
presented all at once. The technique of modern fiction 
that combines conversation, the inner thoughts of the 
conversants, and the narrator's analysis, has become a 
familiar one. This achievement of literary three-dimen-
sionality can be seen in the later novels of Henry James, 
certainly in Joyce, and, later, in Virginia Woolf and 
Lawrence Durrell. We watch Aeneas, we hear him 
speak, we learn of his thoughts that are contrary to his 
words, we hear others describe him. Only gradually 
does the whole man appear, and there are surprises in 
his character even at the end of the poem. We never 
really know the complicated Aeneas any more than we 
know anyone else. In addition to this complicated char­
acterization, there is Vergil's method of freely blend­
ing the past with the present—Agamemnon's Greece, 
primitive Italy, and Augustan Rome. There is the poet's 
highly subjective handling of his characters (as Brooks 
Otis has described so well); and there is the complicated 
web of allusions both to literature and to history. This 
depiction of man in his every facet has been one of the 
important innovations in the writing of this century, 
with a most Vergilian example to be seen in John 
Fowles's novel, The French Lieutenant's Woman (1969), 
in which some characters of Victorian England are care­
fully observed from our point of view. 
Of course we would expect the complexity of modern 
life, often nightmarish, to be reflected in contemporary 
art. The presence of the past, our awareness in recent 
years of the whole world, the ubiquitous conflicts among 
cultures, our educational system that will often bring a 
young mind into contact with Cambodia and Nigeria 
before it really has come to grips with, shall we say, 
Rome or Boston—the kaleidoscope that is the modern 
162

world—is to be found, though perhaps on a smaller 
scale, in the world of Vergil. Aeneas the wanderer, com­
mitted to a cause he only gradually understands, forced 
to move from one world to another, hungry for peace 
and rest but unable to find either one, passionate yet 
dutiful, sluggish yet ambitious, eager to please but de­
termined to hold his own—Aeneas is the kind of complex 
man whom the twentieth century has produced in equally 
complex circumstances. Vergil's representation of such a 
multifarious world with all his allusions, his flashbacks, 
his acceptance of contradictions, actually anticipates the 
modern approach in the novel, the film, and in poetry. 
At the end of the epic Aeneas stands over the dead 
body of Turnus, whom he has killed. Turnus is a tragic 
figure, but he is tragic as Pentheus is, not Oedipus. His 
determination to assert himself, to go against the wishes 
of King Latinus himself, is his tragic flaw. A careful 
reading of the three great prophecies in the poem 
(1. 257-96, 6. 756-892, 8. 626-728) shows that Vergil 
did believe in the greater good to be realized from the 
union of Trojans and Latins, and that the death of 
Turnus did not mean the destruction of the world of 
Italy, that world of wilderness combined with pastoral 
order. Moreover, when you step back from the poem 
and consider it as a whole, you see that Aeneas did not 
succumb to the forces of violence and irrationality.44 
The death of Turnus is not a triumph, but a regrettably 
necessary solution.45 
With Aeneas we leave Adrian; in Aeneas we have a 
greater man. Our own anguished and disillusioned 
times, of which Adrian Leverkiihn is especially sym­
bolic, have, however, seen occasionally and with favor a 
pius Aeneas. In addition to several living men there has 
been Celia Coplestone and her search for satisfaction 
in Eliot's The Cocktail Party; there has been the nobly 
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self-effacing Seymour in the tales of J. D. Salinger; 
there has been the old poet Nonno and his song of 
courage in Williams's play Night of the Iguana. To have 
the bravery, the loyalty, the perseverance, the ultimate 
selflessness of Aeneas; the determination to make the 
best of adversity and to unravel the ambiguities all 
around us; to love something and to be zealous in the 
pursuit of that love—many of us have had such aspira­
tions. On the other hand, the breathtaking turbulence 
and challenges of the twentieth century have made us all 
familiar with the similar exasperations, despair, and 
cloudy triumphs of Aeneas. 
It is in the world of art that we find our problems and 
our selves defined. The description, delineation, and 
explication provided by the poets, novelists, sculptors, 
and painters of this century are unusually sensitive and 
exact. For some of the answers, at least, we need only to 
be aware and to look, because much understanding is to 
be found in the world of art. We need not, however, end 
our questioning and our search for clarification in con­
temporary works. There is an equally valid and cogent 
understanding of life in the work of the poets of classical 
Rome. 
1. I am indebted to Mr. David Heimann, of the University 
of Colorado, for help in planning this essay, and to Mr. Fred­
erick Nicklaus, of the Columbia University Press, for his criti­
cism of the completed draft. 
2. The phrase is stimulatingly used by Henry Steele Com­
mager in his The Odes of Horace (New Haven, Conn., 1962) 
as die title of chapter 6. 
3. Thomas Mann, Doctor Faustus: The Life of the German 
Composer Adrian Leverkiihn as Told by a Friend, trans. H. T. 
Lowe-Porter (New York, 1948), p. 512. All subsequent refer­
ences are to this edition. 
4 Ibid., p. 503. 
164

5. Calvin Tomkins and the Editors of Time-Life Books, The 
World of Marcel Duchamp (New York, 1966) p. 55. 
6. Ibid., p. 57. 
7. Ibid., p. 56. 
8. Ibid., p. 39. 
9. For commentary and representative selection of repro­
ductions see David Douglas Duncan, Picasso's Picassos (New 
York, 1961). Picasso initiated the revolution in painting against 
traditional values and the Cult of Beauty as early as 1907 with 
his Les Demoiselles a"Avignon. 
10. Thomas Mann had come to New York earlier, in 1936. 
Bela Bartok the composer came in 1940, as did a large group 
of painters. Concerning the emigre artists, see Bryan Robertson, 
Jackson Pollock (New York,1960), pp. 66-71; Hilton Kramer, 
"30 Years of the New York School," New York Times Maga­
zine, 12 October 1969, p. 28. 
11. Robertson, Jackson Pollock, p. 36. 
12. Henri Dorra, Years of Ferment: The Birth of 20th 
Century Art (Los Angeles, 1965), pp. 9-10. 
13. There are many studies on this subject, but Dorra, Years 
of Ferment, pp. 26-36, presents an excellent summary. 
14. An adequate cultural history of the twentieth century 
may be an impossibility; there are so many threads to be both 
separated and brought together. A step in die right direction is 
Barbara Tuchman's synthesis of the years 1890-1914, The 
Proud Tower: A Portrait of the World before the War (New 
York, 1966). 
15. Of course this movement began earlier, and it has been 
frequently discussed. Flaubert's Mme Bovary (1857), con­
demned at publication, later enjoyed a succes de scandale. 
Only recently have the novels of Charles Dickens come to be 
regarded as the masterpieces of social criticism that they are. 
See Steven Marcus, "Dickens after One Hundred Years," New 
York Times Book Review, 7 June 1970, p. 1. Henry James en­
tered the fray in 1886 with his Princess Casamassima (for the 
best evaluation see Lionel Trilling's essay in The Liberal Imag­
ination, [New York, 1950]), the same year in which Stevenson 
published Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. 
16. Hugh Kenner, The Invisible Poet: T. S. Eliot (New York 
1959), p. 143. 
17. Walter Kerr in a review of Cymbeline, New York Times 
23 August 1970, sec. 2, p. 1. 
18. "Eliot and Vergil: Parallels in the Sixth Aeneid and Four 
Quartets" Vergilius 12 (1966) : 11-20. 
165 
19. Though Joyce's Ulysses appeared in the same year, it is 
not so strikingly original a work of literature as it at first might 
seem. Certainly, the famous "stream-of-consciousness" technique 
can be found to have its antecedents in certain passages in 
such advanced novels as James's The Golden Bowl (1904). 
20. W. Jackson Bate, The Burden of the Past and the English 
Poet (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), p. 47. 
21. Ibid., p. 134. 
22. This phrase was the title of a conference sponsored by 
the American Council of Learned Societies at Indiana Univer­
sity, 22—23 January, 1958. The papers presented there have been 
collected and edited by Whitney J. Oates, From Sophocles to 
Picasso: The Present-day Vitality of the Classical Tradition 
(Bloomington, 1962). 
23. Cf. J. K. Newman's epilogue "Alexandrianism in Modern 
English Poetry" in Augustus and the New Poetry, Collection 
Latomus 88 (Brussels, 1967), pp. 437-54. 
24. Of course the novel, the major art form of our century, 
has lately manifested the same candor, particularly with the 
decline of censorship that began with the publication by Grove 
Press in 1961 of Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer. But the 
novel is an art form to be enjoyed privately. The new candor 
in the theater and in the film is a more conspicuous example of 
the new attitude. 
25. See, for example: L. R. Taylor, Party Politics in the 
Age of Caesar (Berkeley, 1949); Paul MacKendrick, The Mute 
Stones Speak (New York, I960); L. Richardson, Jr., Poetical 
Theory in Republican Rome (New Haven, Conn., 1944) and 
"Furi etAureli, comites Catulli" Classical Philology 58 (1963) : 
93-106; B. M. W. Knox, "The Serpent and the Flame: The 
Imagery of the Second Book of the Aeneid," American Journal 
of Philology 71 (1950): 379-400; Kenneth Quinn, The Catullan 
Revolution (Melbourne, 1969); Victor Poschl, The Art of 
Vergil, trans. G. Seligson (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1962). The debt 
of American scholars to scholars abroad such as the Vergilians 
Poschl, Heinze, Norden, Skutsch, and R. D. Williams is plain, 
but one point of the present essay is to emphasize America as 
the "new Alexandria" or (better in the context of the westward 
movement) the "new Rome." 
26. For two appreciative observations of Syme's radical new 
treatment, see the reviews of W. L. Wannemacher, Classical 
Weekly 34 (1940): 18-19; and A. F. Giles, Classical Review 
54 (1940): 38-41. On the similarity between the first century 
B.C. and the present one, see L. R. Taylor, Party Politics in the 
Age of Caesar, p. 1. 
166

27. It is noteworthy here and pertinent to the latter part of 
the present essay (as related to Vergil's development) that 
Eliot's work became increasingly classical, both in manner and 
in significance. Eliot's movement from the romanticism of 
alleys, rose gardens, and retreats of the alienated individual to 
a classicism that insists on the relation of art to life is well 
traced by Marion Montgomery, T. S. Eliot: An Essay on the 
American Magus (Athens, Ga., 1969), esp. pp. 26-29, 90-97. 
28. T. S. Eliot, "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock," from 
Collected Poems, 1909-1935 (London, 1936), p. 15. 
29. Lord Dunsany and Michael Oakley, trans., The Col­
lected Works of Horace (London, 1961), p. 91. 
30. Commager, The Odes of Horace, p. 294. But even recent 
criticism has its blind spots. It is hard to see how anyone could 
regard these concluding lines as an "amusing surprise-ending" 
as does the usually helpful Gordon Williams, Tradition and 
Originality in Roman Poetry (Oxford, 1968), p. 557. 
31. A corrective is offered by David West's Reading Horace 
(Edinburgh, 1967). His observations on how the Soracte Ode 
"has been destroyed by the critics" (p. 3) and reduced "to a 
shambles" (p. 8) are a little strong since, in fact, one finds 
himself easily forgetting the criticism but never forgetting the 
poem. The most helpful of contemporary critics have been 
Commager, The Odes of Horace, and Eduard Fraenkel, Horace 
(Oxford, 1957). For West's sensible remarks on Odes 4.1 see 
pp. 134-36. 
32. D. E. W. Wormell, "The Personal World of Lucretius," 
in Lucretius, ed. D. R. Dudley (New York, 1965), p. 35, ex­
plains why Lucretius ought to appeal to the modern reader. 
But the fact is that until recently many teachers have not under­
stood Lucretius's art, as made clear by Richard Minadeo, The 
Lyre of Science: Form and Meaning in Lucretius9s "De Rerum 
Natura" (Detroit, 1969), pp. 9-11 and n. 16, p. 114. 
33. For these terms of definition see Maurice Friedman, The 
Worlds of Existentialism: A Critical Reader (New York, 1964), 
pp. 3-4. Once again, however, the classical authors are prac­
tically unacknowledged. In Friedman's group of "Forerunners" 
he includes only Heraclitus. 
34. Cf. Wormell, "The Personal World of Lucretius," p. 57. 
35. C. Bailey, ed., Lucretius, "De Rerum Natura" (Oxford,' 
1947), 11. 305-18. 
36. Things of This World (New York, 1956), p. 5. Wilbur's 
poem is a good parallel for the simple, straightforward passage 
167

from Lucretius. If one wanted to pursue Lucretius's "existen­
tialism" and use deeper modern parallels, of course, he would 
want to refer to the work of Rainer Maria Rilke, particularly to 
Das Stundenbuch (Leipzig, 1905), repr. in vol. 2 of Gesammelte 
Werke (Leipzig, 1930). Rilke's poetry is both "expressionist" 
and "existentialist" and, therefore, closely related to the artistic 
developments of this century; but the present essay, as a mere 
sketch of twentieth-century trends, can only emphasize the more 
obviously influential figures and works. 
37. Most interesting is the change from devotee of Miller to 
stern critic made by Lawrence Durrell as shown in A Private 
Correspondence ed. George Wickes (New York, 1963). Of 
Miller's book Sexus, Durrell writes: "The moral vulgarity of 
so much of it is artistically painful" (p. 265). Of Jack Kerouac 
and other such writers whom Miller admired, Durrell is com­
pelled to say: "They need a week at a French lycee to be taught 
to think and construct" (p. 348). 
38. Minadeo, Lyre of Science, p. 110. 
39. Victor Poschl, The Art of Vergil, trans. G. Seligson 
(Ann Arbor, Mich., 1962); Brooks Otis, Virgil: A Study in 
Civilized Poetry (Oxford, 1963); Michael C. J. Putnam, The 
Poetry of the Aeneid (Cambridge, Mass., 1965); Kenneth 
Quinn, Virgil's Aeneid: A Critical Description (London, 1968). 
40. Colin Wilson, The Outsider (Boston, 1956), p. ii. The 
epigraph is from Bernard Shaw's John Bull's Other Island, Act 
41. Brooks Otis, Virgil: A Study in Civilized Poetry (Ox­
ford, 1963), pp. 190-214, is splendid on this. Cf. my note 
"Vergil's Daedalus," Classical Journal 62 (1967) : 309-11. 
42. Cf. Wormell, "The Personal World of Lucretius," pp. 
64-65, and n. 23, p. 69, in which he cites the earlier researches 
of Bailey and Merrill. 
43. Michael Putnam, Virgil's Pastoral Art: Studies in the 
Eclogues (Princeton, N.J., 1970), has interesting remarks (esp., 
p. 393) to make on the presence of Rome in those poems. Un­
fortunately Putnam allows the same oddly negative interpreta­
tion of the world of Rome to intrude as he showed in his The 
Poetry of the Aeneid, a book that has made a number of other 
critics view the Aeneid as being on a "long day's journey into 
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works are the ultimate extension, as it were, of Syme's presenta­
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45. It would not be appropriate to give here a detailed study 
of the character of Aeneas. Essentially my understanding of 
Aeneas at the end of Book 12 is that of Brooks Otis, Virgil: 
A Study in Civilized Poetry, pp. 380-81. 
by Kenneth M. Abbott 
Epilogue 
These papers reflect some of the widely varied interests 
of the scholar to whom they are dedicated. The topics 
thus may seem to differ widely and the views expressed, 
as was to be expected and indeed welcomed, to diverge 
as well. Still, as was to be hoped for, the affirmations 
that underlie all of them do not really differ. Professor 
Seidlin need hardly defend himself against a suspicion 
of being among the alien corn. The great Greek revival 
in Germany has never struck classicists as lying outside 
the boundaries of their proper interests. That it does lie 
outside the boundaries of professional competence of 
the classicist is quite another matter, and although a 
number of us did read Goethe's Iphigenia in college for 
comparison with Euripides, at least one of us is now 
thankful for a clearer understanding of it. Indeed, far 
more classicists tend to feel that the fourth century is 
more alien than Goethe, and a large number of those in 
the humanities have for some years regarded the twen­
tieth century as a disaster area best avoided by those 
who wished to escape corruption of their taste. Yet all 
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these papers in different ways and not by design have 
demonstrated, in the affirmations that underlie all of 
them, the continuities in spite of the disruptions and the 
essential vitality of the classical tradition. All the papers, 
then, even if illustrating at times what Robert Frost 
called the truths that are in and out of fashion, have as 
their point of reference their firm adherence to the truths 
that men keep coming back to. And they have kept coming 
back to them when they realized, as the English philoso­
pher Austin once said, "Importance isn't important; 
truth is," though few in the United States in the present 
century would venture to state as flatly and as succinctly 
as the director of the Ashmolean Museum recently did, 
that "in this world the useful exists for the sake of the 
useless." 
There is, to be sure, a divergence in conclusion be­
tween the papers of Professor Babcock and Professor 
Rutledge on the one hand and Professor McDonald on 
the other, on the question that has pressed upon all of us 
with increasing urgency, which is to say, the hopes for 
the future of classical learning. That the classics in 
Greek and Latin have survived disasters in the past and 
have risen from the dust there is no dispute. That the 
themes and concerns of the first century B.C. are not 
alien to the twentieth century Professor Rutledge has 
thoroughly shown. Yet Professor McDonald's paper 
challenges the assumption that the current crisis of the 
humanities in general and the classics in particular will 
in its turn pass away. His position is a reasoned one, 
based on his unfailing respect for evidence. He has not 
needed to show at length that we and the whole Western 
world are in an unhappy period; it has seemed to some 
at times in human history that man was little lower 
than the angels, but at other times, and the latter half of 
the twentieth century is one, man has impressively ex­
171 
tended the distance. The culture of the twentieth century 
no longer seems to please more than a few of its cus­
tomers, and one could save a good deal of the paper 
squandered in the law school at Yale on this subject by 
saying that a very great many of more thoughtful men 
would agree in essence with the father in Sabrina Fair, 
"I have lived in the twentieth century . .  . as long as 
any man and longer than most. And I feel I know as 
much about it as the next man . . . The twentieth cen­
tury! I could pick a century blindfolded out of a hat and 
get a better one!" 
No doubt neither Professor McDonald nor any one 
of the rest of us would take quite so dangerous a gamble 
unless the third century and the fourteenth century after 
Christ were removed from the hat—ages that compiled 
an impressive record of human misery, although pos­
sibly not quite so much mindlessness and mendacity as 
are now our daily experience in public discussion. Yet 
the third and fourteenth centuries were followed by the 
fourth and fifteenth centuries, not only by fixed numer­
ical habit but by impressive human endeavor, and the 
men and women of those periods accomplished much and 
rebuilt much. In his thorough examination of that first 
and crucial renaissance to which we owe so much of 
what it preserves for modern man, but which we so often 
regard as merely a period of transmission, Professor 
Heimann does well to remind us of elements of discon­
tinuity in the fourth century, and Professor Rutledge is 
right in urging us to look with more sympathy and under­
standing at our own century. 
Yet it seems hard to deny that the present prospects 
for the humanities are not bright. Professor Babcock has 
done well and worked diligently to try to set within an 
intelligible framework, for which a definition is not yet 
possible, the voices of dissent. If I understand his discus­
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sion, the New Humanism, if it is humanism in any sense 
we can recognize, is a discontinuity of the sharpest kind, 
if indeed it is not a counter culture that loses all meaning 
when it cannot be in opposition. No one, in any event, is 
likely to maintain that some kindly act of providence 
will save us. Yet those human efforts, as in Avianus's 
fable of putting one's shoulder to the wheel of the mired 
cart in collaboration with help from on high, have been 
and are being made. Surely, we can give our aid, remem­
bering, as Heraclitus noted, that "the eyes and the ears 
are untrustworthy witnesses when the soul is barbarous". 
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